Military service in World War II produced a generation of Democrats. This finding results from an examination of Gallup polls (1945–1953) that probed both party identification and wartime service. The 1944 election afforded soldiers an opportunity to vote for their commander in chief, and they did so by a large margin for Franklin D. Roosevelt—a Democrat. A vote under these circumstances is bound to leave lifelong marks on a cohort in its impressionable years, which was the life stage of many World War II soldiers. Further tests rule out the possibility that the Democratic tendency of soldiers was simply the result of their youthful age, lower socioeconomic status, urban background, union membership, race, or Southern region—all of which predict partisanship. Neither did the return to civilian life erode the Democratic edge of veterans. GI Joe is an unsung hero of what is widely known as the New Deal realignment.

By a measure of religious affiliation used by Gallup polls for nearly a century, the denomination with the largest following in the United States has always turned out to be “None,” ahead of Catholic, Methodist, Baptist, or any other faith. The existence of such a large flock without religious affiliation might be expected for a country with a Constitution guaranteeing freedom of and from religion. The secular portion of the American electorate has always been big enough to wield, potentially at least, political clout. Its partisan attachments have consistently favored the Democratic over the Republican side. What is limiting the electoral clout of the “Nones” today is that nearly half of them profess no partisan affiliation. They are Independents in matters of both church and state.

In 1932, the American electorate was surveyed in a poll that has languished in the archives. The survey was conducted by Houser Associates, a pioneer in market research. It interviewed face-to-face a representative cross section about voter choices and issue attitudes. Although conducted on behalf of the Hoover campaign, the poll was not biased in his favor. The most striking revelation is that the electoral sway of the Depression was quite limited. The government was not seen by most voters as the major culprit or as having been ineffective in alleviating it. Even many FDR voters agreed. Moreover, there was no widespread “doom and gloom” about the future. What loomed larger in 1932 was the issue of Prohibition. The American people overwhelmingly favored repeal. The Democratic stand on it—that is, outright repeal—was a sure electoral winner, given Hoover’s staunch defense of Prohibition.

In the German national election this fall, based on the forecast of the Chancellor Model, the governing coalition will score a resounding victory. Chancellor Angela Merkel enjoys a high approval rating, which puts her at a 2-1 advantage over the challenger, Peer Steinbrück. Although Germany is not a presidential system, where voters elect the chief policymaker, chancellor support has proved to be a strong predictor of vote choice in German national elections. Our forecast model also includes long-term partisanship, which provides a broad base for the governing parties in this election, and length of tenure, which exacts a modest penalty after two terms of office. Since its premiere in 2002, the model has predicted the winner in each election. In a case of perhaps beginner's luck, the 2002 forecast scored a bull's-eye with 47.1%, the exact share of the governing parties; the forecast was posted three months before Election Day. No poll or other model, not even the Election-Day exit polls, came close to this performance; in fact, most people predicted a defeat for Schröder's red-green coalition (Norpoth and Gschwend 2003).

In January of 2012, the Primary Model predicted that Barack Obama would defeat Mitt Romney by a comfortable margin. He did. Obama's popular vote total topped Romney's by more than four million votes. The Primary Model's forecast was by far the earliest of those assembled in the special 2012 PS symposium (45 (4): 614–617). Even so it predicted an Obama victory with greater certainty (almost 90%) than any other one. To put this performance in perspective, note that several models got it wrong in 2012, and hardly any of the other ones picking Obama to win did so with much certainty. Many preelection polls also failed to predict an Obama victory with their final estimate, including the venerable Gallup Poll. How did the Primary Model get it right so far in advance of Election Day 2012?

Democrat Barack Obama is going to defeat Republican Mitt Romney by a comfortable margin in the 2012 presidential election. This forecast comes from a statistical model that uses the primary performance of the candidates and a cycle in presidential elections to predict the presidential vote. In plain English, Obama has history on his side as well as the fact that he was unchallenged in the primaries. The model, called The Primary Model because of its heavy reliance on primaries, covers elections from 1912, the beginning of presidential primaries. Since 1952, however, only the New Hampshire Primary is used; we justify the choice of New Hampshire at some length.

In the 2008 presidential nomination campaigns, both Obama and McCain staked out clear positions on the Iraq war. Exit polls conducted in primary and caucus contests show that the war in Iraq was indeed the key issue of support for the winning contenders. However, it was not agreement with the candidates' positions that drove primary voters into the arms of Obama and McCain; rather, it was concern with the Iraq war. Primary voters treated the war as a valence issue, not as a position issue. Each candidate also won an early contest (the Iowa caucuses for Obama and the New Hampshire primary for McCain) in which concern over the Iraq war was especially strong. Those victories sparked a momentum for both candidates in subsequent contests. As a result, both Obama and McCain owed their respective nominations for president to the combination of war and momentum.

The mid-1960s to mid-1970s was a period of unexpected upheaval, ideological ferment, issue polarization and changing of the guard in the United States no less than in West Germany or other European countries. Nearly everywhere politics moved from an era of tranquillity to an era of confrontation. Established political parties were challenged by the salience of new issues and by new forms of political participation. The ability of parties to govern and, at the same time, to prove responsive under these circumstances was put to a severe test. The hold of parties on the mass electorate appeared to be slipping, and the writing of scenarios for partisan realignment and dealignment turned into a cottage industry.

The October 2008 issue of PS published a symposium of presidential and congressional forecasts made in the summer leading up to the election. This article is an assessment of the accuracy of their models.

The Primary Model predicted that Barack Obama would win a narrow victory with 50.1% of the major-party vote. Obama surpassed that forecast by just a little more than one standard error (2.5). How come the model came as close as it did with a forecast issued as early as January? What prevented it from coming even closer? And what might be done to improve the model?

With another Bush looking weak, many Democrats are feeling good about their prospects in November, even without the dream of a job in the White House for themselves. Yet this time, a Bush won't be on the presidential ballot in November, nor will someone closely affiliated with his administration, such as the vice president. Whatever the Bush legacy may be, the 2008 presidential election shapes up as an open-seat contest. A key predictor of the model used here to forecast the outcome of that contest is the showing of the presidential nominees in primaries (hence the sobriquet Primary Model). Since American elections in November are typically preceded by primary elections earlier in the year, it is natural to inquire whether the voting in presidential primaries is a leading indicator of the vote in the general election? Remarkably so, as it turns out. How the presidential candidates do in primary elections foretells their prospects in the November election with great accuracy.

We apply a dynamic perspective to forecasting votes and seats in British elections. Our vote model captures the swing of the electoral pendulum between the two major parties while using prime ministerial approval as the (sole) short-run predictor of vote choice. The seat model incorporates the inertia of the previous seat distribution while translating votes into seats. The models forecast the lead of one major party over the other (percentage for votes and number for seats). The statistical estimation includes data on British elections since 1945, although the test for cycles (swing of the electoral pendulum) goes as far back as 1832. The vote model picks the winner of every one of the 1945–2005 elections (out-of-sample forecasts) and is rarely off by more than 2 percentage points. The seat model does almost as well, rarely missing the seat lead by more than 25.

For all the signs of a dead heat in the horserace polls and strong hints of a victory for Senator John Kerry in exit polls on Election Day itself, the reelection of George W. Bush proved predictable from a model with a leading indicator available as far back as January. The forecast published in the October 2004 issue of PS was initially posted on January 29, 2004, the day after the New Hampshire Primary. It claimed, with 95% certainty, that President George W. Bush would defeat Democrat John Kerry in November. The forecast, which was not subject to any revision throughout the remainder of the election year, gave Bush 54.7% and Kerry 45.3% of the major-party vote. It missed the actual division of the major-party vote by a little more than one unit of the forecast error (2.7). All in all, a satisfactory performance of the model.

Yogi Berra might have said it: the best predictor of an election is, well, an election. Not a trial-heat conducted by opinion polls, but a real election of voters going to the polls. In the U.S., at least, what is known as a “general” election is preceded by a “primary” election, and that has been the case for presidential contests since 1912. So is the voting in presidential primaries a leading indicator of the vote in November? Remarkably so, as it turns out. How well presidential candidates do in primary elections foretells their prospects in the November election with great accuracy. What is more, the use of primaries as a vote predictor makes it possible to include in the forecast model both the candidate of the incumbent party and the candidate of the party out of the White House. The forecast for 2004 uses candidate vote shares in primaries, not just a win-lose dichotomy as done in the model used to predict the vote in 2000 (Norpoth 2001).

Reports on the state of the horserace and analysis of the candidates' strategies are pervasive themes in news coverage of campaigns. Various explanations have been suggested for the dominance of strategy-oriented news over hard news. The most frequently identified factors are the length of the modern campaign, the built-in conflict between journalists and campaign operatives, and the pressures of the marketplace. This article provides a test of the market hypothesis. Given access to a wide variety of news reports about the presidential campaign during the weeks immediately preceding the 2000 election, we find that voters were drawn to reports on the horserace and strategy. Strategy reports proved especially popular among readers with higher levels of political engagement. In closing, we consider what journalists might do to make stories about the issues more relevant and marketable.