Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’s capital from 1763 to 1960, went through significant changes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the country abolished slavery in 1888 and transitioned from an empire to a republic in 1889. Tens of thousands of former slaves poured into the capital. Equal numbers of European immigrants sought out Rio as a site for new economic opportunities. The new federal government invested in both urban removal and urban renewal, pushing poor and working-class people out of the downtown area and into surrounding hillsides and distant suburbs in an effort to improve public health and remake the centre in the image of a European capital. Female prostitution was corralled into a specific zone, and the police closely monitored same-sex public sociability and sexuality. Annual Carnival celebrations became a unique moment in the city’s yearly calendar where residents could play with the rigid social restrictions placed on gender and sexuality. This chapter traces the changes that took place in gender performance and sexual behavior over the course of the twentieth century, as women and queer men expanded their access to public space and Rio’s Carnival became an international site for audacious expressions of licentiousness and eroticism.

It is clear that, under customary international law, the state that has suffered an armed attack must request aid before other states can provide it with that aid in the exercise of collective self-defence. There are a range of factors that need to be considered that do (or, at least, may) have a bearing on the ‘validity’ of that request. This chapter analyses perhaps the most controversial of them: the question of who can issue a collective self-defence request. In so doing, it examines the view that only states can request aid in collective self-defence and, indeed, further asks whether the issuer of the request must be a UN member. The bulk of the chapter then examines how one identifies the de jure government of the state for the specific purpose of issuing a collective self-defence request. A traditional reference point for the recognition of governments in international law generally has been the effective control of territory. However, this is of minimal – if any – importance to the identification of the entity that can request aid in collective self-defence. Instead, other factors, such as democratic and constitutional legitimacy, are of greater importance.

Self-defence is a crucial feature of international law, amounting as it does to the only lawful basis for the unilateral use of military force in the modern world.1 It is not surprising, then, that a vast literature has developed regarding the nature and parameters of the exercise of self-defence in international law.2 However, there has been relatively little consideration of the specific concept of collective self-defence. This is true not just in scholarship3 but also in terms of the way that states discuss or debate self-defence in a general sense.4 Marginalisation of the topic in this way perhaps has been due to the common perception that collective self-defence was effectively ‘invented’ by the drafters of the United Nations (UN) Charter,5 and the view that states have exercised it only very rarely since.6

The Introduction outlines the nature of the study and the rationale for undertaking it. It argues that collective self-defence remains under-theorised (and collective self-defence practice under-analysed) despite the increased invocation of it by states in recent years. The Introduction also discusses the book’s methodology, particularly in relation to its focus on state practice and opinio juris as crucial ‘raw materials’ for legal standards in this context. The key facts and findings of the famous 1986 Nicaragua decision of the International Court of Justice are then summarised, because the case is referred to throughout the book. The Introduction concludes with a summary of the structure of the book.

This chapter seeks to delineate the notion of collective self-defence in international law. While the core concept can be stated relatively easily, there has been persistent controversy regarding the nature of collective self-defence. It is possible to identify no fewer than five different ‘conceptions’ of collective self-defence that have been advanced in scholarship. These conceptions are all explored in detail. The chapter also examines the question of whether collective self-defence is indeed an ‘inherent right’, as Article 51 of the United Nations Charter proclaims. The status of collective self-defence as a right (and, moreover, as a right that is inherent) has been contested. As such, its status requires theorisation based on the analysis of the views of states. Finally, the chapter considers the modality of collective self-defence: in other words, it asks what ‘qualifies’ as an act of collective self-defence. In examining this question, there is particular focus on whether the provision of weapons and logistical support in support of an attacked state amounts to the exercise of collective self-defence.

This chapter examines how collective self-defence request needs to be issued. There are a number of unanswered questions about the necessary manner and form of such requests. First, the chapter analyses whether ‘open-ended’ requests will suffice, or whether they must be targeted at a particular state (or states). It then considers whether collective self-defence requests must take any specific form and, in particular, queries whether they can be inferred. Similarly, it examines whether a collective self-defence request must even be made publicly (or, at least, be publicised), or whether covert requests can suffice. Finally, the chapter engages with two questions concerning the timing of the request. These are whether the request must be made before the collective self-defence action begins, and whether the existence of a collective self-defence treaty arrangement between the relevant states suffices as a ‘request’ (or whether an ad hoc and specific request is still required in addition).

In the 1986 Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice famously took the view that two additional criteria exist in customary international law for the exercise of collective self-defence, alongside the criteria that it shares with individual self-defence. These purported additional criteria have been commonly repeated in scholarship since. First, it is said that the state that has been attacked must ‘declare’ that it has been so attacked. Second, it must ‘request’ aid in its defence. This chapter sets out the manner in which the Court identified these requirements and whether it considered them to be legally determinative or merely evidentiary. It then goes on to examine state practice/opinio juris, to test whether the requirements indeed can be identified as rules of customary international law. It is argued that the first of those asserted requirements and declaration, in fact, has no legal basis. In contrast, it is argued that the issuance of a request is, as the Court indicated, a binding requirement for the exercise of collective self-defence.

This chapter examines the history and development of collective self-defence. It is argued that – contrary to the common assertion that the concept was created in 1945 – its roots can be seen throughout history. The chapter maps that history, starting briefly with the alliances of ancient Greece and moving through to the writings of the seventeenth century, when recognisable characteristics of the modern concept truly began to emerge. It then focuses on the developments in the interwar years and during the Second World War, which saw an increase in the number of collective defence treaties. This period concluded with the emergence of a collective defence system in the Americas, which was extremely influential for the drafting of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The chapter concludes by analysing the drafting process, and the changes to collective self-defence that the adoption of the Charter brought about. It is argued that Article 51 ‘conjoined’ individual and collective self-defence in a way that had little basis in the previous historical development of collective defence arrangements under international law. This has had significant implications for how collective self-defence is understood today.

This chapter considers the criteria for collective self-defence that are shared with individual self-defence. It is uncontentious to say that the same criteria that apply to individual self-defence – armed attack, necessity, proportionality, the reporting requirement, and the ‘until clause’ – also apply to collective self-defence. Indeed, this is an inevitable consequence of the way the concepts appear in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The nature and application of these criteria in the context of individual self-defence have been examined at great length in the existing literature. This chapter therefore does not provide in-depth analysis of all of their aspects. That said, it does provide a brief overview of these requirements to ensure that this book presents a comprehensive picture of the operation of collective self-defence today. The chapter’s main focus, though, is to examine how the operation of these criteria works specifically in the context of collective self-defence actions, which is something that has been largely overlooked in scholarship.