Introduction

Strategy may be complex and difficult. And yet, perhaps with the aid of theory, experience and ideally military genius, the strategist can, indeed must, utilise the military instrument in the service of policy. This can be done in a number of ways. Highlighting the fact that military power is a far more flexible instrument than many assume, this chapter explores the various uses of force in the modern world. These will be divided into six categories: defence, deterrence, compellence, posturing, offence and miscellaneous. It should of course be noted that the actual use of force will often simultaneously cover a number of these categories. It is important to remember that the categorisation of anything rarely reflects the complexities of reality in an absolute sense.

Often, discussion is limited to the first four categories. The exclusion of the fifth and sixth categories may reflect a philosophical and/or ethical shift away from regarding military force as a useful, flexible or legitimate instrument of policy. However, the conflict-ridden international security environment suggests that this is clearly a naive philosophical approach. Take, for example, the recent history of Afghanistan and Iraq. Regardless of the subsequent challenges encountered by the counterinsurgency campaigns in these two wars, it is undeniable that the offensive use of military power removed the Taliban and Ba'athist regimes.

Having discussed the use of force in general conceptual terms, the chapter will conclude by analysing the current and future state of strategy. In particular, the work will explore the interplay amongst various developments in the strategic landscape: military transformation, irregular warfare, nuclear strategy, cyberwar, targeted killing and military ethics.

The use of force

Defence

Generally speaking, defending the state/community is the primary function of military force. The defensive use of force has two functions: to repel an attack and to limit the damage caused should an attack occur. What actually constitutes an act of self-defence has become something of a debate since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the Bush administration's response to it.

As the preceding chapters have shown, the development of air and space power has been swift. In little more than a century of heavier-than-air flight, aircraft have moved from being capable of spending little more than five minutes in the air to possessing the ability to spend more than a day aloft; the speeds which military aircraft can attain have gone from under 100 miles per hour (160 kilometres per hour) to over 2,000 mph (3,218 kph) and the loads they are capable of carrying have increased dramatically. By the end of the Vietnam War, it was possible for fighter aircraft to routinely engage enemy aircraft with missiles (although the success rate of such weapons in Vietnam was low), while attack aircraft with precision-guided munitions (PGMs) could use one weapon to destroy a target when it might have previously taken several aircraft using over a dozen bombs to achieve the same result. Between the early 1900s and 1989, air and space power had a clear role, directed against potentially hostile nation states or alliances, with regular diversions into ‘small wars’. It became something of a mantra, particularly after Vietnam, to note that high-speed fighter-bombers and attack aircraft, designed to fight a possible Third World War, were not best-suited for this sort of ‘brushfire’ war, not least since their speed and relative lack endurance over a target area meant that it was difficult for aircrew to locate targets. Although a prominent and repeated charge – and not without reason, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, prior to the development of targeting pods and PGMs, as well as technology which allowed ground troops to accurately direct aircrews’ attention to the target which needed to be struck – the fact that air transport and reconnaissance were critical contributions to such campaigns often went unremarked. The constant fear of a major state-on-state war, notably between NATO and the USSR, meant that the development of high-technology fighter aircraft largely went unquestioned.

Introduction

Warfare on land has been pivotal to military outcomes throughout history. This is because human beings live on land; therefore, the capacity to seize and control territory often carries with it decisive political consequences. As the strategist Colin Gray has noted, ‘the inherent strength of land warfare is that it carries the promise of achieving decision’.

The next three chapters explore the key ideas, concepts, principles and debates associated with conventional, high-intensity land warfare in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. At the heart of these chapters lies the idea of the so-called ‘modern system’ of land warfare. During the twentieth century, armies faced a range of problems resulting from the interaction between various forces for change, including the effects of increasing firepower and the problem of moving, feeding and supplying larger armies. Incrementally, armies found potential solutions for these problems by manipulating some of the core areas of continuity in land warfare, not least the nature of the land environment itself and the basic characteristics of armies. These solutions created a dominant set of themes in the conduct of land warfare: dispersal, combined arms, fire-and-manoeuvre, depth and close co-operation with air and maritime forces (joint operations). Collectively, these themes constitute modern-system land warfare.

As with the later parts of this book on maritime and air warfare, our discussion of land warfare begins with an exploration of some of the key concepts that lie at the heart of the subject. This provides an essential background to the development of the modern system of land warfare both in terms of explaining the problems facing armies at the beginning of the twentieth century but also how important continuities, such as the effect of terrain and the flexibility of armies, have shaped potential solutions. Building on the concepts explored in this chapter, chapter 5 then explores how and why the modern system evolved during the twentieth century. Whereas the modern system is essentially an evolutionary and adaptive development, more recent debates have often focused on the potential for revolutionary changes in the conduct of land warfare.

The current era of irregular warfare begins with the end of the Second World War and decolonisation or, rather, had its genesis during the Second World War. American President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill could not possibly have known how truly strong and problematic the future whirlwind would be when they issued the Atlantic Charter in August 1940. Although most of its points appeared innocuous, the third point – the right of all peoples to self-determination – would cause the greatest difficulties. In particular, the leaders of socialist or nationalist movements in colonial territories interpreted the Atlantic Charter as the basis for declarations of independence once the war was over. The most famous example occurred in French Indochina in September 1945, where Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam independent using language borrowed from the US Declaration of Independence.

The previous chapter suggested that there has been a considerable degree of continuity in thinking about naval warfare; concepts and principles articulated in the nineteenth century continue to be employed in the twenty-first. Over the same period there have been many obvious changes in the conduct of naval warfare, particularly in the tactics adopted and in the technology used. No navy today maintains a fleet of wooden sailing ships similar to those employed by Admiral Nelson in 1805 nor do any possess pre-dreadnought battleships akin to those used to good effect by Admiral Togo a century later. No modern commander would deploy their fleet in battle in the same way as did either Nelson or Togo and to do so would be to invite disaster. It is legitimate therefore to question whether principles articulated in Togo's era, which were often derived from an examination of Nelson's, are still useful today when platforms, weapons and sensors have changed so much and where the general strategic context has been transformed. This chapter will address that question.

Unfortunately there is not the space here to provide a detailed history of the evolution of naval warfare over the past century, still less can we examine the very rich history before this period. The reader is fortunate that there are numerous good books that already do precisely this and some of these are introduced in the ‘Further reading’ guide at the end of this chapter. The aim here is not to present a comprehensive history but rather to illustrate some of the ways in which naval warfare has changed over time, and also some of the continuities. There will be a particular focus on the past 150 years, roughly the time at which steam, steel and shellfire replaced the ‘wooden ships and iron men’ of Nelson's era.

Introduction

In this final chapter on land warfare, we turn our attention to the future. The two preceding chapters have highlighted the evolutionary underpinnings of the ‘modern system’ approach to land warfare. Can we assume similarly that future land warfare will look much like that of the past? This is clearly a crucial question for land forces around the world. Governments do not have the luxury of perpetual analysis: given the time taken to generate effective military power, choices have to be made now about the sorts of land forces that will be required for the future – their size, structure, equipment, training and doctrine. But these choices carry risks: while we need to know that we are preparing for the right future, history suggests, as the previous chapter has illustrated, that we often do not get the sorts of wars that we expect.

Sadly, for those tasked with generating future land power there is no consensus on what the future of land warfare holds. This chapter looks at the issue of future land warfare through the lens of three of the key contending schools of thought on the issue: the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA); new wars; and hybrid warfare. Each takes the view that the character of warfare is changing; each has implications for the kind of land forces required to fight it; but each is also the subject of important critiques.

The Revolution in Military Affairs

The Gulf War of 1991 cast a long shadow over subsequent debates on the character and future of land warfare. The then US secretary of defense, Richard (‘Dick’) Cheney, argued that the Gulf War ‘demonstrated dramatically the new possibilities of what has been called the “military–technical revolution in warfare”’.

Chapters 7 and 8 argued that despite continuing change at the tactical level of naval warfare there has been a considerable degree of continuity in the roles that navies fulfil. It is not necessarily true that this will always remain the case. It is possible that naval roles might change to reflect political, economic or technological developments. Even if existing roles do remain, navies might be forced to change their forms in order to meet future challenges. Thus, new roles may evolve (and old ones disappear) in the face of new challenges while alternative means may be needed in order to sustain those roles that endure. This chapter will examine these issues and will discuss the nature of naval warfare today and into the future.

Naval warfare: changing roles?

Traditional interpretations suggest that naval warfare revolves around the use or denial of the use of the sea for military or economic purposes.

Understanding modern irregular warfare through the lens of the past

The study of irregular warfare historically presents a number of unique challenges. Although the history of irregular warfare, in the form of bandit raids or other unconventional tactics, arguably existed long before more organised, conventional warfare by fielded armies, there are relatively few memoirs, much less theories of violence, by those conducting irregular warfare against militarily superior opponents prior to the nineteenth century. Classic texts on ancient warfare from across the globe, including Maurice's Strategikon (Byzantium), Sun Tzu's The Art of War (China) and Kautilya's Arthasastra (India), addressed unconventional methods of fighting such as raids, ambushes, stratagems and ruses as a method of gaining an advantage over an opponent prior to or during battle. Other ancient texts, including epic poems, theological texts and historical narratives, suggest that irregular tactics were used to overcome formidable defences. The most famous example remains the Trojan Horse in Homer's Iliad, but far more accounts describe a common subterfuge: taking walled cities by using traitors inside to open gates for armies waiting outside. In addition, some texts discuss the specific fighting qualities, or what scholars now call ‘stra-tegic culture’ or ‘way of war’, of irregular or barbarian opponents. Indeed, some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that civilisations have distinct styles of fighting, either as a result of geography or as an explanation for their political and economic success.

Introduction

Now that we have identified the need to develop an analytical approach to the subject, we must begin our exploration with some key definitions of strategy and its various levels. Having illuminated the essence of strategy, this chapter will analyse the various factors that make it difficult. In particular, the chapter will explore strategy's multidimensional nature; disharmony amongst the levels; the paradoxical logic; nature of war; friction; human participation; and war's polymorphous character. It is hoped that by the end of this chapter the reader will have a better understanding of the challenges involved in strategy, and how these can be dealt with so that the use of military force can best serve policy objectives.

Strategy defined

Extant strategic literature contains various definitions of strategy. For Clausewitz, it can be understood as ‘the use of engagements for the object of the war.’ Similarly, Gray defines strategy as ‘the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy’, whereas Andre Beaufre highlights the dynamic interaction between belligerents: ‘the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute’. This work defines strategy as the process that converts military power into policy effect (see Box 2.1). Importantly, this definition identifies the key relationship in strategy: that between policy and the military instrument. Furthermore, it acknowledges strategy as process. The latter is recognition of that fact that strategy is not tangible, but is dynamic and does have manifest effect.</p

As noted, the core relationship within strategy is that between military force and the policy objective. Gray describes this relationship as a bridge that links the military and political worlds. Alternatively, Eliot Cohen described this relationship as an ‘unequal dialogue’ (see Figure 2.1). In this sense, we can regard strategy as a process by which military force creates political effect. Although the supremacy of policy is established and well understood, and thereby military force must serve policy, it is not simply a case of the political leadership demanding what it requires from the military instrument.

This chapter examines concepts and theories associated with naval warfare. It begins with a discussion of the nature of the maritime operating environment, and the notion that navies have particular attributes that they derive from this. It then introduces traditional theories of maritime strategy, focusing first on the dominant ‘Anglo-American’ tradition before examining some alternative approaches. The discussion here sets the context for the examination of the conduct of naval warfare over the past century, in chapter 8, and the analysis of current practice and future possibilities in chapter 9.

The particular characteristics of the sea and of naval forces, discussed below, have led to the development of a series of concepts and principles peculiar to naval warfare. In order to understand naval warfare and, in particular, to understand the thought processes that lie behind much modern naval activity, it is necessary to be conversant with distinctly naval concepts and principles. This, in turn, requires familiarity with the work of the traditional maritime stra-tegists who first articulated and popularised such concepts. The impact of the most notable of these, Alfred Thayer Mahan, was reflected in the 1940s by the former US secretary of war, Henry Stimson, when he complained that the Navy Department frequently ‘seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet and the United States Navy the only true Church’. While this may not now be a fair reflection of Mahan's impact on the US Navy it is true to say that the concepts that he and others advanced have continued to influence naval thought and practice through to the present day.

Introduction: defining weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)

While most of the chapters in this book focus chiefly on how warfare is conducted, and only address weapons within that context, any discussion of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMDs) must have a somewhat different focus. This is because these weapons have been placed in a special category, marking the weapons themselves as being extraordinary and making their use uniquely controversial. Indeed, the term conventional weapons, which generally is applied to virtually all non-weapons of mass destruction, is telling, as it implies that such weapons are ‘normal’ and thus usable, unlike their WMDs counterparts. This focus on the weapon itself is unusual, and is in substantial contrast to the attitude towards most conventional weapons, which generally are treated more like various tools in a tool chest, some of which are appropriate for particular jobs but not for others, but all of which are ethically acceptable in a general sense, even if many of them ethically cannot be used in every situation.

Any reasonable recounting of the overall WMDs ‘story’, therefore, must address why these weapons have not been used in various situations where they would have promised military advantage. This is critical because, in general, one should expect that a weapon which is likely to yield military advantage will be used in warfare, and that its use will not be limited or prohibited by international agreement. Indeed, the very notion of prohibition seems slightly bizarre in regard to most conventional weapons.

The evolution of control of the air

Once the First World War began, it became clear that those commentators who had argued that fighting between aircraft would occur had been correct. Denying the enemy the ability to conduct aerial reconnaissance missions was desirable, and by the end of 1914, all the air services engaged in the war in France and Belgium had begun to realise this. The difficulty was how to achieve this. Aircraft were not routinely fitted with weapons, so pilots and observers armed themselves with pistols and rifles in an improvised attempt to bring down enemy aircraft. This proved to be ineffective, since aiming weapons from the cockpit of an aircraft was not an easy task.

The ability of aircraft to manoeuvre in three dimensions at some speed complicated aiming. The need to take account of the speed and angle through which the opposing aircraft was moving when engaged required whoever was firing the weapon in the aircraft to take account of such issues as deflection of aim and making necessary adjustments as the enemy aircraft manoeuvred.

Introduction

In order to achieve victory in warfare, most political leaders have relied historically upon their military leaders to use their various armed forces – armies, navies and, later, air forces – as effectively and efficiently as possible. As has been discussed in preceding chapters, the destruction of enough of an adversary's armed forces or core capacity in a decisive operational campaign is the traditional manner of convincing political leaders to seek an end to hostilities. US or other Western-led offensive campaigns throughout the last decade are textbook examples of how to fight a joint military campaign effectively and economically and include: Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001), Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq, 2003) and Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011). The initial phases of all three operations made use of available and in some cases highly limited, land, sea, air, space, cyberspace and special operations capabilities in an integrated manner to unbalance and unhinge Taliban, Iraqi and Libyan forces. The net result of all three joint applications of military power was the toppling of the various regimes in all three cases in a matter of days or months at a minimal cost in friendly casualties.

Despite this demonstrated conventional military prowess, coalition forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere seem hard pressed to deal effectively or efficiently with the irregular threats that have appeared once the ruling regimes were removed.