Introduction

On 31 May 2016, Resolute Forest Products, a Canadian pulp and paper manufacturer, filed suit against Greenpeace and Stand.earth, environmental organizations that had been engaged in a campaign against Resolute regarding its allegedly unsustainable forestry activities. Resolute accused Greenpeace of racketeering under the United States’ Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, arguing that Greenpeace is a criminal enterprise. Resolute claimed that Greenpeace is a ‘global fraud’ and that it has ‘fraudulently induced people throughout the United States and the world to donate millions of dollars based on materially false and misleading claims about its purported environmental purpose and its “campaigns” against targeted companies’. According to Resolute, ‘maximizing donations, not saving the environment, is Greenpeace's true objective’. After a long legal battle in which the case was transferred to the Northern District of California, the US District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the RICO charges on 22 January 2019, and ordered Resolute to pay part of the defendants’ legal fees. Resolute had previously filed a similar defamation case against Greenpeace Canada and two of its staff members for allegedly distorting the truth in order to raise money. Resolute also lost this case as the Ontario Supreme Court stated that there was not a single example of Greenpeace engaging in the alleged behaviour. The court described the allegations as ‘scandalous and vexatious’. Greenpeace was also sued in relation to its campaign against the Dakota Access Pipeline, by Energy Transfer, in a $900 million case led by Resolute's lawyers. The District Court of North Dakota dismissed these claims as well.

These cases are not unique. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other public watchdogs, such as journalists and academics, are frequently sued for criticizing corporate behaviour. These lawsuits exemplify how corporate actors may strategically and aggressively litigate against public watchdogs to discourage them from speaking out against corporations. Although it is difficult to establish malicious motives behind a lawsuit, these suits are viewed as strategic as their real objective is not to win the case or remedy real harm, but to deter criticism against powerful actors. They are therefore named strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

Abstract: Naming and shaming offenders is often considered an effective strategy to improve compliance. Shaming exposes an offender to condemnation by a community of stakeholders. The threat of negative publicity, reputational damage and social disapproval is perceived as a sanction, and can in theory be more powerful than a formal legal sanction. This chapter asks to what extent naming and shaming can improve compliance. It takes stock of extant empirical evidence on the effect of shaming policies on regulatory compliance and identifies conditions for shaming to affect compliance. The complex relationship between ‘naming and shaming’ and compliance makes it difficult to predict and control the various effects of shaming sanctions. The chapter concludes that the unpredictability of effects makes ‘naming and shaming’ a risky tool for regulators. A theory about naming and shaming should differentiate among types of offender, shaming agent and social context.