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25 results

Page 1 of 2

A Philosopher Looks at Clothes
  • Kate Moran
  • Coming soon
  • Expected online publication date:
    May 2025
    Print publication:
    05 June 2025
  • Clothes are much more than just what we put on in the morning. They express our identity; they can be an independent statement or the result of coercion; and they have deeply entrenched historical, political, and social aspects. Kate Moran explores the connections between clothes and philosophy, showing how clothes can illustrate and pose philosophical problems, and how philosophical ideas influence clothing. She discusses what it might mean for an article of clothing to be beautiful; how we communicate with clothes; how we use clothes to navigate our social existence; and how our social existence leaves its mark on our clothes. She also considers the curious relationship between philosophers and children's clothes, legal restrictions on clothing, textile waste, and labor conditions of textile workers. Her absorbing and engaging portrait of our clothes helps us to understand an important and underexplored aspect of our lives.

  • Kant on Despondent Moral Failure

  • Kate Moran
  • Journal:
    Kantian Review / Volume 28 / Issue 1 / March 2023
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    06 January 2023, pp. 125-141
    Print publication:
    March 2023
    • Article
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      • Open access
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  • Typically, Kant describes maxims that violate the moral law as engaging in a kind of comparative judgement: the person who makes a false promise judges it best – at least subjectively – to deceive her friend. I argue that this is not the only possible account of moral failure for Kant. In particular, when we examine maxims of so-called despondency (Verzagtheit) we find that some maxims are resistant to comparative judgement. I argue that this is true for at least two reasons: first, the despondent agent has a maxim to avoid suffering at all costs; second, this anxious preoccupation with suffering makes the despondent agent prone to failures associated with the imagination and its role in creating an ideal of happiness.

Kant's Ethics

Kant's Ethics
  • Kate A. Moran
  • Published online:
    10 February 2022
    Print publication:
    10 March 2022
  • The Element provides an overview of Immanuel Kant's arguments regarding the content of the moral law (the categorical imperative), as well as an exposition of his arguments for the bindingness of the moral law for rational agents. The Element also considers common objections to Kant's ethics.

  • Mental health before and during the COVID-19 pandemic in two longitudinal UK population cohorts

  • Alex S. F. Kwong, Rebecca M. Pearson, Mark J. Adams, Kate Northstone, Kate Tilling, Daniel Smith, Chloe Fawns-Ritchie, Helen Bould, Naomi Warne, Stanley Zammit, David J. Gunnell, Paul A. Moran, Nadia Micali, Abraham Reichenberg, Matthew Hickman, Dheeraj Rai, Simon Haworth, Archie Campbell, Drew Altschul, Robin Flaig, Andrew M. McIntosh, Deborah A. Lawlor, David Porteous, Nicholas J. Timpson
  • Journal:
    The British Journal of Psychiatry / Volume 218 / Issue 6 / June 2021
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    24 November 2020, pp. 334-343
    Print publication:
    June 2021
    • Article
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      • Open access
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  • Background

    The COVID-19 pandemic and mitigation measures are likely to have a marked effect on mental health. It is important to use longitudinal data to improve inferences.

    Aims

    To quantify the prevalence of depression, anxiety and mental well-being before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Also, to identify groups at risk of depression and/or anxiety during the pandemic.

    Method

    Data were from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC) index generation (n = 2850, mean age 28 years) and parent generation (n = 3720, mean age 59 years), and Generation Scotland (n = 4233, mean age 59 years). Depression was measured with the Short Mood and Feelings Questionnaire in ALSPAC and the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 in Generation Scotland. Anxiety and mental well-being were measured with the Generalised Anxiety Disorder Assessment-7 and the Short Warwick Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale.

    Results

    Depression during the pandemic was similar to pre-pandemic levels in the ALSPAC index generation, but those experiencing anxiety had almost doubled, at 24% (95% CI 23–26%) compared with a pre-pandemic level of 13% (95% CI 12–14%). In both studies, anxiety and depression during the pandemic was greater in younger members, women, those with pre-existing mental/physical health conditions and individuals in socioeconomic adversity, even when controlling for pre-pandemic anxiety and depression.

    Conclusions

    These results provide evidence for increased anxiety in young people that is coincident with the pandemic. Specific groups are at elevated risk of depression and anxiety during the COVID-19 pandemic. This is important for planning current mental health provisions and for long-term impact beyond this pandemic.

  • Neither justice nor charity? Kant on ‘general injustice’

  • Kate A. Moran
  • Journal:
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 47 / Issue 4 / 2017
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2020, pp. 477-498

  • We often make a distinction between what we owe as a matter of repayment, and what we give or offer out of charity. But how shall we describe our obligations to fellow citizens when we are in a position to be charitable because of a past injustice on the part of the state? This essay examines the moral implications of past injustice by considering Immanuel Kant’s remarks on this phenomenon in his lectures and writings. In particular, it discusses the role of the state and the individual in addressing the problem.

  • Chapter 10 - Inclination, Need, and Moral Misery

  • from Part III - Freedom as Autonomous Willing: Kant’s Sensible Agent
  • Edited by Kate A. Moran, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
  • Book:
    Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity
    Published online:
    07 September 2018
    Print publication:
    27 September 2018, pp 195-213

  • Summary

    Kate Moran considers the attitude that autonomous agents ought to take toward inclination. Kant himself often describes inclination as the antagonist of moral willing and virtuous struggle, even suggesting at one point that "to be entirely free from [inclination] must … be the wish of every rational being" (GMS 4:428). Moran argues that this assertion – and others like it – are often misunderstood as a wholesale indictment of inclination. She offers an analysis of the text that demonstrates that Kant’s concern is not with inclination as such, but with inclination as a source of need and neediness. The chapter continues to consider Kant’s conception of neediness, and his account of the ideal stance toward inclination – something he calls independence. Although independence is an impossible ideal for free, yet sensible, agents, it is nonetheless an informative ideal. In particular, the ideal serves as a standard against which one can measure the ways in which agents fall short of complete independence. Moran offers a sketch of the "moral misery" that agents experience when need gains ascendancy over freedom.

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