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If a definitive history of the controversy during the final decades of the thirteenth century regarding the real distinction between essence and existence still remains to be written, an exposition of the views expressed by Godfrey of Fontaines on this point may provide one more step in this direction. It seems probable that Godfrey had studied in Paris during Thomas' final years there (1269-1272) and that he may have studied under Henry of Ghent as well as under Siger of Brabant. He lectured as Master of theology at Paris for some thirteen years (1285-1297), and again around 1303-1304, when he composed his fifteenth Quodlibetal Question. Giles of Rome had also studied at Paris under Thomas (1269-1272) and served there as Bachelor in theology (1276-1277), and later as Master in theology (1285-1291). Henry of Ghent had taught at Paris around 1271 (apparently on the faculty of Arts) and later, beginning in 1276, on the faculty of Theology. Between 1276 and 1292 he delivered the courses which resulted in his Summa and in his Quaestiones Quodlibetales. Because Godfrey was familiar with the work of Thomas Aquinas (in Q[uodlibet] 2 q.3 one finds an almost verbatim reproduction of a section of Thomas' De aeternitate mundi), because he witnessed the famed debate on the real distinction between Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome, and because his work was well known to Duns Scotus, clarification of his own position should be of historical interest. In addition, it is to be hoped that such a study will show that his views are distinctive enough to merit investigation for their own sake.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss Norman Kretzmann's account of Aquinas's discussion of will in God. According to Kretzmann, Aquinas's reasoning seems to leave no place for choice on God's part, since, on Aquinas's account, God is not free not to will Himself. And so this leads to the problem about God's willing things other than Himself. On this, Kretzmann finds serious problems with Thomas's position. Kretzmann argues that Aquinas should have drawn necessitarian conclusions from his account of divine will. Moreover, in light of one reading of De veritate, q. 24, a. 3, but one not accepted by the Leonine edition, Kretzmann also maintains that Aquinas practically conceded this necessitarian view of God's creative activity in that text. My purpose will be, after presenting Kretzmann's presentation and defence of Aquinas's attribution of will to God, to examine critically his claim that Thomas should have concluded that God is not free not to create, and to determine whether a stronger argument can be made in support of Aquinas's position in light of his texts.