Introduction

European antipoverty policies are monitored to a large extent by means of harmonised household panels in all member states, such as the EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Whereas official poverty rates and related indicators based on EU-SILC are now widely used in national and EU-level policy documents, some of the (presumably) poorest groups (including homeless people and undocumented immigrants) are seriously underrepresented or excluded from such panels, or display disproportionate attrition rates. In the first place, this involves groups that fall outside the sampling frame of the EU-SILC, which (in Belgium) consists of private households drawn from the National Register:

• • collective households (including elderly people in residential homes, people living in institutions or prisons) are therefore excluded despite the presumption that they experience more extreme forms of poverty;

• • other categories are not listed in the National Register (or related registers) at all. This applies to undocumented immigrants, who are presumed to face more severe poverty but whose numbers are unknown.

In addition to groups that ‘by definition’ fall outside the sampling frame, some groups rarely or never stay at their legally registered address and consequently cannot be reached. This includes, for example, rough sleepers and homeless people, as well as travellers and itinerant groups.

Taken together, the aforementioned groups constitute between 2% and 3% of the Belgian population (210,000 to 320,000 people). Estimates vary greatly, particularly of undocumented immigrants. The impact of these groups on the ‘corrected’ rate of poverty in Belgium is difficult to estimate but could lie somewhere between 0.6 and 1.7 percentage points.

These groups are relevant because of their size and, more importantly, their specific living conditions (e.g. travellers) or their extreme poverty (for example, rough sleepers or undocumented immigrants). Considering the more severe living conditions that these groups are facing, their under- or nonrepresentation grows into a crucial problem because policy decisions may be taken based on data that potentially misrepresent or distort the actual situation.

The living conditions of these hidden groups of poor people in Belgium are highly relevant, as we suspect that they not only suffer from a lack of financial resources, but also from inadequate housing, limited access to essential services, mental and physical health problems, and other forms of exclusion.

Every year the European (and Belgian) authorities publish figures concerning poverty and precariousness, based on the EU Surveys of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). These surveys are carried out jointly by the statistical offices of the member states and coordinated by Eurostat. From these, it can be seen that the at-risk-of-poverty rate (AROP) in the EU for the year 2011 was 16.9 percent (European Commission, 2013). The income threshold used to define the AROP rate is set separately for each member state at 60 percent of the median equivalized disposable income in the country, and the EU average is weighted by the population size. Despite widespread consensus on the validity of this AROP rate, new problems arose with the extension of the EU in 2004. In the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, the average standard of living was so low that the 60 percent norm looked unrealistically low. Therefore, two additional poverty criteria were introduced, namely, a material deprivation index (based on a list of necessities) and joblessness at household level. Households meeting any of the three criteria are called “at-risk-of-poverty-and-social-exclusion” (AROPE). Incorporating these criteria, the extended poverty rate for the EU was 24.1 percent in 2011, affecting 119.5 million people (European Commission, 2013). All three criteria are measured by means of EU-SILC. The importance of these indicators is also reflected in the Europe 2020 strategy, which aims (among other targets) to reduce poverty (based on the AROPE criterion) by 20 million individuals.

Apart from the three key indicators discussed above, EU-SILC produces data for a wider set of indicators relating to education, housing, health, etc. (the so-called Laeken indicators), which allow for a multidimensional comparison of poverty and living conditions (see, e.g., European Commission, 2013). Moreover, the survey is a “rotating panel,” with one quarter of the sample being renewed every year. In other words, every household forms part of the sample for between one and three years, which allows limited longitudinal analyses to be performed.

Introduction

According to EU policy documents, lifelong learning serves the following four purposes: enhancing or maintaining employability, promoting personal development, fostering social cohesion and developing active citizenship (European Commission, 2010). It is generally believed that – nowadays and in contrast to the humanistic approach of the Faure report in the 1970s – labour market requirements such as employability account for more than 80% of all learning activities, and lifelong learning is therefore often discussed in terms of ‘human resource development in drag’ (Boshier, 1998; see also Chapter Three). Whereas this may apply to learning as a whole, we find that the reasons for participation in formal adult learning are far more diverse and go beyond vocational aspects, while national systems differ widely with regard to the scope of courses on offer.

This chapter reports on a survey of adult learners participating in formal adult education. A precise definition and full account of the data collection procedure are found in the technical annex to this chapter (see pp 163-9). The survey aimed to collect data from 13,000 adult learners in the 13 European countries/regions involved in the LLL2010 project; however, because of problems with data collection in one country, only 12 countries/regions were included in the comparative analysis. In this chapter we sketch a comparative picture of the profile of these participants in formal adult education. We explore questions such as: Who are these learners? What do national adult education systems offer them? Why do they learn? How responsive are national systems to adults’ learning needs? The main reason for exploring these questions is the fact that adult learning is seen as key to the achievement of a ‘competitive and dynamic knowledge based society’ as stated in the Lisbon goals (see Chapter Three). Increasing overall participation rates is clearly an important concern for policymakers; however, it is also important to work with motivated and satisfied adult learners in order to achieve successful learning outcomes (Keller, 1987). Two key questions are addressed in this chapter. First, we examine differences in reasons for participation by level of the current course and country and consider whether the outcomes confirm some old stereotypes, for example with regard to the greater extrinsic motivation of people with lower qualifications – and the more intrinsic motivation of highly educated learners.

This chapter gives an overview of financial or material support measures for pupils in different countries and their effectiveness in securing equal opportunities for children from economically disadvantaged families. The aim is to identify the various strategies, to make cross-national comparisons, to analyse some critical issues, and to describe examples of good practice which may be transferable to other member states.

In summarising the existing financial/material support measures, a distinction is made between:

• • pre-school education level (nursery schools or daycare centres);

• • the compulsory education level, which lasts for 9 to 12 years (primary and lower (sometimes also upper) secondary education level – see chapter 7);

• • the post-compulsory secondary education level (mostly between the ages of 16 and 19); and

• • higher education.

A description of material and financial support measures

Pre-school level

The degree to which pre-school education is organised at national level varies widely from country to country (see Chapter 6). For this reason, support measures for children of less well-off parents can also vary widely, as can their general applicability. The first question, then, is: which countries have a national system of pre-school education, and is this free? Second, we come to the question of the extent to which special facilities exist for children from disadvantaged families.

As a general rule, it can be said that daycare services (for children aged 0-3 or 4) are not free; parents usually pay a contribution in proportion to their income. Nursery education, by contrast (organised by the Ministries of Education) is usually free, at least in principle. The discussion below is limited to nursery education; an analysis of the financial aspects of daycare would require a separate study.

Non means-tested support

Flanders has a highly developed pre-school education system (from the age of 2½); the law guarantees that this education is free to parents, although it is not compulsory. This means that no enrolment fees are payable and that all school facilities are free in principle. In practice, however, parents’ expenses for transport, school trips, and so on, equal a yearly contribution, expressed in 1998 prices, of approximately 125 Euros per pupil, or 10% of the total educational costs (Van Hooreweghe et al, 1989).

The adoption of specific priorities in the educational policies associated with additional funding arises as a kind of measure for promoting the school success of socially excluded children. In fact, as we will notice further on, the definition of priorities in the distribution or allocation of funds to schools is usually dependent on criteria connected with the proportion of pupils in the school population that are particularly at risk of being excluded from the education system.

Educational priority policies (EPP) can be regarded as a lever for the development of positive discrimination processes designed to support schools or educational areas that are undergoing problems that have a special importance in the regional or national context. These positive discrimination processes can be achieved in practice through actions such as remedial teaching, extra language courses for migrant children, differentiation within the classroom, and so on.

The content of the actions conducted under educational priority policies will not be described in this chapter, because these types of actions are discussed in detail in other chapters (see, for example, Chapters 5, 6, 10 and 13). As far as possible, we will present a typology of measures and actions that are usually associated with the financing mechanisms of educational priority policies.

It must also be stressed that educational priority policies are part of the regular or mainstream education system, and are not related to the alternative routes in education, such as special education.

To summarise, the delimitation of the subject of this chapter – educational priority policy – is based upon three crucial criteria:

• • it is mainly about additional financing mechanisms that allow special support to be provided in specific areas or to specific groups of students with more serious problems of integration in the education system;

• • it implies positive discrimination over other educational areas and groups of students where the school exclusion problems are less serious;

• • finally, the application of this policy takes place in the mainstream education system.

The objectives of educational priority policies

Generally speaking, educational priority policies are based on objectives that are very similar throughout the different countries.

Flanders

Figure A.1, taken from Eurydice Cedefop (1995), reflects the structure of the educational curriculum in Flanders. It is to be noted that the federal state (Belgium) is competent mainly for the legislation relating to compulsory education, which runs on a full-time basis from the age of 6 until 16, and on a part-time basis until the age of 18. The linguistic communities rule all other matters.

Compulsory education thus starts with primary school (from the age of 6 until 12), although participation in nursery school (age 3-6) is virtually generalised. During the spring of 1997, the Flemish Government proposed excluding children aged 2; this decision was heavily contested because of its possible negative consequences on equality of opportunities.

In secondary education, two ‘types’ (traditional and renewed) have coexisted for many years. Since the beginning of the 1990s, a ‘unified structure’ has been imposed, combining elements of both types. Secondary school now starts – at least theoretically – with a comprehensive cycle of two years. Then follows an ‘orientation’ cycle, also of two years, and a ‘determination’ cycle of two (sometimes three) years.

Compared with traditional secondary education, the philosophy behind the reform has been to postpone study orientation decisions until the age of 14 (start of the second cycle), whereas they were made at 12 in the previous period. In reality, the reform seems to have had a rather limited impact. Pupils who have had learning problems in primary school enter secondary education in so-called ‘b classes’, which are supposed to allow them to catch up with their fellows at a later stage.

However, Van de Velde et al (1996a) found that over 95% of starters in ‘b’ classes went on in a ‘b-stream’ where the second year is a preparation for vocational education. This vocational education is generally regarded as the ‘weaker’ stream. Within the ‘a-stream’, students are oriented to a ‘general option’ or a ‘technical option’ from the second year on. Again, all sorts of transitions are allowed for in theory, but according to Van de Velde et al (1996a), the transition from the technical option in the second year to general education in the next cycle is extremely rare (5%).

Have we given up?

The issue of social inequality has been pushed well into the background in the last 15 years, both in the political discourse and in education research. There has been a clear shift of emphasis from equality of opportunity to the performance of the education system, in terms of both efficiency and labour market demands. Have we given up the ideal of achieving greater equality in education?

The observed shift in the policy debate may be linked to the generally weak position of school leavers in the labour market. Mass unemployment hits this group harder than other groups, because they are newcomers and still have to secure their first job. Early school leavers are not the only ones to have problems here: graduates of secondary and higher education also face difficulties.

Many observers interpret these high levels of unemployment as evidence of the inadequate quality of the education system itself. Schools, they argue, do not keep pace with the demands of the labour market, and turn out ‘uneducated’ young people, despite the fact that these students have spent between 10 and 15 years at school.

In addition, there is budgetary pressure to cut costs; this has led to calls for greater efficiency in education, as in other fields. Schools have to become more effective, and this effectiveness is usually measured in terms of average pupil achievement. This approach has obscured the inequality of that achievement among pupils.

Although social inequality – and more particularly social exclusion – has re-emerged as an issue in the European education literature as well as the policy debate (boosted by the shift towards social democracy in several member states), it is still often confined to issues of a ‘lack of education’ on the part of certain groups in preparation for the labour market. Arguably, like all regions in the world, the European Union is challenged by a continuously changing economic and technological environment. Adapting to new markets, new technologies, and new realities implies a need for new productive roles for individuals. Young people who are not prepared for those changes are regarded as being particularly at risk of being excluded in the future.

Reality and ideology

The debate about the democratisation of education has dwindled over the past 20 years, giving way to an increased emphasis on efficiency and output. As a result, the vision of the education system presented has become more narrowly focused on preparation for the labour market, in the hope that more efficient education will solve the problem of youth unemployment and improve national competitiveness.

Very recently, the issue of democratisation has been rediscovered, partly thanks to the surprising results of transnational research. While the general level of education has increased, it has been demonstrated that in most countries inequality in education is passed on unrelentingly from generation to generation (Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993; Erikson and Jonsson, 1996; OECD, 1997b). The attention devoted to social exclusion brings this inequality sharply into focus, although the empirical evidence in this respect is scarce and fragmented. The poorest children often fail, and large numbers of them end up in special education or in ‘second-rate streams’ of secondary education. Halfway through their school careers, they still score extremely poorly in terms of literacy and numeracy. They leave school – if not before the end of compulsory education, then without qualifications – with a damaged self-image, and disillusioned about what society has to offer them. The vicious circle of exclusion is thus perpetuated, because uneducated young people become the first victims of unemployment and poverty, more frequently have to deal with illness, are more likely to become delinquent and, in this age of ‘lifelong learning’, benefit much less from every form of adult education.

The education system thus filters, segregates and reproduces social inequality. This reality is in stark contrast to the expectations of a democratic education system – the dream of equal opportunities and unhindered social mobility.