25 results
A Regression Discontinuity Design for Studying Divided Government
- Patricia A. Kirkland, Justin H. Phillips
-
- Journal:
- State Politics & Policy Quarterly / Volume 20 / Issue 3 / September 2020
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 01 January 2021, pp. 356-389
- Print publication:
- September 2020
-
- Article
- Export citation
-
The regression discontinuity design (RDD) is a valuable tool for identifying causal effects with observational data. However, applying the traditional electoral RDD to the study of divided government is challenging. Because assignment to treatment in this case is the result of elections to multiple institutions, there is no obvious single forcing variable. Here, we use simulations in which we apply shocks to real-world election results in order to generate two measures of the likelihood of divided government, both of which can be used for causal analysis. The first captures the electoral distance to divided government and can easily be utilized in conjunction with the standard sharp RDD toolkit. The second is a simulated probability of divided government. This measure does not easily fit into a sharp RDD framework, so we develop a probability restricted design (PRD) which relies upon the underlying logic of an RDD. This design incorporates common regression techniques but limits the sample to those observations for which assignment to treatment approaches “as-if random.” To illustrate both of our approaches, we reevaluate the link between divided government and the size of budget deficits.
The Party or the Purse? Unequal Representation in the US Senate
- JEFFREY R. LAX, JUSTIN H. PHILLIPS, ADAM ZELIZER
-
- Journal:
- American Political Science Review / Volume 113 / Issue 4 / November 2019
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 12 July 2019, pp. 917-940
- Print publication:
- November 2019
-
- Article
- Export citation
-
Recent work on US policymaking argues that responsiveness to public opinion is distorted by money, in that the preferences of the rich matter much more than those of lower-income Americans. A second distortion—partisan biases in responsiveness—has been less well studied and is often ignored or downplayed in the literature on affluent influence. We are the first to evaluate, in tandem, these two potential distortions in representation. We do so using 49 Senate roll-call votes from 2001 to 2015. We find that affluent influence is overstated and itself contingent on partisanship—party trumps the purse when senators have to take sides. The poor get what they want more often from Democrats. The rich get what they want more often from Republicans, but only if Republican constituents side with the rich. Thus, partisanship induces, shapes, and constrains affluent influence.
Is self-guided internet-based cognitive behavioural therapy (iCBT) harmful? An individual participant data meta-analysis
- Eirini Karyotaki, Lise Kemmeren, Heleen Riper, Jos Twisk, Adriaan Hoogendoorn, Annet Kleiboer, Adriana Mira, Andrew Mackinnon, Björn Meyer, Cristina Botella, Elizabeth Littlewood, Gerhard Andersson, Helen Christensen, Jan P. Klein, Johanna Schröder, Juana Bretón-López, Justine Scheider, Kathy Griffiths, Louise Farrer, Marcus J. H. Huibers, Rachel Phillips, Simon Gilbody, Steffen Moritz, Thomas Berger, Victor Pop, Viola Spek, Pim Cuijpers
-
- Journal:
- Psychological Medicine / Volume 48 / Issue 15 / November 2018
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 15 March 2018, pp. 2456-2466
-
- Article
-
- You have access Access
- Open access
- HTML
- Export citation
-
Background
Little is known about potential harmful effects as a consequence of self-guided internet-based cognitive behaviour therapy (iCBT), such as symptom deterioration rates. Thus, safety concerns remain and hamper the implementation of self-guided iCBT into clinical practice. We aimed to conduct an individual participant data (IPD) meta-analysis to determine the prevalence of clinically significant deterioration (symptom worsening) in adults with depressive symptoms who received self-guided iCBT compared with control conditions. Several socio-demographic, clinical and study-level variables were tested as potential moderators of deterioration.
MethodsRandomised controlled trials that reported results of self-guided iCBT compared with control conditions in adults with symptoms of depression were selected. Mixed effects models with participants nested within studies were used to examine possible clinically significant deterioration rates.
ResultsThirteen out of 16 eligible trials were included in the present IPD meta-analysis. Of the 3805 participants analysed, 7.2% showed clinically significant deterioration (5.8% and 9.1% of participants in the intervention and control groups, respectively). Participants in self-guided iCBT were less likely to deteriorate (OR 0.62, p < 0.001) compared with control conditions. None of the examined participant- and study-level moderators were significantly associated with deterioration rates.
ConclusionsSelf-guided iCBT has a lower rate of negative outcomes on symptoms than control conditions and could be a first step treatment approach for adult depression as well as an alternative to watchful waiting in general practice.
Contributors
-
- By Mitchell Aboulafia, Frederick Adams, Marilyn McCord Adams, Robert M. Adams, Laird Addis, James W. Allard, David Allison, William P. Alston, Karl Ameriks, C. Anthony Anderson, David Leech Anderson, Lanier Anderson, Roger Ariew, David Armstrong, Denis G. Arnold, E. J. Ashworth, Margaret Atherton, Robin Attfield, Bruce Aune, Edward Wilson Averill, Jody Azzouni, Kent Bach, Andrew Bailey, Lynne Rudder Baker, Thomas R. Baldwin, Jon Barwise, George Bealer, William Bechtel, Lawrence C. Becker, Mark A. Bedau, Ernst Behler, José A. Benardete, Ermanno Bencivenga, Jan Berg, Michael Bergmann, Robert L. Bernasconi, Sven Bernecker, Bernard Berofsky, Rod Bertolet, Charles J. Beyer, Christian Beyer, Joseph Bien, Joseph Bien, Peg Birmingham, Ivan Boh, James Bohman, Daniel Bonevac, Laurence BonJour, William J. Bouwsma, Raymond D. Bradley, Myles Brand, Richard B. Brandt, Michael E. Bratman, Stephen E. Braude, Daniel Breazeale, Angela Breitenbach, Jason Bridges, David O. Brink, Gordon G. Brittan, Justin Broackes, Dan W. Brock, Aaron Bronfman, Jeffrey E. Brower, Bartosz Brozek, Anthony Brueckner, Jeffrey Bub, Lara Buchak, Otavio Bueno, Ann E. Bumpus, Robert W. Burch, John Burgess, Arthur W. Burks, Panayot Butchvarov, Robert E. Butts, Marina Bykova, Patrick Byrne, David Carr, Noël Carroll, Edward S. Casey, Victor Caston, Victor Caston, Albert Casullo, Robert L. Causey, Alan K. L. Chan, Ruth Chang, Deen K. Chatterjee, Andrew Chignell, Roderick M. Chisholm, Kelly J. Clark, E. J. Coffman, Robin Collins, Brian P. Copenhaver, John Corcoran, John Cottingham, Roger Crisp, Frederick J. Crosson, Antonio S. Cua, Phillip D. Cummins, Martin Curd, Adam Cureton, Andrew Cutrofello, Stephen Darwall, Paul Sheldon Davies, Wayne A. Davis, Timothy Joseph Day, Claudio de Almeida, Mario De Caro, Mario De Caro, John Deigh, C. F. Delaney, Daniel C. Dennett, Michael R. DePaul, Michael Detlefsen, Daniel Trent Devereux, Philip E. Devine, John M. Dillon, Martin C. Dillon, Robert DiSalle, Mary Domski, Alan Donagan, Paul Draper, Fred Dretske, Mircea Dumitru, Wilhelm Dupré, Gerald Dworkin, John Earman, Ellery Eells, Catherine Z. Elgin, Berent Enç, Ronald P. Endicott, Edward Erwin, John Etchemendy, C. Stephen Evans, Susan L. Feagin, Solomon Feferman, Richard Feldman, Arthur Fine, Maurice A. Finocchiaro, William FitzPatrick, Richard E. Flathman, Gvozden Flego, Richard Foley, Graeme Forbes, Rainer Forst, Malcolm R. Forster, Daniel Fouke, Patrick Francken, Samuel Freeman, Elizabeth Fricker, Miranda Fricker, Michael Friedman, Michael Fuerstein, Richard A. Fumerton, Alan Gabbey, Pieranna Garavaso, Daniel Garber, Jorge L. A. Garcia, Robert K. Garcia, Don Garrett, Philip Gasper, Gerald Gaus, Berys Gaut, Bernard Gert, Roger F. Gibson, Cody Gilmore, Carl Ginet, Alan H. Goldman, Alvin I. Goldman, Alfonso Gömez-Lobo, Lenn E. Goodman, Robert M. Gordon, Stefan Gosepath, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Daniel W. Graham, George A. Graham, Peter J. Graham, Richard E. Grandy, I. Grattan-Guinness, John Greco, Philip T. Grier, Nicholas Griffin, Nicholas Griffin, David A. Griffiths, Paul J. Griffiths, Stephen R. Grimm, Charles L. Griswold, Charles B. Guignon, Pete A. Y. Gunter, Dimitri Gutas, Gary Gutting, Paul Guyer, Kwame Gyekye, Oscar A. Haac, Raul Hakli, Raul Hakli, Michael Hallett, Edward C. Halper, Jean Hampton, R. James Hankinson, K. R. Hanley, Russell Hardin, Robert M. Harnish, William Harper, David Harrah, Kevin Hart, Ali Hasan, William Hasker, John Haugeland, Roger Hausheer, William Heald, Peter Heath, Richard Heck, John F. Heil, Vincent F. Hendricks, Stephen Hetherington, Francis Heylighen, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Risto Hilpinen, Harold T. Hodes, Joshua Hoffman, Alan Holland, Robert L. Holmes, Richard Holton, Brad W. Hooker, Terence E. Horgan, Tamara Horowitz, Paul Horwich, Vittorio Hösle, Paul Hoβfeld, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder, Anne Hudson, Deal W. Hudson, Carl A. Huffman, David L. Hull, Patricia Huntington, Thomas Hurka, Paul Hurley, Rosalind Hursthouse, Guillermo Hurtado, Ronald E. Hustwit, Sarah Hutton, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Harry A. Ide, David Ingram, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Alfred L. Ivry, Frank Jackson, Dale Jacquette, Joseph Jedwab, Richard Jeffrey, David Alan Johnson, Edward Johnson, Mark D. Jordan, Richard Joyce, Hwa Yol Jung, Robert Hillary Kane, Tomis Kapitan, Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, James A. Keller, Ralph Kennedy, Sergei Khoruzhii, Jaegwon Kim, Yersu Kim, Nathan L. King, Patricia Kitcher, Peter D. Klein, E. D. Klemke, Virginia Klenk, George L. Kline, Christian Klotz, Simo Knuuttila, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Konstantin Kolenda, Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Isaac Kramnick, Richard Kraut, Fred Kroon, Manfred Kuehn, Steven T. Kuhn, Henry E. Kyburg, John Lachs, Jennifer Lackey, Stephen E. Lahey, Andrea Lavazza, Thomas H. Leahey, Joo Heung Lee, Keith Lehrer, Dorothy Leland, Noah M. Lemos, Ernest LePore, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Isaac Levi, Andrew Levine, Alan E. Lewis, Daniel E. Little, Shu-hsien Liu, Shu-hsien Liu, Alan K. L. Chan, Brian Loar, Lawrence B. Lombard, John Longeway, Dominic McIver Lopes, Michael J. Loux, E. J. Lowe, Steven Luper, Eugene C. Luschei, William G. Lycan, David Lyons, David Macarthur, Danielle Macbeth, Scott MacDonald, Jacob L. Mackey, Louis H. Mackey, Penelope Mackie, Edward H. Madden, Penelope Maddy, G. B. Madison, Bernd Magnus, Pekka Mäkelä, Rudolf A. Makkreel, David Manley, William E. Mann (W.E.M.), Vladimir Marchenkov, Peter Markie, Jean-Pierre Marquis, Ausonio Marras, Mike W. Martin, A. P. Martinich, William L. McBride, David McCabe, Storrs McCall, Hugh J. McCann, Robert N. McCauley, John J. McDermott, Sarah McGrath, Ralph McInerny, Daniel J. McKaughan, Thomas McKay, Michael McKinsey, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ernan McMullin, Anthonie Meijers, Jack W. Meiland, William Jason Melanson, Alfred R. Mele, Joseph R. Mendola, Christopher Menzel, Michael J. Meyer, Christian B. Miller, David W. Miller, Peter Millican, Robert N. Minor, Phillip Mitsis, James A. Montmarquet, Michael S. Moore, Tim Moore, Benjamin Morison, Donald R. Morrison, Stephen J. Morse, Paul K. Moser, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, Ian Mueller, James Bernard Murphy, Mark C. Murphy, Steven Nadler, Jan Narveson, Alan Nelson, Jerome Neu, Samuel Newlands, Kai Nielsen, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Carlos G. Noreña, Calvin G. Normore, David Fate Norton, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Donald Nute, David S. Oderberg, Steve Odin, Michael O’Rourke, Willard G. Oxtoby, Heinz Paetzold, George S. Pappas, Anthony J. Parel, Lydia Patton, R. P. Peerenboom, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Adriaan T. Peperzak, Derk Pereboom, Jaroslav Peregrin, Glen Pettigrove, Philip Pettit, Edmund L. Pincoffs, Andrew Pinsent, Robert B. Pippin, Alvin Plantinga, Louis P. Pojman, Richard H. Popkin, John F. Post, Carl J. Posy, William J. Prior, Richard Purtill, Michael Quante, Philip L. Quinn, Philip L. Quinn, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Diana Raffman, Gerard Raulet, Stephen L. Read, Andrews Reath, Andrew Reisner, Nicholas Rescher, Henry S. Richardson, Robert C. Richardson, Thomas Ricketts, Wayne D. Riggs, Mark Roberts, Robert C. Roberts, Luke Robinson, Alexander Rosenberg, Gary Rosenkranz, Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, Adina L. Roskies, William L. Rowe, T. M. Rudavsky, Michael Ruse, Bruce Russell, Lilly-Marlene Russow, Dan Ryder, R. M. Sainsbury, Joseph Salerno, Nathan Salmon, Wesley C. Salmon, Constantine Sandis, David H. Sanford, Marco Santambrogio, David Sapire, Ruth A. Saunders, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Charles Sayward, James P. Scanlan, Richard Schacht, Tamar Schapiro, Frederick F. Schmitt, Jerome B. Schneewind, Calvin O. Schrag, Alan D. Schrift, George F. Schumm, Jean-Loup Seban, David N. Sedley, Kenneth Seeskin, Krister Segerberg, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Dennis M. Senchuk, James F. Sennett, William Lad Sessions, Stewart Shapiro, Tommie Shelby, Donald W. Sherburne, Christopher Shields, Roger A. Shiner, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert K. Shope, Kwong-loi Shun, Wilfried Sieg, A. John Simmons, Robert L. Simon, Marcus G. Singer, Georgette Sinkler, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Matti T. Sintonen, Lawrence Sklar, Brian Skyrms, Robert C. Sleigh, Michael Anthony Slote, Hans Sluga, Barry Smith, Michael Smith, Robin Smith, Robert Sokolowski, Robert C. Solomon, Marta Soniewicka, Philip Soper, Ernest Sosa, Nicholas Southwood, Paul Vincent Spade, T. L. S. Sprigge, Eric O. Springsted, George J. Stack, Rebecca Stangl, Jason Stanley, Florian Steinberger, Sören Stenlund, Christopher Stephens, James P. Sterba, Josef Stern, Matthias Steup, M. A. Stewart, Leopold Stubenberg, Edith Dudley Sulla, Frederick Suppe, Jere Paul Surber, David George Sussman, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Zeno G. Swijtink, Richard Swinburne, Charles C. Taliaferro, Robert B. Talisse, John Tasioulas, Paul Teller, Larry S. Temkin, Mark Textor, H. S. Thayer, Peter Thielke, Alan Thomas, Amie L. Thomasson, Katherine Thomson-Jones, Joshua C. Thurow, Vzalerie Tiberius, Terrence N. Tice, Paul Tidman, Mark C. Timmons, William Tolhurst, James E. Tomberlin, Rosemarie Tong, Lawrence Torcello, Kelly Trogdon, J. D. Trout, Robert E. Tully, Raimo Tuomela, John Turri, Martin M. Tweedale, Thomas Uebel, Jennifer Uleman, James Van Cleve, Harry van der Linden, Peter van Inwagen, Bryan W. Van Norden, René van Woudenberg, Donald Phillip Verene, Samantha Vice, Thomas Vinci, Donald Wayne Viney, Barbara Von Eckardt, Peter B. M. Vranas, Steven J. Wagner, William J. Wainwright, Paul E. Walker, Robert E. Wall, Craig Walton, Douglas Walton, Eric Watkins, Richard A. Watson, Michael V. Wedin, Rudolph H. Weingartner, Paul Weirich, Paul J. Weithman, Carl Wellman, Howard Wettstein, Samuel C. Wheeler, Stephen A. White, Jennifer Whiting, Edward R. Wierenga, Michael Williams, Fred Wilson, W. Kent Wilson, Kenneth P. Winkler, John F. Wippel, Jan Woleński, Allan B. Wolter, Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Rega Wood, W. Jay Wood, Paul Woodruff, Alison Wylie, Gideon Yaffe, Takashi Yagisawa, Yutaka Yamamoto, Keith E. Yandell, Xiaomei Yang, Dean Zimmerman, Günter Zoller, Catherine Zuckert, Michael Zuckert, Jack A. Zupko (J.A.Z.)
- Edited by Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
-
- Book:
- The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
- Published online:
- 05 August 2015
- Print publication:
- 27 April 2015, pp ix-xxx
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
2 - The Roots of Executive Power
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 26-73
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
During his eight years as New Mexico's governor, Gary Johnson competed in the Ironman Triathlon World Championship, won the America's Challenge Gas Balloon Race, played guitar with Van Halen's Sammy Hagar, and helped save a house when massive wildfires struck Los Alamos. Yet, one accomplishment that consistently eluded him was convincing legislators in Santa Fe to pass the items on his legislative agendas. Session after session, many of Gov. Johnson's policy proposals went nowhere. From the start of his administration, Johnson, a Republican with a background in business, openly clashed with a legislature led by Democratic political veterans. When he entered office in 1995, Johnson admitted, “I have no expectations to get anything out of the Legislature. The bottom line is we do have different philosophies.” The governor quickly highlighted these differences by vetoing a record-setting 200 bills passed by legislators, who retaliated by burying the bills that he wanted. By the end of that first year, Republican state senator Skip Vernon observed, “This guy couldn't pass Mother's Day through the Legislature.”
Little changed over the course of Johnson's governorship. The fate of the ambitious policy agenda that he announced in his 2001 State of the State address was emblematic of his frequent frustrations. He began his speech with a call for education vouchers that could be used in private schools. After Republican representative Dan Foley introduced the governor's proposal as HB84, the legislature wasted little time killing it.
4 - Gubernatorial Success
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 103-134
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Many of the chief executives in our study proposed headline-grabbing education reforms in their State of the State addresses. These governors fought hard to move their reforms through the legislature, but not all emerged victorious. Democrat Roy Barnes, for instance, called on Georgia lawmakers to end the practice of “social promotion” in public schools by expanding use of high-stakes standardized testing. Nearly two months to the day after announcing his proposal, Gov. Barnes was seated at a teacher's desk in front of a classroom full of third graders, signing his bill into law. The governor's rapid success occurred despite strong opposition from black lawmakers and civil rights leaders, who feared that minority students would be disproportionately hurt. Republican governor Robert Ehrlich of Maryland also made public education a centerpiece of his State of the State, though he pursued his goals through the budget. Ehrlich called on lawmakers to make record financial investments in the state's primary and secondary schools as well as its colleges and universities. Ultimately, the governor secured much of what he originally asked for, even though he confronted a legislature controlled overwhelmingly by the opposition party. Indeed, his large education investments were initially dismissed by Democratic lawmakers, including an Appropriations Committee member who responded to the governor's proposal by saying, “He's spending money like a drunken sailor, and I apologize to self-respecting drunken sailors out there.”
5 - Do Governors Set the Size of Government?
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 135-156
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
How powerful are governors in negotiations over the size of the state budget? Can chief executives stand up to legislatures when it comes to deciding how much government will tax and spend? A lengthy literature in state politics suggests that the answer to this question is no. Most quantitative studies find that governors are reduced to little more than bystanders when it comes to determining the overall size of the state public sector.
Early empirical work found little to no relationship between the size of the budget and the partisanship of either the governor or the legislature, concluding that elected officials are neutral translators of economic and demographic conditions into policy (Dawson and Robinson 1963; Dye 1966; Hofferbert 1966; Winters 1976). Although more recent work has uncovered a link between party control and state budgeting, this link is conditioned by the types of issues over which the parties divide (Dye 1984; Brown 1995), the way that party control is measured (Smith 1997), and the set of state political institutions (Phillips 2008). Importantly, it only appears that it is the legislature's party that matters. State houses that are controlled by Democrats spend more, whereas Republican-run legislatures are more frugal and conservative. Yet, in all these studies, the party of the governor seems to be irrelevant to models predicting the size of state government. Can a Gov. Mitt Romney be no different than a Gov. Howard Dean? Can capturing the biggest prize in state politics really be irrelevant when it comes to setting the size of state government?
3 - What Do Governors Propose?
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 74-102
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Each January, governors in nearly all states stand before a joint meeting of the legislature and deliver what has become known as a State of the State address. These speeches, like the president's State of the Union address, are highly anticipated and choreographed events. The process of drafting the governor's comments begins weeks in advance, and debate within the administration over the content of the speech is spirited. For the governor, the State of the State not only kicks off the legislative session but is almost always her highest-profile speech of the year. This address receives front-page coverage in state newspapers, serves as the lead story on local news broadcasts, and is sometimes even carried live by local television stations. The State of the State is a crucial opportunity for the governor to speak directly to the lawmakers seated in front of her (whose votes will decide the fate of her legislative agenda) as well as to the voters and party activists who helped put her in office. Simply put, “the most precious rhetorical real estate of the year is a sentence in the State of the State address.”
These speeches are, of course, part political theater. Governors use the State of the State to highlight their political and legislative triumphs from the prior year and to praise the strength and character of their constituents. Like the State of the Union, these speeches are peppered with applause lines designed to bring lawmakers to their feet and to appeal to voters watching from home.
Frontmatter
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp i-vi
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
References
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 261-272
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
8 - Legislative Professionalism and Gubernatorial Power
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 219-249
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
If states are to survive and prosper in our system, they need the tools of effective government. Proposition 1 -a is a giant step toward that goal. California can lead the way.
– B allot argument in favor of California's Proposition 1 -aIn 1966, California voters handily ratified a ballot measure that not only transformed their state's legislature from a citizen house into a professional body but also precipitated a decade of legislative modernization across the country. For California lawmakers, the passage of Proposition 1-a brought about a dramatic lengthening of legislative sessions, an increase in their salary, and the expansion of the legislature's expert staff. These reforms, part of a package proposed by the state's blue-ribbon Constitutional Revision Commission, were not intended merely to make life better for lawmakers. The proponents of the reform saw that it could transform state government more fundamentally. They understood that Proposition 1-a, by enhancing the effectiveness of the legislature, could alter the balance of power between the branches of government. Jesse Unruh, the speaker of the California Assembly and leader of the reform effort, argued that professionalization was needed because it would strengthen the hand of the legislature when it comes to dealing with the governor (Squire 1992).
On the eve of professionalization, however, not everyone was in agreement with Speaker Unruh. The information guide mailed to California voters prior to the 1966 election contained some surprising predictions at odds with our intuition about the effects of professionalization.
List of Figures
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp ix-x
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Contents
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp vii-viii
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Acknowledgments
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp xiii-xvi
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
6 - The Power and Perils of Popularity
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 157-187
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Gov. Kathleen Blanco, whose political standing nose-dived amid her administration's response to Hurricane Katrina, emerged Tuesday from a 17 -day special legislative session with a string of victories on the state budget, business tax breaks, a state wide building code, and a partial takeover of the troubled New Orleans public schools.
– The Times-Picayune, November 23, 2005Despite an all time-low approval rating and a major scandal exploding around him, Republican Gov. Bob Taft appears on the verge of scoring the biggest public policy victory of his nearly 6 and 1/2 years in office.
– Dayton Daily News, June 3, 2005When Louisiana's governor Kathleen Blanco and Ohio's governor Bob Taft won major legislative victories in the face of plummeting polls, it surprised the statehouse journalists who covered them. And, well, it should have. The link between popularity and legislative success is an important part of the lore of American politics, buttressed by systematic studies at the national level and frequent observations in states. Essential to the notion of political capital is the understanding that chief executives can spend it by translating strong public approval into policy persuasion. The converse should also be true: unpopular leaders should be hamstrung by their poll numbers, unable to convince legislators to past he agendas they propose.
1 - One Problem Shared by 50 Governors
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 1-25
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Governors, just like American presidents, face a singular disadvantage when it comes to lawmaking. Though the public may look to governors to lead their states, credit them with any successes, and hold them accountable for most failures, state constitutions strip governors of any direct power to craft legislation. Legislators in this country hold a monopoly over the power to introduce, amend, and pass bills, giving them the ability to write laws and then present them as take-it-or-leave-it offers to America's chief executives. A governor's only formal legislative power is a reactive one – the ability to veto or sign bills that are passed by the other branch – and comes at the end of the lawmaking process.
The dynamics of this relationship can be seen in the logistics of the annual rituals that bring the branches together. When presidents lay out legislative agendas in their State of the Union addresses, they head down Pennsylvania Avenue to do so from the speaker's rostrum before a joint session of Congress. Likewise, governors typically deliver their State of the State speeches to lawmakers in their respective legislatures' lower houses. Governors recognize who the home team is when it comes to playing the legislative game and know that their ability to shape policy depends crucially on the actions of the men and women who serve in the legislative branch. With respect to many of the formal prerogatives of lawmaking, each state's chief executive stands behind even the most junior rank-and-file legislator.
9 - Governors and the Comparative Study of Chief Executives
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 250-260
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
I have suffered a series of problems with regard to the Administration bills which I have drafted. The problems have arisen, I believe, primarily because the legislators selected to sponsor the bills have not been sufficiently informed about the contents of the bills. For instance, Senator Dunn sponsored and introduced the Urban Aid bill without realizing that Elizabeth was the only city which would not receive an increase. Assemblyman Pellechia sponsored and introduced the Uniform State Building Code without knowing that it would preclude his beloved plumbing code. I think we can do something to prevent the embarrassment and hard feelings which result from such situations.
– internal memo from Ark Winkler, Assistant counsel to New Jersey governor Brendan Byrne, March 26, 1974Members of the Legislature have requested that they be forewarned, if possible, of announcement pertaining to major departmental expenditures, new projects, etc…that affect their respective districts.
– Memo from Jeff Ketterson, secretary to the cabinet, administration of Gov. Brendan Byrne, February 1, 1974Internal memos from the first year of New Jersey governor Brendan T. Byrne's administrations how that governors can and do make mistakes, complicating the efforts of observers and scholars to predict executive productivity. The almost comical mistakes noted in the Byrne memos failing to inform key sponsors of potentially embarrassing details contained in the governor's bills and failing to notify lawmakers prior to major budgetary announcements affecting t heir districts – reveal a new governor and his administration struggling to master the informal and often perplexing levers of executive power.
List of Tables
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp xi-xii
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
7 - The Item Veto A Negative or a Positive Power?
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 188-218
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Legislators would say I really need funding for a school in my district. I'd say I absolutely understand it, I know that is important and want to be helpful to you, and as soon as I see my smart growth bill pass, I will turn my full attention to the supplemental budget.
– Maryland governor Parris Glendening, describing t he dynamic that allowed him to leverage his power to line-item capital budget items into support f or his policy programThere are no quid pro quos. Governors just line out things that they want to line out.
– Bill Hauck, deputy chief of staff t o California governor Pete Wilson and chief of staff t o assembly s peakers Willie Brown and Bob Moretti, describing t he item veto as simply a budget-trimming toolIn 1994, Newt Gingrich and his Republican revolutionaries became strange bedfellows with President Bill Clinton, making the line-item veto the first pledged reform in the “Contract with America.” Proponents viewed this reform, which conveys to chief executives the power to nullify individual expenditures in appropriations bills without having to reject the entire bill, as a way to eliminate wasteful spending in the federal budget and “restore fiscal responsibility to an out of control Congress.” Indeed, after he had been granted and exercised this new executive power, President Clinton observed, “I think that having it has made it much easier to control s pending.” Veteran legislative leaders, who felt a stake in defending congressional control over the nation's purse, objected.
Index
- Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego, Justin H. Phillips, Columbia University, New York
-
- Book:
- The Power of American Governors
- Published online:
- 05 November 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 September 2012, pp 273-284
-
- Chapter
- Export citation