Scholars in the twenty-first century increasingly describe a transformation in the architecture of global governance: from state-led international organizations to one of partnerships, networks, clubs, and layers populated by nongovernmental organizations, public–private partnerships, private organizations, corporations, and foundations. This introductory chapter tees up the core question for this edited volume: how do we understand these new architectures, and how do they reflect the changing relations between the actors involved in contemporary global governance? In order to better understand whether and how relations among the now myriad key actors have changed, it uses the lens of modes of governance, and focuses the analysis on three ideal-typical modes drawn from economic and sociological institutionalism. Hierarchical modes are characterized by top-down, centralized, organizational forms. Market modes are organized around non-hierarchical principles that regulate relatively independent actors. Network modes are characterized by relatively interdependent actors with a common purpose that voluntarily negotiate their rules through bargaining and persuasion. The chapter argues that the transformations in global governance are better understood not in terms of changes in actors but rather changes in relations among actors. It reviews the various forces behind the change, and emphasizes the necessity of examining both structures and preferences.

Since the cataclysm of World War II, the international order has grown increasingly institutionalized. Hundreds of international organizations (IOs) and tens of thousands of treaties now exist, many with widespread – and in some cases nearly universal – membership. International institutions existed before 1945, of course, and even before the outbreak of World War I. But compared to these earlier eras, the international system today is far more densely populated by rules and institutions.

At one level, this is a sign of the robustness of international cooperation. Great wars yield great reorderings, and the reordering that took place after 1945 was unusual in its focus on the construction of a rule-based and multilateral system (Ikenberry 2000; Patrick 2009). Yet, the significance of the postwar growth of rules and institutions is contested. For some, it is a sign of healthy maturation toward a more cooperative world, increasingly “lapt in universal law” (Tennyson 1881: 54). For others, international institutions are simply big government writ global: irrelevant at best and, at worst, a menace to national sovereignty (e.g., Rabkin 2004). Even those inclined toward a positive view of international institutions, however, sometimes see a dark side to the robust growth that has taken place in recent decades. Too many rules, and too many institutions to administer and adjudicate them, can fragment and complicate the international order.

Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) make it clear that the risks of global climate change are even greater than previously realized. Yet commensurate progress in negotiating a meaningful future agreement remains elusive. Since maintenance of a stable climate is a public good, both theory and history suggest it will be undersupplied. Furthermore, the costs of climate change will largely fall on politically weak developing countries, whereas the costs of emissions reduction will largely fall on industrialized countries. Consequently, agreement on any meaningful international regulatory system has been and will continue to be very difficult. With the 1997 Kyoto Protocol coming to an end in 2012, however, the design of a new regulatory regime is essential.

Any international regime aimed at the mitigation of climate change must solve three problems: (1) secure sufficient participation to be effective; (2) achieve agreement on rules that are meaningful, so that if they were followed, climate change would indeed be mitigated; and (3) ensure compliance with the rules. That is, it must solve problems of participation, effectiveness, and compliance. Solving all three problems simultaneously is particularly difficult, since these goals are often in tension. The most direct trade-off is between participation and the strictness of the rules, since as rules become stricter, reluctant states become even more reluctant to be bound by them. Similarly, as participation becomes wider, agreement may only become possible on lax rules.