Background: Since 2009, the CDC has invested in nationwide outbreak response capacity through Healthcare-associated Infections and Antimicrobial Resistance (HAI/AR) Programs in public health departments. The unpredictable nature of outbreaks requires public health programs to be able to scale operations and adapt strategies to effectively respond to emerging challenges, as demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. This analysis characterizes HAI/AR Programs response capacity in scalability, adaptability, and technical expertise. Method: We reviewed data from HAI/AR Programs in 50 state, 6 local, and 2 territorial health departments (August 2019–December 2022). HAI/AR responses were defined as specific public health actions to assess an acute risk and prevent further harm in the context of a confirmed or possible healthcare outbreak; responses were categorized as involving novel or targeted multi-drug resistant organisms (nMDROs), COVID-19, and HAIs or infection control breaches. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze reported responses in three domains: scalability (number of responses per year), adaptability (number of pathogens and healthcare facility types involved in responses), and technical expertise (number of responses involving onsite or remote infection control assessments). The annual number of responses conducted in 2019 was estimated based on five months of data (Aug–Dec); all other results were calculated directly. Results: From August 2019 to December 2022, 58 HAI/AR Programs reported 141,445 responses (87% COVID-19, 11% nMDROs, 2% other HAIs or infection control breaches). Annually, programs conducted an estimated 5,546 responses in 2019, and this figure rose to 42,359 in 2020, 49,124 in 2021, and 47,651 in 2022. Outbreak responses involved 110 different pathogens, including emerging infectious diseases (e.g., SARS-CoV-2, mpox), nMDRO (e.g., carbapenemase-producing organisms, Candida auris), and other pathogens (e.g., hepatitis viruses, Mycobacterium abscessus) across >20 setting types (e.g., acute care hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, ambulatory surgery centers, assisted living facilities). Additionally, programs responded to infection control breaches in the absence of identified patient infections, including drug diversion, medical device reprocessing, and injection safety breaches. Programs conducted 50,245 infection control assessments during reported responses. Conclusion: From 2019–2022, as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold, HAI/AR Programs effectively utilized CDC funding to scale their response operations with an 8-fold increase in annual response activity, including a 24% increase for non-COVID-19 responses. Programs adapted responses to various pathogens, including emerging infectious diseases, across various setting types. Health department staff utilized technical expertise to conduct infection control assessments. This analysis provides valuable insights into the resilience and impact of HAI/AR Programs nationwide.

Background: Stenotrophomonas maltophilia is an opportunistic pathogen found in healthcare settings. During April–September 2022, nine S. maltophilia bloodstream infections (BSIs) were identified among intensive care unit (ICU) patients at a hospital in Alameda County, California. Whole genome sequencing found isolates to be highly related. Despite implementation of infection prevention and control (IPC) interventions, four additional S. maltophilia BSIs were identified during June–September 2023. We investigated to identify risk factors for infection and stop transmission. Methods: We conducted a matched case-control study. A case was defined as S. maltophilia isolated from a blood culture from an ICU patient with a fever during April 2022–September 2023; control-patient subjects were patients admitted to the ICU during the same period with hospital stay greater than or equal to their matched case. Three control subjects were matched to each case. We extracted information on risk factors for infection from medical charts and observed IPC practices in hospital locations of interest. We collected environmental samples from the ICU, radiology unit, and emergency department. Results: Among 13 cases and 39 control subjects, patients exposed to iodinated contrast Omnipaque-300 (odds ratio [OR]: 5.7; 95% CI: 1.2–28.0), injectable propofol (OR: 12.2; 95% CI: 1.5–101.4), or fentanyl (OR: 9.2; 95% CI: 1.8–Inf.) were more likely to have a S. maltophilia BSI, compared with control-subjects. IPC deficiencies included improper cleaning and storage of medical equipment, including the contrast injection system, and patient care supplies. The outbreak strain of S. maltophilia was not isolated from environmental samples. Conclusions: Although a point-source was not identified, S. maltophilia was likely transmitted through improper IPC practices involving injectable contrast or anesthesia. Recommendations on proper cleaning and disinfection of the contrast injection system and proper storage, preparation, and administration of medications were made to reduce risk for contamination.

Among nursing home outbreaks of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) with ≥3 breakthrough infections when the predominant severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant circulating was the SARS-CoV-2 δ (delta) variant, fully vaccinated residents were 28% less likely to be infected than were unvaccinated residents. Once infected, they had approximately half the risk for all-cause hospitalization and all-cause death compared with unvaccinated infected residents.

Background: Rapid response is critical to control healthcare-associated infection (HAI) and antibiotic resistance threats within healthcare facilities to prevent illness among patients, residents, and healthcare personnel. Through this analysis, we aimed to quantify public health response activities, by healthcare setting type, for (1) novel and targeted multidrug-resistant organisms or mechanisms (MDROs), (2) SARS-CoV-2, and (3) other possible outbreaks. Method: We reviewed response activity data submitted by US state, territorial, and local health department HAI/AR programs to the CDC as part of funding requirements. We performed descriptive analyses of response activities conducted during the funding reporting period (August 2019–July 2020). SARS-CoV-2 response activities were reported from January through July 2020. Data were analyzed by response category (novel or targeted MDRO, SARS-CoV-2, other HAI/AR responses), and healthcare setting type. Results: During August 2019–July 2020, 57 HAI/AR Programs (50 state, 1 territorial, 5 local health departments, and District of Columbia) reported 18,306 public health responses involving healthcare facilities. These data included 3,860 responses to 1 or more cases of novel or targeted MDROs, 13,992 responses to SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks (beginning in January 2020), and 454 responses to other possible outbreaks. Novel and targeted MDRO responses most frequently occurred in acute-care hospitals (ACHs, 64.5%), skilled nursing facilities (SNFs, 24.5%), and long-term acute-care hospitals (LTACHs, 5.8%). SARS-CoV-2 responses most frequently occurred in SNFs (55%), and assisted living facilities (24%). Other HAI/AR responses most frequently occurred in ACH (50%), SNF (28.4%), and outpatient settings (19.6%). Of the “other” HAI/AR responses, 76% were responses to cases, clusters, or outbreaks, and 23.8% were responses to serious infection control breaches including device and instrument reprocessing, injection safety, and other deficient practices. Conclusions: During the study period, public health programs performed a high volume of HAI/AR response activities largely focused on SARS-CoV-2 in nursing homes and assisted living facilities. Other important response activities occurred across a range of other healthcare settings, including responses to novel and targeted MDROs, HAI outbreaks, and serious infection control breaches. Whereas SARS-CoV-2 response activities largely centered in long-term care settings, MDRO and other HAI/AR responses occurred mostly in acute-care settings. These data demonstrate the importance of building and sustaining public health response capacity for a broad array of healthcare settings, pathogens, and patient populations to meet the range of current and emerging HAI/AR threats.

Funding: None

Disclosures: None

Background: Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, CDC Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion (DHQP) has provided technical assistance in support of state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments for COVID-19 healthcare outbreak management and infection prevention and control (IPC). We characterized the volume and trends of technical assistance provided during the pandemic to inform the future needs of health departments for COVID-19 healthcare IPC and DHQP resources required to meet these needs. Methods: In January 2020, DHQP began receiving COVID-19 IPC TA requests directly from health departments for remote assistance or from CDC staff on field deployments providing onsite support. DHQP subject-matter experts provided responses via e-mail or, for more complex inquiries, outbreaks, or field deployments, via phone consultations. Records of e-mail communications and phone consultations were entered into an inquiry database for tracking. We calculated the number, mean, and range of technical-assistance responses by jurisdiction and by month from January 2020 through December 2021. We designated months as high-volume periods for technical assistance if inquiries surpassed the 75th percentile. Results: In total, 1,869 IPC technical-assistance responses were provided. Of all technical-assistance responses, 1,725 (92%) were to state or local health departments, 115 (6%) were tribal nations, and 28 (2%) were US territories. IPC technical assistance was provided to all 50 states and the District of Columbia, 16 tribal nations, and 5 US territories. The average total number of technical assistance responses per site during the 24-month period was 34 to state and local HDs (range, 2–111), 6 to tribal nations (when tribal nation was specified; range, 1–17), and 6 to US territories (range, 1–15). E-mail communications comprised 1,164 responses (62%); phone consultations made up the remaining 705 responses (38%). Of phone consultations, 350 (50%) were with CDC field deployers providing onsite support to health departments. The average number of technical-assistance responses provided each month across all jurisdictions was 78 (range, 0–334); months with high volumes included April–August 2020 and January 2021. Conclusions: These findings highlight the high-level collaboration between federal and state, tribal, local, and territorial health department partners in remote and onsite support of COVID-19 prevention and response efforts in healthcare settings. Variations in monthly volumes of health-department COVID-19 healthcare IPC technical assistance requests may reflect factors such as fluctuations in community infection rates and changes in CDC IPC guidance. The ability to provide effective technical assistance during pandemic response depends on the CDC maintaining sufficient healthcare IPC staffing and expertise.

Funding: None

Disclosures: None

Background: Domestically, the integration of public health into healthcare-associated infection (HAI) and antibiotic resistance (AR) prevention activities represents a major development. We describe CDC Funding: of public health HAI/AR programs through the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity (ELC) cooperative agreement to improve local capacity to prevent HAIs and detect and contain the spread of AR threats. Methods: We reviewed ELC budget reports and program documents to summarize the evolution of funded activities and programs from 2009 to 2018. Results: In 2009, 51 programs (49 states, 2 cities and territories) received US$35.8 million through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act for an initial 28-month period. These funds supported each jurisdiction to establish an HAI coordinator and a multidisciplinary HAI advisory group, coordinate and report HAI prevention efforts, conduct surveillance and report HAI data, and maintain an HAI plan; ~27 programs were also funded to coordinate multicenter HAI prevention collaboratives among acute-care hospitals. Through 2011, 188 state or local HAI/AR program positions were at least partially funded by the CDC. From 2011 to 2015, investments from the Affordable Care Act (~US$10–11 million annually) were used to maintain the HAI/AR programs, with some expansion of program goals related to non–acute-care settings and antibiotic stewardship. In 2015, following the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, supplemental ELC funds were awarded to 61 programs (50 states, 11 cities and territories) totaling US$85 million over 36 months. These awards marked an expansion of HAI/AR program activities to develop healthcare provider inventories, to conduct data-driven education and training, and to perform onsite infection control assessments in healthcare facilities. In 2016, through its AR Solutions Initiative, CDC invested US$57.3 million in Funding: to 57 programs (50 states, 7 cities and territories), expanding laboratory capacities for AR threat detection (via the AR Laboratory Network) and epidemiologic activities to rapidly contain novel and targeted multidrug-resistant organisms. As of 2018, >500 state or local HAI/AR program positions were at least partially funded by the CDC. Conclusions: State and local HAI/AR programs have grown substantially over the 10 years of their existence, as reflected in major increases in funding, staffing, scope, and partnerships. CDC investments and guidance have supported the development of HAI/AR epidemiology prevention and response capacity.

Funding: None

Disclosures: None

Background: Health departments have been increasingly called upon to monitor healthcare associated-infections (HAIs) at the hospital- or facility-level and provide targeted assistance when high rates are identified. Health department capacity to effectively respond to these types of signals depends not only on technical expertise but also the legal and regulatory authority to intervene. Methods: We reviewed annual reports describing HAI and antibiotic resistance (HAI/AR) activities from CDC-funded HAI/AR programs for August 2017 through July 2018. We performed a qualitative data analysis on all 50 state health department responses to a question about their regulatory and legal authority to intervene or assist facilities without invitation when outbreaks are suspected (as determined by the health department) or high HAI rates have been identified (eg, based on NHSN data). Results: When an outbreak is identified, 31 health departments (62%) indicated that they have the authority to intervene without invitation from a facility and 8 (16%) did not specify. Among the 11 health departments (22%) that indicated that they do not have this authority, 5 (45%) states noted that they operate under decentralized systems in which the local health department can intervene in outbreak situations and the state health department is available to assist. When a health department identifies high HAI rates, 14 health departments (28%) indicated that they have the authority to intervene without invitation, 22 (44%) indicated that they do not, and 14 (28%) did not specify. Among those in the latter categories, 3 stated they can work through their local health departments, which do have this authority and 8 described working through partners (eg, State Hospital Association, n = 3 or State Healthcare Licensing Agency, n = 5). Discussion: Assistance from state health departments (eg, HAI/AR programs) in the context of outbreaks and high HAI rates has value that is usually well recognized and welcomed by healthcare facilities. Nonetheless, there are occasions when a health department might need to exert its authority to intervene. The preliminary analysis described here indicated that this authority was more commonly self-reported in the context of outbreaks than when high HAI rates are identified. These 2 situations are connected, as high rates might be indicative of unrecognized or unreported outbreak activity, and these issues may benefit from further analysis.

Funding: None

Disclosures: None

The use of nanotechnology based materials for chemical sensing has been of great interest since nanocrystalline materials have been shown to offer improved sensor sensitivity, stability, and response time. Several groups are successfully integrating nanostructures such as nanowires into operational sensors. The typical procedure may include random placement (e.g., dispersion, with fine-line patterning techniques used to create functional sensors) or time consuming precise fabrication (e.g., mechanical placement using an atomic force microscope or laser tweezer techniques). Dielectrophoresis has also been utilized, however it can be challenging to achieve good electrical contact of the nanostructures to the underlying electrodes. In this paper we report on a sensor platform that incorporates nanorods in a controlled, efficient, and effective manner. Semiconducting SnO2 nanorods are used as the sensing element for detection of hydrogen (H2) and propylene (C3H6) up to 600oC. Using a novel approach of combining dielectrophoresis with standard microfabrication processing techniques, we have achieved reproducible, time-efficient fabrication of gas sensors with reliable contacts to the SnO2 nanorods used for the detection of gases. The sensor layout is designed to assist in the alignment of the nanorods by selectively enhancing the electric field strength and allowing for the quick production of sensor arrays. The SnO2 nanorods are produced using a thermal evaporation-condensation approach. After growth, nanorods are separated from the resulting material using gravimetric separation. The rods vary in length from 3μm to greater than 10μm, with diameters ranging from 50 to 300nm. Dielectrophoresis is used to align multiple nanorods between electrodes. A second layer of metal is incorporated using standard microfabrication methods immediately after alignment to bury the ends of the rods making contact with the underlying electrodes within another layer of metal. Electrical contact was verified during testing by the response to H2 and C3H6 gases at a range of temperatures. Testing was performed on a stage with temperature control and probes were used for electrical contact. Gas flows into the testing chamber at a flow rate of 4000sccm. Sensor response of normalized current shift, |Igas-Iair|/Iair, was measured at a constant voltage bias. Sensors showed response to both H2 and C3H6. Detection of H2 was achieved at 100oC and response levels improved approximately 12000-fold at 600oC. Detection of C3H6 started at 100oC and improved approximately 10000-fold at 600oC. Detection of at least 200ppm for both gases was achieved at 600oC. Using this novel microfabrication approach, semiconducting SnO2 nanorods integrated into a microsensor platform have been demonstrated and sensing response showed dramatic increases at higher temperatures.