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This article explores the economic issues related to financial crises at insurance companies, using an example from the Great Depression, the National Surety Company. National Surety was a large and diverse American insurance company that experienced a major crisis in 1933 due to losses from its guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. I find that policyholders were able to stage a massive run on the company by demanding the return of their unearned premiums. A key dynamic of the crisis was that policyholders at an insurance company have a dual role as holders of liabilities and as providers of income. In addition, I establish that government officials believed National Surety to be systemically important, due to the size of its insurance business and because many of its counterparties were societal actors that these officials sought to protect. As a result, the New York State Insurance Commissioner used emergency powers to reorganize the company, with the goal of providing continuity to its business lines outside mortgage-backed security insurance.
To determine the typical microbial bioburden (overall bacterial and multidrug-resistant organisms [MDROs]) on high-touch healthcare environmental surfaces after routine or terminal cleaning.
Prospective 2.5-year microbiological survey of large surface areas (>1,000 cm2).
MDRO contact-precaution rooms from 9 acute-care hospitals and 2 long-term care facilities in 4 states.
Samples from 166 rooms (113 routine cleaned and 53 terminal cleaned rooms).
Using a standard sponge-wipe sampling protocol, 2 composite samples were collected from each room; a third sample was collected from each Clostridium difficile room. Composite 1 included the TV remote, telephone, call button, and bed rails. Composite 2 included the room door handle, IV pole, and overbed table. Composite 3 included toileting surfaces. Total bacteria and MDROs (ie, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, vancomycin-resistant enterococci [VRE], Acinetobacter baumannii, Klebsiella pneumoniae, and C. difficile) were quantified, confirmed, and tested for drug resistance.
The mean microbial bioburden and range from routine cleaned room composites were higher (2,700 colony-forming units [CFU]/100 cm2; ≤1–130,000 CFU/100 cm2) than from terminal cleaned room composites (353 CFU/100 cm2; ≤1–4,300 CFU/100 cm2). MDROs were recovered from 34% of routine cleaned room composites (range ≤1–13,000 CFU/100 cm2) and 17% of terminal cleaned room composites (≤1–524 CFU/100 cm2). MDROs were recovered from 40% of rooms; VRE was the most common (19%).
This multicenter bioburden summary provides a first step to determining microbial bioburden on healthcare surfaces, which may help provide a basis for developing standards to evaluate cleaning and disinfection as well as a framework for studies using an evidentiary hierarchy for environmental infection control.
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2016;1426–1432
This article analyzes President Herbert Hoover's role in causing wage rigidity during the onset of the Great Depression, through two conferences in which he encouraged business leaders to maintain high wages. New data on the set of firms and trade associations attending these conferences provides evidence that Hoover's conferences delayed the cuts in hourly wages at a small number of large firms, although this result may have been due to characteristics of the particular industries the firms represented. In a cross-section of industries, there is no evidence that industry representation at the December conference affected the timing of wage cuts.
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