The 8 March 2008 Malaysian general election stunned the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition for it was bereft of the two-third parliamentary majority the coalition traditionally has held since the country obtained political independence in 1957. The electoral outcome was considered a tremendous shock to the BN and Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. Not only did the BN see its share of the popular vote fall to 50.6 per cent, it now also lacked the necessary two-third majority to amend the Malaysian Constitution in Parliament. Indeed, compared with the 2004 general election when the newly appointed Prime Minister Badawi led the BN to its biggest electoral win, the results of the 2008 were shocking.

Do the results of the 2008 general election signify the transformation, albeit transitional, of Malaysia into a two-coalition party system — hence a more “democratic” — wherein the power of the people is truly exercised? Or do the election results simply indicate that things are out of balance? In the Malay dominated politics of Malaysia, what could have caused the sudden shift away from the BN to the opposition, which is composed of the ethnically Chinese-dominated DAP, the multi-ethnic Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), and the religiously inspired PAS? What are the implications for the Malaysian Chinese, who voted overwhelmingly for the opposition? Can the Chinese-based parties, the MCA and the Gerakan, survive into the future?

ELECTION OUTCOME:

2004 VS. 2008

The 2008 election results were all the more startling when compared with the overwhelming and decisively strong BN electoral victory in 2004. A comparison of the breakdown of parliamentary and state seats in 2008 and 2004 (see Table 4.1) will clearly show that all the parties in the BN coalition, even UMNO, lost a sizeable number of parliamentary and state seats in the 2008 vis-à-vis their overwhelming electoral victory in 2004. Although analysts and the Internet political pundits have postulated that the BN would return to power, they were also unanimous in their predictions that the BN votes for the 2008 election would be severely reduced owing to its alienation of the Chinese and Indian voters. This prediction is largely correct as demonstrated by comparing the 2004 and 2008 election results.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

The continuous dominance of the People's Action Party (PAP) in Singaporean politics is a topic that opens up a plethora of discussion and debate. While many observers have marvelled at Singapore's transformation from Third World to First World status in just one generation under the PAP stewardship, they have noted that its economic success was at the cost of limiting political democratization, curtailing freedom of speech and promoting collectivist ideals and consensual politics. There are a few signs that the PAP's consolidation of political power will dissipate in the near future when the forces of globalization and democratization knock at its door. In the 1989 volume of Management of Success, Chan Heng Chee's chapter on the local political system concluded that “the administrative [PAP] state of the 1970s has undergone some modification. The de-politicization of the recent past has been replaced by a re-politicization of the citizenry. Successful mass education, as well as the open economy, can directly contribute to increased political cognition and a sense of personal efficacy. This seems to be the case in Singapore. How will the Singapore political system further develop?”

This chapter seeks to answer Chan's question by uncovering some of the nuances of governance in Singapore, primarily by sorting out the overlapping and mutually reinforcing roles of party, government and state, so as to draw some logical conclusions for PAP's political consolidation in the city-state. Distinctions are made between these political structures to examine the strategies culminating in the PAP's successful legitimization and entrenchment of its authority. A number of questions are raised: how has the PAP, voted into power in 1959, managed to convince the citizenry of its relevance through the years? How have state authorities perpetuated a seemingly paradoxical situation where political control seems to be both tighter and freer at the same time? In short, what strategies has the PAP deployed to consolidate its rule?

The general argument of this chapter is that the PAP has expanded governmental institutions by institutionalizing them as state apparatus to consolidate the interest of the political party in power.

“Connecting” and “distancing” have been two prominent themes permeating the writings on the historical and contemporary developments of the relationship between Southeast Asia and China. As neighbours, the nation-states in Southeast Asia and the giant political entity in the north communicated with each other through a variety of diplomatic overtures, political agitations, and cultural nuances. The people felt a need to connect even in the worst of times when governments were not on the best of terms. “Connecting” is a two-way street. It denotes a deep influence of Chinese presence in the region since the sixteenth century in the areas of trade, culture and politics, as well as Southeast Asia's enduring bewilderment and perplexity about its giant neighbour. The rise of China and the recent influx of Chinese immigrants in the region added to the already influential and considerable presence of China. In the last two decades with the rise of China as an economic powerhouse in the region, Southeast Asia's need to connect with China has become more urgent and necessary as it attempts to reap the benefit from the successful economic modernization in China.

At the same time, however, there were feelings of ambivalence, hesitation and even suspicions on the part of the Southeast Asian states vis-à-vis the rise of a political power which is so little understood or misunderstood. Much of these negative thoughts admittedly were remnants of historical experiences; some are possibly even related to the growing soft and hard power influence of the People's Republic of China. “Distancing”, therefore, refers to the attitudes and policies of these nations’ attempts to maintain their sovereign rights as well as political and cultural autonomy in the midst of a rising empire and regional hegemonic power.

To a large extent, the perpetual tensions between idealist expectation and realist necessity have defined Sino-Southeast Asia relations in the last few decades. How Southeast Asia and China should best deal with one another becomes a central question in this complex relationship.

Despite its often stated aims of promoting economic growth, social progress, and Asian cultural development, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was originally conceptualized as an association of states engaged in post-independence confidence building. In coming together to form an association, the initial members, among which were the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, sought to lay down the basic ground rules of interstate engagement. Those ground rules have continued to define the “ASEAN way”. Among other things they state that each ASEAN member has the right as a sovereign country to carry out its domestic policies free from external interference. This agreement on non-interference marks the overarching principle of ASEAN engagement. Indeed, all ASEAN members are committed to non-confrontation and avoidance of the use of force as a basis for regional cooperation.

This ASEAN stance on non-interference, but also minimal institutionalization, consultation and consensus, non-use of force, and non-confrontation, have characterized the regional association for much of its forty years of existence. However the non-intervention/non-interference principle has come under criticism from the Western world. Western countries have been noticeably vocal against the so-called “soft” ASEAN stance, especially vis-à-vis the issue of promoting human rights and democracy in the region. These criticisms came to a head most recently in October 2007 when the Myanmar military regime cracked down on peaceful demonstrations in Yangon. ASEAN came under criticism for its refusal to suspend Myanmar's regional membership and rejection of proposals of imposing economic sanctions in the country. In remaining firm on its non-confrontational and non-interference policy, ASEAN incurred the displeasure of the European Union (EU), which it had been courting as a trading partner. Some observers have been led to call ASEAN a “talk shop” that is “big on words, but small on action”.

To build up its image as a responsible party in regional and international affairs, the ASEAN member countries seriously renewed their efforts at conceptualizing and instituting an ASEAN Charter. The Charter, which acts as a kind of “constitution” for ASEAN, was eventually signed by the heads of government at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007 in Singapore, and by the end of 2008, has been rectified by all ASEAN countries.

INTRODUCTION

Regional integration in Asia has been on the move, and free trade agreements, a strategy by which integration can be achieved, has a prominent feature in the Asian political economy in the last decade. Indeed, rising regionalism is not just an Asian phenomenon, but a global one. Asian states — big and small, authoritarian or democratic — have only a few alternatives to respond to global challenges and developments brought about rapid changes in the international environment. The idea of the East Asia Community (EAC) — made up of three East Asian countries (Japan, China, South Korea and the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]) — is such a response. In the last decade, efforts to achieve such an integrated community have been going on at an unexpectedly fast pace, pushing the Asian economic and political agenda forward. The East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 2005, of the leaders of 13 East Asian nations in effect set in motion a historic process of a Pan-East Asian community.

The first significant step forward towards making East Asian Community no doubt has been taken. An official proclamation issued in the declaration that followed the summit meeting of Japan and the 10 ASEAN members held in Tokyo in December 2004 indicated serious commitment from the various parties. Commentators were quick to observe that it was the first time that all of the ASEAN leaders had gathered outside the region, which reflected the growing significance of the organization, and the attention given to it by neighbouring big powers. The declaration put the East Asia Community's creation on an official agenda. Now, China and Japan have become two of the more vocal and enthusiastic advocates.

This paper argues that China, given its phenomenal rise, is slated to play an accelerated role in building the future of East Asian Community, and ASEAN–China FTA would be one of the cornerstones in such as a process. It will examine the relationship between China and the EAC, ASEAN and the EAC, and the problems and challenges of the EAC.

The year 2006 witnessed several important events in Singapore, all of which have long-term political and economic significance. First, Singapore held its eleventh general election since independence, the first led by Lee Hsien Loong since becoming Prime Minister in August 2004 and Secretary General of the People's Action Party (PAP). Second, Singapore hosted the Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group, amidst civil society organizations’ protest and negative international press coverage on the Singapore government's refusal to admit a number of activists. Third, the investment of government-linked Temasek in Shin Corp, the family business of Thailand's former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was deposed in a military coup in September, weathered legal problems and continued to develop into a policy lesson in government-business relations for both the countries involved.

Singapore's economy picked up steam in the middle of the year, and experienced a relatively robust growth rate of 7.7 per cent. At the end of the year, the PAP government announced its intention to increase the Goods and Services Tax (GST) by 2 per cent, that is, from 5 to 7 per cent. The century-old Penal Code was given an extensive review and public feedback was sought, but Internet free speech was curtailed with the imposition of stricter regulations. Smoke haze from fires in Indonesia covered most of the country in October, prompting once again an urgent call by ASEAN to help Indonesia fight the forest fires. Two stalwarts of independent Singapore, S. Rajaratnam, Minister for Foreign Affairs (1965–80) and Deputy Prime Minister (1980–85), and Lim Kim San, who was credited with the public housing programme, passed away at the age of 81.

General Election 2006: Entrenching PAP Dominance

Singapore's general elections are awkward events. Despite incessant appeals from the PAP government to Singaporeans to be more engaged and active in public affairs, there are few opportunities for the citizenry to demonstrate their political choices and preferences.

ASEAN–KOREA RELATIONS: PARTNERSHIP IN COMMUNITY BUILDING

The relations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) occupy a somewhat awkward position in the Asia-Pacific foreign relations vis-à-vis ASEAN–Japan and ASEAN–China relations. For the past decades, the focus of the Southeast Asian region has been on Japan, as the latter has been taking the leadership role in the region's economic development through investment and foreign aid. Japanese cultural influences have also been prevalent in almost every corner of Southeast Asia, and the recent surge of Japanese military nationalism, once again, has become a concern for the Southeast Asian governments and citizens. The rise of China in the 1990s quickly propelled Southeast Asian governments and policy- makers to re-examine its potential political, economic, and strategic impacts. Intellectual as well as institutional attention on a rising China and Sino–ASEAN relations has since blossomed into a flourishing enterprise.

In the midst of these regional dynamics, ASEAN–Korea relations seem relatively neglected, and have been relegated to receiving marginal policy attention from Southeast Asian governments. As the ROK is a latecomer in establishing ties with its Southeast Asian neighbours, it needs to catch up with the other two Northeast Asian neighbours in building and improving ASEAN relations. The free trade agreement (FTA) between China and ASEAN has been in effect since July 2004. After signing bilateral trade agreements with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, Japan is seeking an accord with ASEAN. With most of its Asian neighbours already on the FTA bandwagon, the ROK is further pressed to speedily complete its bilateral accord with ASEAN. At present, the ROK has only signed an FTA with one ASEAN country, Singapore.

ASEAN–Korea relations have improved markedly since the 1960s and continue to grow stronger. Given this era of regionalism and globalization, it would not be farfetched to speculate that ASEAN and Korea could share similar fates.

INTRODUCTION

More than two decades ago, a delegation of Australian historians and social scientists led by Professor Wang Gungwu visited universities, centres, and institutes in the People's Republic of China (PRC) to find out more about the state of Southeast Asian Studies in the country. The curiosity was generated by the fact that while academics knew much about the state of Southeast Asian Studies in North America, Europe and Japan, they were less cognizant as to the state of the art in China. Many of the important observations made by these scholars were that Southeast Asian Studies scholarship in China has had the unfortunate experience of neglect and discontinuities in the 1960s and 1970s; and that PRC scholars doing Southeast Asian Studies were predominantly concerned with the problems of Chinese overseas and “the Chinese influence in Southeast Asia”. One member of the delegation, David Marr, made a salient observation that there seemed to be a lack of seriousness in Chinese Southeast Asian Studies scholarship in researching “the autonomous histories of Southeast Asian kingdoms”. His mere suggestion that PRC scholars needed to pay some attention to the subject raised the ire of the host and propelled him into a long, argumentative defence.

In the last twenty-five years, Southeast Asian Studies in China has experienced a sea-change. Since the early 1980s, Southeast Asian Studies in the country developed much more rapidly after the open-door economic reform policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping. Institutes and centres on Southeast Asian Studies have been better financed by governments, staffed with young and energetic scholars trained in the various humanities and social sciences, and have produced many fine and pioneering works. A review of the state of literature in 1987 revealed various positive developments in this regard. By early 2000, Southeast Asian Studies in China has gradually matured into a more coherent academic discipline supported by the state. Much has been achieved and much remained to be done, however. Liao Shaolian, in his recent review of the state of Southeast Asian Studies scholarship in the PRC, listed four problems that need to be solved for the field to go forward. There were: 1. lack of training and knowledge for some researchers; 2. duplication of research; 3. lack of research materials, and 4. limited academic exchanges.

INTRODUCTION

Since Malaysia's independence in 1957, the nation's economy has been doing reasonably well with economic growth averaging 8.7 per cent annually. This trend continued until 1997, when the Asian financial crisis hit almost all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. It is widely recognized that Malaysia's strong economic performance in the 1980s and most of the 1990s had been built on effective economic planning and a relatively efficent civil service (Ho 2002). The country had also enjoyed strong inflows of foreign direct investment in the decade before the Asian financial crisis. In retrospect after the crisis, Malaysian state policies have undergone a number of phases of adjustment — from state expansion to divestment to privatization, from the New Economic Policy to the National Development Policy to the New Vision Policy, from manufacturing to industrialization to the K-economy. These changes were by no means trivial or insignificant, and they have transformed the country's economy to what it is today.

The economic fate of the Malaysian Chinese is invariably linked to external environments (such as the forces of globalization, emergence of China, Taiwan's “Look South Policy” etc.), as well as internal factors, such as pro-Bumiputera (pro-Malay) policies and regulations, aimed at wealth redistribution in the country. With various restrictions and constraints imposed by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)-led Barisan Nasional [National Front] government, Malaysian Chinese businesses have gone through various periods of adaptation and adjustment, submitting memoranda through business associations and political parties, building alliances with Malay bureaucrats and businesses, and lately, responding to the emergence of China as a destination for business expansion.

This chapter will examine the patterns of government economic policies and their impact on Malaysian Chinese business development over the past thirty years. While the government's pro-Bumiputera policies were restrictive toward Chinese economic development, the ethnic Chinese business community responded to these governmental discriminatory actions by making itself more competitive through organizational restructuring, political alliance and patronage, and discerning outsourcing.

Introduction

Since Malaysia's independence in 1957, administrative reform efforts in the country have been moving ahead at a rapid pace. Under Mahathir, such reform efforts have been further reinforced with much conviction as well as rhetoric. His administration picked up the new public management (NPM) paradigm. New civil service reform programmes, together with their problems, emerged in the mid-1990s amidst major political and economic transformations in the country.

When Abdullah Badawi was sworn in as the fifth prime minister of Malaysia in 2003, he inherited the weaknesses and strengths of the reform programmes as well as the intended and unintended consequences of Mahathir's relentless efforts in transforming the country. The perennial issues of performance, efficiency, control, and accountability (or the lack of) in the Malaysian civil service remain major challenges for Abdullah. He has pledged, after the landslide victory of the 11th general election, to take Malaysia towards “excellence, glory, and distinction”. The bureaucracy, as a tool of policy implementation, will be a major player in the process.

This chapter surveys the administrative reform initiatives in Malaysia, focusing, in particular, on developments during the Mahathir administration and the challenges that confront the Abdullah administration. It argues that both internal and external changes have forced the Malaysian administrative apparatus to adjust and respond rapidly in the Mahathir administration, and these forces will remain significant in the Abdullah administration. In addition, Abdullah's pledges to improve bureaucratic efficiency and minimising corruption would prove to be difficult to fulfil if entrenched and stubborn political and bureaucratic resistance are not removed.

Administrative Reforms: Malaysian Style

The Malaysian political elite's approach is consistent with the general belief that administrative reform is a prerequisite for significant growth on the development front. Civil service reforms — broadly defined “an organizational, instrumental, problem-related change of government and the public sector to meet environmental demands and require-ments” — were initiated by the United Malays’ National Organization (UMNO)-dominated Barisan Nasional (BN) government in the past 40 years.