When a suspected viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) case presents to a healthcare facility, healthcare personnel must be able to safely provide initial stabilizing care, which may involve performing basic routine laboratory testing. Current gaps exist in the ability of frontline acute care hospitals to safely perform routine laboratory tests on patients with suspected VHFs that generate category A waste. This review outlines a potential solution for frontline acute care hospitals to perform electrolytes, hemoglobin/hematocrit, and malaria testing, in accordance with National Special Pathogens System guidelines, in the patient’s isolation room. We discuss guidance on laboratory risk assessment, equipment considerations, space requirements, staffing solutions, waste management, cost estimates, and remaining challenges. Our manuscript provides frontline acute care hospitals with a potential solution to safely provide a minimum set of routine laboratory tests for patients with suspected VHF.

Background: NYC Health + Hospitals (H+H) provides care to large communities experiencing social vulnerability. During the 2022 mpox outbreak, H+H implemented a large-scale, targeted mpox vaccination campaign using electronic health record (EHR) reminders among groups with greatest risk of mpox infection. When demand was high, 25% of available vaccine appointments were reserved for established H+H patients. This study aims to describe patterns of mpox vaccination amongst eligible H+H patient groups. Methods: H+H started vaccinating with JYNNEOS in May 2022 and used EHR reminders to encourage vaccination amongst those eligible, including: (1) Patients with an HIV diagnosis AND who had a sexually transmitted infection in the past year; OR (2) Patients who received at least one mpox vaccine and was due for the second; OR (3) Patients with a sexual orientation in the EHR as Gay, Bisexual, Lesbian, Something else, or Choose not to disclose; OR (4) Patients with a gender identity in the EHR as Transgender Female, Transgender Male, Gender Non-binary/Nonconforming, Other, or Choose not to disclose. We extracted data from the NYC Citywide Immunization Registry through April 30, 2025, into our EHR. We calculated a Pearson correlation coefficient between the 2022 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) and percentage who received at least one mpox vaccination by zip code with significance set at a p-value <0.05. Results: Figure 1 summarizes key events along the H+H mpox vaccination timeline. There were 112,680 H+H patients eligible for mpox vaccination, of which 25.7% received at least one dose by April 2025, compared to 51.5% amongst patients with HIV (Table). White patients had the highest proportion vaccinated (31.1%), and Hispanic/Latinx patients had the lowest (22.0%). Figure 2 indicates the percentage vaccinated by neighborhood at three time points (September 2022, April 2023, April 2025). As of April 2025, the percentage of eligible individuals vaccinated by zip code was negatively correlated with SVI of the zip code (r= -0.0529; p<0.01) (Figure 3). Conclusion: Amongst eligible H+H patients, we identified disparities in mpox vaccination rates by race/ethnicity, neighborhood, and the zip code SVI. The use of EHR reminders may have helped us achieve a higher vaccination rate amongst eligible patients with HIV, compared to the overall cohort. A limitation may be misclassification of eligible individuals, which relies on structured social history and gender identity data accurately documented in the EHR. Our findings identify areas for quality improvement to optimize vaccine equity.

Background: Outbreaks of Zaire ebolavirus are an ongoing public health threat associated with high case fatality rates. The US Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends preexposure vaccination with rVSV∆G-ZEBOV-GP Ebola vaccine (Brand name: Ervebo), which is effective in preventing disease caused by Zaire ebolavirus, to people at high risk for occupational exposure. We describe the perceptions and desire to be vaccinated with Ervebo among a subset of eligible US healthcare workers (HCWs). Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional online anonymous survey during March-October 2024, distributed to eligible HCWs at three Regional Emerging Special Pathogen Treatment Centers (RESPTCs): NYC Health + Hospitals/Bellevue, University of Texas Medical Branch, and Denver Health & Hospital Authority. Results: There were 66 responses (40% response rate), with the majority aged 30-49 years (63%), female (65%), and either a physician (42%) or nurse (27%). The majority (56%) had received some form of education on Ebola vaccines, most commonly through informational sheets or pamphlets (60%). Thirty-four (51%) were interested in (n=30) or already vaccinated with (n=4) Ervebo. Among those interested or already vaccinated, 44% would choose to receive the vaccine immediately, while 24% would get vaccinated if there were a case of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in the US. Among those not interested or unsure (n=32), most were concerned about risks of spreading the vaccine viral vector (44%), insufficient knowledge about the vaccine (31%), and unacceptable side effects (31%). Among all respondents, the most common concerns about adverse events included potential for a serious side effect (64%) and risk of arthritis (36%). Forty seven percent of respondents were concerned about the potential for spread of the vaccine virus vector. Respondents most frequently wanted more education on potential side effects (67%) and the risk of spreading the vaccine virus vector (59%). Among those not interested in vaccination or unsure (n=32), some may be convinced to accept vaccination if there were an EVD outbreak in the US (44%), if they better understood the risks and benefits of vaccination (34%), and if they better understood the vaccine safety (31%). Conclusion: During a period with no EVD outbreaks, a majority (51%) of eligible HCWs surveyed at three US RESPTCs were interested in or had received Ervebo. A significant proportion (24%) prefer to postpone vaccination until there is a case of EVD in the US. Deployment of Ervebo to eligible US HCWs may be optimized by addressing concerns identified in this study.

This report describes a delayed recognition of mpox in a patient admitted to an inpatient psychiatry unit, resulting in potential exposures to staff and patients. We detail the investigation and risk mitigation efforts and emphasize the importance of prompt identification and isolation in congregate healthcare settings to prevent transmission.

Background: In May 2022, New York City (NYC) experienced a large outbreak of human mpox (clade IIb). Data on mpox transmission following exposure in healthcare facilities in nonendemic settings are limited. Because mpox was previously not seen in NYC, our healthcare staff may not always recognize a suspected case and therefore may neglect to implement timely infection prevention and control measures, leading to infectious exposures. The risk of transmission from unrecognized mpox may be higher in inpatient psychiatric units where direct physical contact is more common in the setting of common spaces for patients. In July 2022, a patient was admitted to NYC Health + Hospitals–Bellevue (Bellevue) psychiatry with signs and symptoms of mpox that were not recognized for 4 days, at which point the patient was tested for mpox and was isolated. We describe the investigation of staff and patients exposed during the 4 days prior to diagnosis and isolation of the index patient, and we report on the outcome mpox infection among those exposed. Methods: This study was a retrospective chart review of adult patients admitted to and staff working on an inpatient psychiatric unit where the patient with mpox was admitted to Bellevue, the largest municipal hospital in NYC. Each individual was classified regarding degree of exposure, based on criteria from the CDC, and was offered postexposure mpox vaccination where indicated. We describe the nature of contact with the patient for those with high-risk exposures. The outcome of interest was development of mpox infection during 21 days after last exposure. Results: In total, 29 patients and 84 staff members were identified to have been on the psychiatric unit prior to isolation of the index case of mpox. All exposed individuals were monitored for signs and symptoms of mpox for 21 days after last exposure. The exposed and unexposed patients were kept apart in the psychiatric unit. All patients who had contact were classified as having a low-to-intermediate risk exposure. Among 23 staff members exposed, 8 had high-risk exposures, 4 had intermediate-risk exposures, and 11 had low-risk exposures. Those with high-risk exposures were offered Jynneos as postexposure vaccination, but they declined. None of the exposed staff or patients developed mpox during the follow-up period. Conclusions: Mpox transmission was not observed despite several exposures in a congregate psychiatry unit. Given limited data, further studies are needed to better understand transmission risk in congregate healthcare settings.

Disclosures: None

During the 2022 mpox outbreak, tecovirimat was accessed through an expanded access investigational new drug (EA-IND) protocol. We leveraged a unique public/private hospital partnership in New York City to create a novel infrastructure to navigate the EA-IND’s regulatory requirements and rapidly provide tecovirimat to patients.

Background: Detection of unusual carbapenemase-producing organisms (CPOs) in a healthcare facility may signify broader regional spread. During investigation of a VIM-producing Pseudomonas aeruginosa (VIM-CRPA) outbreak in a long-term acute-care hospital in central Florida, enhanced surveillance identified VIM-CRPA from multiple facilities, denoting potential regional emergence. We evaluated infection control and performed screening for CPOs in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) across the region to identify potential CPO reservoirs and improve practices. Methods: All SNFs in 2 central Florida counties were offered a facility-wide point-prevalence survey (PPS) for CPOs and a nonregulatory infection control consultation. PPSs were conducted using a PCR-based screening method; specimens with a carbapenemase gene detected were cultured to identify the organisms. Infection control assessments focused on direct observations of hand hygiene (HH), environmental cleaning, and the sink splash zone. Thoroughness of environmental cleaning was evaluated using fluorescent markers applied to 6 standardized high-touch surfaces in at least 2 rooms per facility. Results: Overall, 21 (48%) SNFs in the 2-county region participated; 18 conducted PPS. Bed size ranged from 40 to 391, 5 (24%) facilities were ventilator-capable SNFs (vSNFs), and 12 had short-stay inpatient rehabilitation units. Of 1,338 residents approached, 649 agreed to rectal screening, and 14 (2.2%) carried CPOs. CPO-colonized residents were from the ventilator-capable units of 3 vSNFs (KPC-CRE=7; KPC-CRPA=1) and from short-stay units of 2 additional facilities (VIM-CRPA, n = 5; KPC-CRE, n = 1). Among the 5 facilities where CPO colonization was identified, the prevalence ranged from 1.1% in a short-stay unit to 16.1% in a ventilator unit. All facilities had access to soap and water in resident bathrooms; 14 (67%) had alcohol-based hand rubs accessible. Overall, mean facility HH adherence was 52% (range, 37%–66%; mean observations per facility = 106) (Fig. 1). We observed the use of non–EPA-registered disinfectants and cross contamination from dirty to clean areas during environmental cleaning; the overall surface cleaning rate was 46% (n = 178 rooms); only 1 room had all 6 markers removed. Resident supplies were frequently stored in the sink splash zone. Conclusions: A regional assessment conducted in response to emergence of VIM-CRPA identified a relatively low CPO prevalence at participating SNFs; CPOs were primarily identified in vSNFs and among short-stay residents. Across facilities, we observed low adherence to core infection control practices that could facilitate spread of CPOs and other resistant organisms. In this region, targeting ventilator and short-stay units of SNFs for surveillance and infection control efforts may have the greatest prevention impact.

Funding: None

Disclosures: None

The COVID-19 pandemic has placed unprecedented demands on health systems, where hospitals have become overwhelmed with patients amidst limited resources. Disaster response and resource allocation during such crises present multiple challenges. A breakdown in communication and organization can lead to unnecessary disruptions and adverse events. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) promotes the use of an incident command system (ICS) model during large-scale disasters, and we hope that an institutional disaster plan and ICS will help to mitigate these lapses. In this article, we describe the alignment of an emergency department (ED) specific Forward Command structure with the hospital ICS and address the challenges specific to the ED. Key components of this ICS include a hospital-wide incident command or Joint Operations Center (JOC) and an ED Forward Command. This type of structure leads to a shared mental model with division of responsibilities that allows institutional adaptations to changing environments and maintenance of specific roles for optimal coordination and communication. We present this as a model that can be applied to other hospital EDs around the country to help structure the response to the COVID-19 pandemic while remaining generalizable to other disaster situations.