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Reading these essays gave me a thrill of excitement like the one I felt on hearing that the #MeToo movement had extended even into China. The ideas in this Critical Perspectives collection go much deeper into the nature of and reasons for descriptive representation than I could two decades ago. Anne Phillips (1995) and Melissa Williams (1998), the two pioneers in this field who produced analyses far more thorough than mine, would, I think, agree with me on this. So would Iris Marion Young, whose early challenge in a talk over lunch inspired me to puzzle out my own take on the problem.
Today we face a long-run crisis of democratic legitimacy. Our increasing human interdependence is steadily increasing the numbers of “collective action,” or “free-rider” problems. Those problems in turn require increasing amounts of state coercion. Yet, in part precisely because state coercion is growing, that coercion is becoming less legitimate. As the demand for legitimacy increases and the supply decreases, every ounce of legitimacy becomes more precious.
A long-run response to this crisis requires many changes, including major restructuring to decrease inequality.
A relatively modest, but perhaps practicable and far-reaching, change in our thinking would make recursivity, meaning mutually responsive and iterated communication between representatives and constituents, more central to both the ideals and the practices of the representative system. In the aspirational ideal of recursive representation, representatives in the legislative, administrative, and societal realms engage in ongoing back-and-forth communication with their constituents. That recursivity allows each party to listen and learn, facilitating mutual influence and mutual adjustment. Because the process is more respectful of each citizen than the current system, the outcomes are more likely to reflect citizens’ needs. The resulting coercion should be both more defensible normatively and experienced as more legitimate.
In 1951, when Jean Elshtain was ten, she contracted polio. In the small Colorado town where she grew up (then as now, the population was under 200), the medical system did not understand well how to deal with polio. Her doctors sent her to a hospital, separated her from her parents, withdrew fluid from her spinal cord without anesthetic, and, for fear of contagion, sequestered her in a single room where even the nurse feared contact. Elshtain said later, “The only person I saw during that time was a nurse who [would] … put a meal down and leave a bedpan.” After the nurse hurriedly left the room, this ten-year old girl faced the walls and her condition by herself.
Several important underlying causes of our current polarization in Congress will persist for the foreseeable future. The framers bequeathed us a set of democratic institutions that separate powers more than in almost any other modern industrial democracy, generating veto powers by each of two houses of Congress and a president. We have added an electoral system, based on plurality votes in single-member districts, that gives great power to the individual legislator, making coordination even harder. We eschew systems of compulsory voting that would bring moderate voters into the elections. We pick our candidates through primary elections constructed and timed to bring out the most extreme portion of the electorate. Through the constitutional rulings of our highest court, we have deprived ourselves of the capacity to block out-of-district and out-of-state money aimed at small but close elections at the primary level. Changes to any of these features of the current constitutional system are politically hard to imagine. If we add to this long-standing constitutional and institutional system the current causes of polarization, including two parties that, since the Southern realignment, have become ideologically far more internally consistent and since 1980 have become far more competitive in their potential control of the presidency and Congress, we have a recipe for deadlock.
If polarization is the “new normal,” we must adopt institutions designed for enemies, not friends. Negotiation is such an institution. Negotiation does not require the parties to put aside their enmity to reach for common ground. To the contrary, even enemies can negotiate as long as both can benefit from a deal. In many cases one or both parties in Congress will benefit from stalemate rather than a deal, in which case negotiation is not the answer. But we know from 50 years of work in the field of negotiation in business and international relations that often parties will walk away from a deal that would benefit all sides because either they are not cool-headedly letting their interests dictate their actions or they are unskilled in looking for ways to “expand the pie” by exploiting differences in value between the parties. Or both.
This address advances three ideas. First, political science as a discipline has a mandate to help human beings govern themselves. Second, within this mandate we should be focusing, more than we do now, on creating legitimate coercion. In a world of increasing interdependence we now face an almost infinite number of collective action problems created when something we need or want involves a “free-access good.” We need coercion to solve these collective action problems. The best coercion is normatively legitimate coercion. Democratic theory, however, has focused more on preventing tyranny than on how to legitimate coercion. Finally, our discipline has neglected an important source of legitimate coercion: negotiation to agreement. Recognizing the central role of negotiation in politics would shed a different light on our relatively unexamined democratic commitments to transparency in process and contested elections. This analysis is overall both descriptive and aspirational, arguing that helping human beings to govern themselves has been in the DNA of our profession since its inception.
'Deliberative democracy' is often dismissed as a set of small-scale, academic experiments. This volume seeks to demonstrate how the deliberative ideal can work as a theory of democracy on a larger scale. It provides a new way of thinking about democratic engagement across the spectrum of political action, from towns and villages to nation states, and from local networks to transnational, even global systems. Written by a team of the world's leading deliberative theorists, Deliberative Systems explains the principles of this new approach, which seeks ways of ensuring that a division of deliberative labour in a system nonetheless meets both deliberative and democratic norms. Rather than simply elaborating the theory, the contributors examine the problems of implementation in a real world of competing norms, competing institutions and competing powerful interests. This pioneering book will inspire an exciting new phase of deliberative research, both theoretical and empirical.
Trend plus inaction equals drift. When a trend has external causes and no one can act to intervene, that inaction leads to drift—the unimpeded trajectory of change. Drift in the United States produces the domination of American democracy by business interests. Drift in international decisions produces global warming. Specific institutional designs for government, such as the US separation of powers, can cause the inaction that facilitates drift. More fundamentally, ingrained patterns of thinking can cause inaction. Here I argue that the long and multifaceted resistance tradition in the West contributes to inaction by focusing on stopping, rather than using, coercion.
This response to Andrew Rehfeld's “Representation Rethought” (American Political Science Review 2009) takes up his criticisms of my “Rethinking Representation” (American Political Science Review 2003) to advance a more relational and systematic approach to representation. To this end, it suggests replacing the “trustee” concept of representation with a “selection model” based on the selection and replacement of “gyroscopic” representatives who are both relatively self-reliant in judgment and relatively nonresponsive to sanctions. It explores as well the interaction between representatives’ (and constituents’) perceptions of reality and their normative views of what the representative ought to represent. Building from the concept of surrogate representation and other features of legislative representation, it argues for investigating, both normatively and empirically, not only the characteristics of individual representatives emphasized by Rehfeld's analysis but also the representative–constituent relationship and the larger representative system, including both elected and nonelected representatives, inside and outside the legislature.