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What accounts for the election of Latinos to districts in which Latinos are not a majority? Are Latinos elected primarily in majority-African-American districts or majority-white districts? Are Latinos winning by appealing to the Latino pluralities in their districts and then adding the minimum number of non-Latino voters? Are Latinos defeating incumbents? If so, are they white or African-American incumbents? Are they winning in multicandidate primaries? Do Latinos with Anglo names appear to have an advantage? To what extent has each political party been responsible for the growing number of Latinos elected in non-Latino majority districts? To what extent have features of the electoral system contributed to more Latino victories in such districts? Now that Latinos have become the largest minority group in the United States, it is fitting to examine the conditions under which Latinos are elected to legislative bodies. In particular, this chapter seeks to explore the conditions under which Latinos are elected to non-Latino majority districts. I argue that although demographics play an important role in the election of Latino candidates, we must look beyond the obvious Latino majority districts that elect Latino legislators. The growing mainstreaming of Latinos in American society is already manifesting itself in the election of Latino legislators in areas where traditionally they are not likely to be elected.

The tests in Chapter 2 were also conducted using various different model specifications to account for possible model-driven results. Tests using traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) models indicate similar substantive results. OLS models 1 through 5 all demonstrate that the percentage Latino in state remains strongly significant across the board. All other variables exhibit similar coefficients, despite the higher standard errors due to autocorrelation. Because OLS assumes independence of the dependent variable, it is an inappropriate method for these data.

Random effects models with both the state and year as the group variables, however, differ in minor ways as explained later. These types of models are appropriate for time-series data but do not account for serial autocorrelation like the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) procedure (Bertrand et al. 2004). Model 1 is robust across both state and year models. Model 2 with the states as the random effects control indicates the same substantive results with the exception of the implementation of term limits variable, which is not statistically significant, although in the negative direction. This suggests that there are considerable state-to-state differences on the impact of term limits on Latino representation. Model 4 yields the same results for both time and state specifications. Because all other specifications show a strong and significantly negative effect of more professional legislatures on Latino representation, this seems more like a statistical artifact.

In recent political campaigns, candidates have adopted Spanish-language appeals in their efforts to woo the growing Latino vote. The reasons for such appeals are obvious: Latinos are the largest minority group in the United States, and the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that the Latino population will increase from 14 percent of the population in 2007 to nearly 30 percent of the population in 2050. However, although the growth of Latinos in American legislative institutions has slowly increased in the past decade, Latinos remain underrepresented in Congress and state legislatures. Even though Congress has long been the focal point for studies of representation, a comparative analysis of Congress and state legislatures has yet to be done. This book is the first systematic examination of the election of Latinos to U.S. state legislatures and Congress.

This book argues that Latino representation is dependent on subethnic diversity, distinct political backgrounds even among Mexican Americans, and nascent political experience. The central argument is that Latino representation in U.S. legislative institutions is shaped not only by demographics, but also by legislative institutional design, as well as elite-driven methods, features of the electoral system, and the increasing mainstreaming of Latinos in American society. The election of Latino legislators in the United States is thus complex and varied.

Before the Voting Rights Act in 1965, few Latinos served in the U.S. Congress. Before 1912, only one Latino, California Republican Romualdo Pacheco, served in the U.S. House (Vigil 1996). With the exception of New Mexico and Louisiana, no state sent a Latino to Congress between 1912 and 1960 (Lublin 1997). The Congressional Hispanic Caucus began in 1976 through the efforts of Democratic Reps. Herman Badillo (NY), Baltasar Corrada (PR), E. Kika de la Garza (TX), Henry B. González (TX), and Edward Roybal (CA). Compared to the Congressional Black Caucus, the Hispanic caucus is newer and smaller. In 1992 and 1994, African-American representatives numbered thirty-eight whereas Latinos numbered seventeen (Lublin 1997). In 2005, the number of Latinos serving in Congress had increased to twenty-five. More groundbreaking, however, was the election of two Latinos to the U.S. Senate in 2004. By 2008, Sen. Robert Menéndez (D-NJ) was elected to the U.S. Senate, giving Latinos three U.S. senators for the first time in history. Until 2004, no Latino had served in the Senate since New Mexico's Joseph Montoya, who served until 1977.

As shown in Table 1.1 (both parts a and b), the number of Latinos in Congress had increased to twenty-five by 2008. As shown in Table 1.2, the growth of Latinos in Congress is partly a consequence of the national growth in the Latino population.

Do Latino members of Congress and state legislators vote differently than their non-Latino counterparts? If so, what are the implications for representative democracy? Do Latino legislators vote differently across states and chambers? If so, what are some of the reasons for this? Does the percentage of Latinos and African Americans in a district make a difference in terms of how members of Congress and legislators vote? Whereas the bulk of the literature on Latino representation has examined roll call voting patterns at the national level, very little attention has been given to examining the roll call voting patterns of Latino state legislators.

This chapter examines the roll call voting behavior of Latino legislators in Colorado, New Jersey, and Texas and compares how Latinos in Congress and in their respective states vote in legislative institutions, using new data from Nolan McCarty's research on state legislative polarization as well as the McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal NOMINATE data used in many research studies. Although not one of the seven states thoroughly discussed previously, Colorado's recent political transformations make it an exciting state to study. Through the examination of key roll call votes cast by members of Congress from districts with similar proportions of Latinos, it is possible to make some conclusions regarding substantive representation. Even though previous studies have found that the percentage of Latinos makes no difference in the roll call voting patterns of members of Congress, new evidence suggests that in some states, the Latino population is beginning to exert influence, suggesting the continued mainstreaming of Latinos in American society.

Pennsylvania State Representative Angel Cruz (D-Philadelphia), a Puerto Rican who represents a majority-Latino district, recounted a story about one of his constituents – a little girl named Delimar Vera who was presumed dead after being kidnapped from her home when she was a newborn. The kidnapper subsequently set fire to the home so that the Fire Department would think that the newborn had perished in the fire. Delimar's mother never believed her daughter had perished in the fire, but because of her difficulty communicating in English, she was never able to pursue the matter any further. Then, one day six years later, Delimar's mother attended a birthday party for a friend and noticed a young girl who resembled herself and her other children. She now had a Latino representative and decided to contact him and recount her story in Spanish. She enlisted the help of Representative Cruz, who helped her pursue DNA tests and file the appropriate police reports. At the end of the day, Representative Cruz was able to reunite Delimar with her mother.

To what extent has the growing Latino population translated into more Latino legislators in Congress and state legislatures? Are Latinos as likely to serve in upper chambers as lower chambers? Are Latino candidates advantaged when turnover is high within legislatures? Does the imposition of term limits further advantage Latino candidates? Are states that are more liberal more likely than conservative states to elect Latino candidates? This chapter examines Latino representation in all fifty states by tracking the growth of Latinos serving in legislatures over the past decade and comparing the percentage of Latino citizens in the population with the percentage of Latinos in each legislature. At the state level, the Latino representation in the legislature is largely reflective of the percentage of Latinos in the population. Additionally, some states have much higher turnover rates in their legislatures, thus opening up more seats for talented Latinos to win. Similarly, Latinos may have better chances of being elected in states that have enacted term limits, which eliminates the incumbency advantage. Using the latest data on turnover and term limits, I help explain the impact of these variables on Latino representation in legislatures (Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004). Chapter 3 explores the conditions under which Latinos are elected to seven of the nine state legislatures with the largest Latino memberships, and will provide precise estimates of district-level effects.

After having addressed the institutional and demographic determinants of Latino representation across all fifty states, this chapter delves into district-level determinants of Latino representation in states with significant Latino populations to estimate the probability of electing Latino candidates. In particular, this chapter addresses the following questions: How does the ethnic composition of a legislative district affect the probability that the district will elect a Latino candidate? Are Latino candidates advantaged when they run in districts with citizens who share their ethnic heritage? At what point does the ethnic composition of a district create an advantage for Latino candidates? Do districts need to be majority-Latino before they tend to elect Latino candidates, or is there a lesser threshold where Latino candidates become competitive? If so, what is that threshold? What about other minority groups? Does it matter how many African-American citizens reside in a district? Are Latino candidates advantaged when a district's African-American and Latino citizens outnumber a district's Anglo citizens?

Why might the ethnic composition of a district affect the chances of electing a Latino legislator? First, a district's composition affects the supply of candidates for potential office. In many instances, Latinos who have been successful in winning state legislative seats began their careers on school boards or city councils in heavily Latino districts. They first become well known in the local community.