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Chapter Five discusses two things. First, it looks at the aftermath of the Futian Rebellion and at Xiang Ying’s efforts to calm things down. Xiang’s efforts were soon reversed by the arrival of the “three person group,” which implemented the radical new line coming out of the Comintern. Zhou Enlai would later try to control the sufan movement, but new leadership (Bo Gu) and the pressing need for soldiers and money would reignite efforts to suppress so-called counterrevolutionaries. Second, the chapter looks briefly at the Eyuwan Revolutionary Base Area, north of the Yangzi river, to show that the same logic of sufan applied there as well.
Up to this point the book has followed the development of the Donggu Revolutionary Base Area on the one hand and Mao’s efforts to build a party-army on the other. In Chapter Four these two strands of the story come together violently. Mao is determined to purge the southwest Jiangxi party organizations of all landlords and rich peasants. Soon an “AB (anti-Bolshevik) Corps” is “discovered,” even though it is nonexistent. Hundreds of people (Communist Party members) are tortured and killed. The culmination of this campaign is the Futian Rebellion.
The Conclusion reviews the arguments made in the previous chapters and argues the importance of the Donggu Revolutionary Base Area for understanding the Chinese revolution. It is impossible to ignore the conflicts between the local interests of the Donggu revolutionaries and Mao’s efforts to create a national revolution. It is also impossible to ignore the conflict between the Communist movement’s need for soldiers and money and the unwillingness of local society to provide either in sufficient quantity.
Chapter Two lays out the history of the Donggu Revolutionary Base Area. It emphasizes some of the unique characteristics of this place – its relative isolation nestled in the mountainous countryside of eastern Ji’an county, the close ties among a number of classmates, and the ties of kinship that made their alliance with local bandits possible. This core leadership group was able to stay together even after their original leader, Lai Jingbang, was killed. Lai was replaced by Li Wenlin, a graduate of Whampoa Military Academy, who led the Donggu Revolutionary Base area to expand to cover some 24 townships in the area.
This conflict led to a bloody purge of local Communists. Moreover, the “suppression of counterrevolutionaries” did not stop but continued and deepened when the Communist leadership moved from Shanghai to Jiangxi.
The Introduction lays out the basic theses of the book: that it was local revolutionaries, not Mao, who introduced Marxism and, more importantly, political organization, to the countryside, but Mao suppressed these local movements. Moreover, the party was remade by Mao as a far more hierarchical, disciplined, violent, and militarized party than anything imagined in 1927.
Chapter Three lays out Mao Zedong’s determination to build a revolutionary army. Party policy at the time argued for mobilizing the masses and the party leadership thought that Mao’s approach was too militaristic. Mao and Zhu De came into conflict over the scope of party control, and Mao was voted out. Zhou Enlai backed Mao, and he was restored to his position. The chapter ends with the Gutian Conference, at which Mao asserted his dominance over the military.
Forging Leninism in China is a re-examination of the events of the Chinese revolution and the transformation of the Chinese Communist Party from the years 1927 to 1934. Describing the transformation of the party as 'the forging of Leninism', Joseph Fewsmith offers a clear analysis of the development of the party. Drawing on supporting statements of party leaders and a wealth of historical material, he demonstrates how the Chinese Communist Party reshaped itself to become far more violent, more hierarchical, and more militarized during this time. He highlights the role of local educated youth in organizing the Chinese revolution, arguing that it was these local organizations, rather than Mao, who introduced Marxism into the countryside. Fewsmith presents a vivid story of local social history and conflict between Mao's revolutionaries and local Communists.
In recent years, explanations of the Chinese Communist Party's longevity as a ruling party have focused on institutionalization. But a close look at the four leaders of China since 1978 reveal that institutions have remained weak. Of much greater importance have been balances that reflect the informal distribution of power and norms that express agreed-upon Party procedures. Of yet even greater importance have been the efforts of individual leaders to concentrate power in themselves through the appointment of protégés to critical positions. Such leaders also attempt to extend their influence beyond their terms in office through those protégés and their roles as “elders.” Thus, we see a tension between Party norms and the centralizing tendencies of Leninist systems in which the centralizing tendencies usually prevail. With Xi Jinping, we see a far greater personalization of power disrupting the norms and balances existing under previous leaders.
This final chapter looks closely at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 2017. This was a remarkable congress; there had not been such extensive personnel change since Deng Xiaoping took over from Hua Guofeng. Of greatest significance was the personalization of power as Xi elevated two allies to the Politburo who had never served on the Central Committee, as well as four other allies who were promoted from the alternate list of the Central Committee. China had generally avoided such “helicopter promotions” since the Maoist period, but here they were again, underlining the lack of institutionalization and the inability of party institutions to constrain Xi. At the same time, we have seen a renewed emphasis on ideology, combined with nationalism, as Xi has sought to reinvigorate Leninism. Can such a reinvigorated Leninism successfully fight the pathologies looked at in Chapter 4?