Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in the philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science–policy interface.We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest several avenues for further exploration of the role of knowledge brokers in evidence-based policy.

Value transparency is thought to promote trust in scientific expertise. Yet, transparency is a complex concept. I will argue that transparency requirements come with a varying extent of engagement: merely disclosing information, providing information that is publicly accessible, or having additional mechanisms for criticism in place. It is often not clear in which sense transparency requirements are to be understood in the context of trust in expertise. However, each sense can backfire in different ways. Merely talking about transparency in a general sense hides these possible trade-offs. This furthermore shows that requiring transparency may come with a greater regulatory force.