Do individuals have a right to private property? That is the question pursued in this lengthy investigation (445 pages). Waldron distinguishes utilitarian arguments from “Right-based” ones. That is hardly an exhaustive distinction, one would think; reliance on its being so would not bode well. But having made such a distinction, he believes that the question comes to whether there are “any good right-based arguments for private property.” This, he thinks, amounts to the question: are any important individual interests served “by the existence of private property as opposed to someother sort of property regime?” The alternative, he thinks, is to turn to utilitarian arguments about property institutions, “rather than having it treated as the basis of right” (p. 5). How we are to measure “importance,” and to whom the proposed regimes are to be important is not discussed. And of course some think that we can, too, have a utilitarian-based theory of rights. And there will be other complaints about Waldron's framework; but we will not be able to go further into such matters here.