We agree with Sijilmassi et al. that historical myths are a tool for coalition recruitment. We argue, however, that a close fit between an evolved entity and an identified function does not imply that the latter is the critical evolutionary trigger. We also propose an alternative individual-centric explanation: Historical myths reduce uncertainty by providing cognitive and behavioral guidance.

We extend Ivancovsky et al.'s finding on the association between curiosity and creativity by proposing a sequential causal model assuming that (a) curiosity determines the motivation to seek information and that (b) creativity constitutes a capacity to act on that motivation. This framework assumes that both high levels of curiosity and creativity are necessary for information-seeking behavior.

We elaborate on Glowacki's claim that humans are more capable of establishing peace than other mammals. We present three aspects suggesting caution. First, the social capabilities of nonhuman primates should not be underestimated. Second, the effect of these capabilities on peace establishment is nonmonotonous. Third, defining peace by human-centered values introduces a fallacy.

We discuss and expand Boyer's idea of ownership coordination. Interpersonal similarity, we suggest, can moderate the attainment of coordination: Perceived similarity predicts coordination costs, whereas actual similarity dictates coordination success and the severity of illusory assumptions regarding a shared understanding of ownership. The example of similarity highlights the complexity of the social projection process uncritically assumed behind ownership coordination.

We consider an underdeveloped feature of De Neys's model. Decisions with multiple intuitions per option are neither trivial to explain nor rare. These decision scenarios are crucial for an assessment of the model's generalizability and adequacy. Besides monitoring absolute differences in intuition strength, the mind might add the strengths of intuitions per choice option, leading to competing and testable hypotheses.

The “problem of points”, introduced by Paccioli in 1494 and solved by Pascal and Fermat 160 years later, inspired the modern concept of probability. Incidentally, the problem also shows that rational decision-making requires the consideration of future events. We show that naïve responses to the problem of points are more future oriented and thus more rational in this sense when the problem itself is presented in a future frame instead of the canonical past frame. A simple nudge is sufficient to make decisions more rational. We consider the implications of this finding for hypothesis testing and predictions of replicability.

Recent research suggests that people discount or neglect expectations of reciprocity in trust dilemmas. We examine the underlying processes and boundary conditions of this effect, finding that expectations have stronger effects on trust when they are made accessible and when they are provided as objective probabilities (Study 1). Objective expectations have stronger effects when they are based on precise, rather than ambiguous, probabilities (Study 2). We also find that trust decisions differ from individual risk-taking decisions: people are more willing to trust, and expectations have stronger effects on trusting behavior (Study 2). These results show that the availability and ambiguity of expectations shape trust decisions, and that people differentially weight expectations in dilemmas of trust and individual risk-taking.

According to recent dual-process theories, interpersonal trust is influenced by both impulsive and deliberative processes. The present research explores the determinants of deliberative trust, investigating how trust decisions are affected by the availability of cognitive resources. We test the interaction of two relevant factors: self-control (the ability to exert mental control over one’s behavior) and the default response (a preselected option that requires minimal or no effort). Past research has shown that self-control has extensive effects on social behavior and decision making. Here, we report that the effect of self-control on trust depends on the default. Across two studies, we find no direct link between self-control and trust. Instead, self-control affects trust indirectly by influencing the level of effort in decision making. Poor self-control (due to experimental depletion or trait-based differences) predicts adherence to the default—the response that requires the least effort.

Rational trust decisions depend on potential outcomes and expectations of reciprocity. In the trust game, outcomes and expectations correspond to the structural factors of risk and temptation. Two experiments investigated how risk and temptation influenced information search and final decisions in the trust game. The central finding was that trustors underemphasized temptation relative to its effects on the expected value of trust. Instead, trustors made decisions egocentrically, focusing on potential outcomes. In Experiment 1, information search data revealed that trustors often made decisions without learning about the payoffs related to temptation. Experiment 2 investigated whether trustors were able to use temptation to form accurate expectations of reciprocity. Trustors understood, but underestimated, the relationship between temptation and the probability of reciprocity. Moreover, they did not fully consider expectations in their final trust decisions. Changes in potential outcomes had larger effects on trust than comparable changes in expectations. These results suggest that levels of trust are too high when the probability of reciprocity is low and too low when that probability is high.

The theory of group-selected Big God religions is a master narrative of cultural evolution. The evidence is a positive manifold of correlated assumptions and variables. Although provocative, the theory is overly elastic. Its critical ingredient – belief in Big Gods – is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for in-group prosociality and discipline. Four specific issues illustrate this elasticity.

Psychological science can benefit from a theoretical unification with other social sciences. Social psychology in particular has gone through cycles of repression, denying itself the opportunity to see the calculating element in human interaction. A closer alignment with theories of evolution and theories of interpersonal (and intergroup) games would bring strategic reasoning back into the focus of research.

According to the view that humans are conscious automata, the experience of conscious will is illusory. Epistemic theories of causation, however, make room for causal will, planned behavior, and moral action.

Mainstream social psychology focuses on how people characteristically violate norms of action through social misbehaviors such as conformity with false majority judgments, destructive obedience, and failures to help those in need. Likewise, they are seen to violate norms of reasoning through cognitive errors such as misuse of social information, self-enhancement, and an over-readiness to attribute dispositional characteristics. The causes of this negative research emphasis include the apparent informativeness of norm violation, the status of good behavior and judgment as unconfirmable null hypotheses, and the allure of counter-intuitive findings. The shortcomings of this orientation include frequently erroneous imputations of error, findings of mutually contradictory errors, incoherent interpretations of error, an inability to explain the sources of behavioral or cognitive achievement, and the inhibition of generalized theory. Possible remedies include increased attention to the complete range of behavior and judgmental accomplishment, analytic reforms emphasizing effect sizes and Bayesian inference, and a theoretical paradigm able to account for both the sources of accomplishment and of error. A more balanced social psychology would yield not only a more positive view of human nature, but also an improved understanding of the bases of good behavior and accurate judgment, coherent explanations of occasional lapses, and theoretically grounded suggestions for improvement.

Many commentators agree with our view that the problem-oriented approach to social psychology has not fulfilled its promise, and they suggest new research directions that may contribute to the maturation of the field. Others suggest that social psychology is not as focused on negative phenomena as we claim, or that a negative focus does indeed lay the most efficient path toward a general understanding of social cognition and behavior. In this response, we organize the comments thematically, discuss them in light of our original exposition, and reiterate that we seek not a disproportionately positive social psychology but a balanced field that addresses the range of human performance.

In social dilemmas, expectations of reciprocity can lead to fully determined cooperation concurrent with the illusion of choice. The choice of the dominant alternative (i.e., defection) may be construed as being free and rational, but only at the cost of being incompatible with a behavioral science claiming to be deterministic.

The mother sacrificing herself while rescuing someone else's child is a red herring. Neither behaviorism nor cognitivism can explain it. Unlike behaviorism, however, the cognitive process of projection can explain cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas.