It has been nearly four decades since Felice Morgenstern delivered her ‘Lauterpacht lectures’ and published them in book form as Legal Problems of International Organizations. The book serves as something of an informal litmus test for international organization lawyers: one of those classic texts that one simply must have read at some point. Why some books acquire this status and others do not remains mysterious, something sociologists of science may wish to investigate in order to come to a general hypothesis, but in Morgenstern’s case the answer seems fairly straightforward, and consists of two, maybe three, elements.

Any organization normally determines, by express rules or otherwise, the participants in its operation and the manner of their participation. The determination should be designed to further the aims and purposes of the organization and the effectiveness of its work. This means that, beyond the enumeration of the categories of participants which may be admitted, the basis of the contribution that can be made by each needs to be considered and the principles governing admission to participation refined accordingly.

I was glad to have been invited to deliver the Hersch Lauterpacht lectures; very glad indeed for the opportunity it has given me to pay homage in a small way to someone whom I remember with respect, affection and gratitude. In preparing the lectures I was able to appreciate, once again, the great impact he had on my development and career, teaching me by example to question and to seek constructive answers related to the evolution of the law. And I say ‘evolution’ purposefully because in all his work he was aware that the world was changing too rapidly for any other approach to be valid. If I show less confidence in the future than he perhaps might have done, it may be because I do not have the same degree of courage as he did, or because the twenty-five years since his death have provided little ground for faith. I do share his conviction that any approach to the future must be based on law and on the moral precepts underlying it.

During the formative period of international organizations, attention was largely1 focused on their “internal” law, i.e. on their functions, powers and procedures under their constitutions and other rules. The assumption that international organizations do not have a common denominator encouraged such introspection. However — to misapply a famous quotation — no organization is an island, entire of itself. For their dealings with the outside world, whether in the sphere of public international law or in that of private law, the internal rules of organizations are relevant but not sufficient.2

The functions of many international organizations include the establishment of standards of conduct for purposes other than the internal functioning of the organization. With the major exception of the European Communities — which are so different that they have to be left out of account here — the organizations in question do not have legislative authority in the sense of having the power to make the standards legally binding on all addressees. The powers of organizations like I.C.A.O., W.H.O. and W.M.O. to make technical regulations,1 or of organizations like O.E.C.D, or the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission to take decisions, come closest to such authority; however, even these powers are accompanied by qualifications — the possibility of refusal by opting out or by notification of inability to comply; the requirement of unanimity; or the recognized need for Members to meet national constitutional requirements before complying — which ensure, in effect, that no State is bound against its will. It is thus appropriate to apply to the entire subject a statement originally made with respect to one of its features, namely that “the great debate of State sovereignty versus world community pervades every aspect of it”.2

Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since the death of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. At the time of his death, public international organizations were beginning to outnumber States, but no one foresaw the potential, both for growth and for variety, of that form of international activity; this may explain why he did not devote any major work to the place of international organizations in international law. At present, a considerably larger total of States is much more heavily outnumbered by the total of international organizations; a proportion of three to two is probably an unduly conservative estimate.

In some ways the position of international organizations in international law is reminiscent of the status of women in national law. It is accepted — with varying degrees of enthusiasm — that they are subjects of the law with a claim to rights and obligations equivalent to those of States, where a need for different treatment is not inherent in their nature. At the same time, there is controversy as to the “inherent” differences and their implications. The imagination to define the needs that are different from those of States and to provide appropriate solutions is signally lacking. Inertia, far more than active resistance, is an obstacle to adaptation of the law even where particular needs are identified.

This chapter discusses the complicated relationship between international alw and domestic law, focusing on international law is received by domestic legal orders

This chapter discusses how international courts operate, and how their jurisdiction is dependent on consent of states. It goes systematically through notions of jurisdiction, admissibility, interim measures, and compensation, ending with a discussion of advisory opinions and the possibilities for judicial review