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The book collects thirteen previously published essays by Keith Dowding on social and political power, freedom, choice and luck. It is anchored by a substantial introductory essay that pulls together the different strands to demonstrate the coherence and connections between the different concepts discussed through the book. The book demonstrates the importance of the concept of power to political science and argues that comparative static definitions enable comparison of power structures in terms of agents’ resources. It shows the importance of systematic luck in understanding the power structure. However, static definitions are inherently unsatisfactory in dynamic settings. Here we need to apply game theory rather than game forms, and in dynamic settings luck is vital to our perception of freedom, responsibility and leadership. Later chapters reveal the problematic evaluation of choice and freedom and how these relate to responsibility. The book concludes by demonstrating that freedom and rights exist in different senses, which matter for our understanding of how much freedom exists in a society. It shows that Sen’s liberal paradox is ambiguous between rights as claims and rights as liberties; how fundamental his paradox is to our understanding of the conflict between rights and welfare depends on the manner in which we evaluate freedom.
Brian Barry attacks the ‘resource account’ of power, providing a set of definitions through which power should be analysed. While there might be different, equally good, ways of defining power, I argue that my formulations are superior to those of Barry, as they produce fewer anomalies and provide a better foundation for empirical research. The chapter defends the resource account against Barry’s criticisms and argues for the utility of the ideas of luck and ‘systematic luck’.
Egalitarians claim that inequality in society is only justified to the extent that it results from choices freely and responsibly made. Inequality resulting from brute bad luck is not justified. I argue that luck, and therefore responsibility, are defined in terms of the reward structure. Luck and responsibility are epiphenomena of the incentives that people have to choose from the opportunity sets available. Egalitarians should therefore look more directly at the degree of inequality that is acceptable and examine more closely the classes of actions they want to leave to individual responsibility even where these will lead to greater inequality. State action should concentrate upon reducing inequality between classes of people; it cannot be expected to reduce all inequalities between people, even though many will have only peripheral relationships to responsibility.
The techniques of social choice and game theory are increasingly being used to analyse concepts in political theory. Although these techniques may prove invaluable for teasing out contradictory formulations, puzzles and problems with traditional concepts, formal writers often begin their analysis with simplistic intuitive accounts rather than building on earlier traditions in analytic political theory. This is particularly apparent in social-choice and game-theory analysis of rights and freedoms. This chapter reviews these approaches and demonstrates that by ignoring the grammar of rights and freedoms, social-choice and game-theory analysis goes wrong from the very beginning. Formal writers need to take more account of the history of their subject, as developed in the analytic theory tradition.
Conceptualizing and measuring choice is problematic both in theory and in practice. Measuring by counting the alternatives seems counterintuitive, as a smaller set of better or more diverse alternatives seems to provide more choice than one that is simply larger. However, concentrating upon better alternatives leads to choice being defined by welfare or utility, which is also counterintuitive. The chapter considers the implications of this paradox in relation to examples drawn from the choice agenda in British social policy. It examines the empirical difficulties in measuring welfare gains through implementing greater choice at a time of other central-led policy initiatives such as targets, and discusses the extant evidence. It suggests criteria for judging whether or not choice has been welfare-enhancing. It argues that ‘soft choice’, where service providers supply information and explain different options, is preferable to ‘hard’ choice involving simplistic targets to increase choice by box-ticking.
Republican freedom is freedom from domination, whereas negative freedom is freedom from interference. Proponents argue that republican freedom is superior, since it highlights that individuals can lose freedoms even when they are not subject to interference, and claim republican freedom is more ‘resilient’. I examine the debate through the ‘coalition problem’ for republican freedom. Ssince there is always a coalition of others who could dominate any agent in any sphere, all agents are subject to domination, and hence no one can ever have republican freedom. Pettit’s simple solution to this reductio ad absurdum distinguishes potential from actual coalitions: individuals are only dominated by actual not potential coalitions. The simple solution highlights moralization problems as it demonstrates that domination cannot be purely institutionally defined, but requires consideration of dispositions and expectations about others’ behaviour. I argue that the differences between the ‘free man’ and ‘unfree person’ paradigmatic to republican arguments are best captured not by the difference between domination and interference but, rather, from familiar distinctions between different types of rights and freedoms. Resilience is a practical matter that might track some of these familiar distinctions.
People plan strategies to enable them to get what they want. Obviously, luck plays a part in achieving their desires. The question becomes: can one plan for that luck? As luck is normally defined and understood, the answer would be no. However, if luck is defined on the basis of obtaining what one wants without trying, as suggested by Brian Barry, then it is possible to consider a strategy of planning for luck. Indeed, one may plan only for luck and, with foresight in developing one’s future luck, this may be more efficient than other strategies. This chapter explains how this may be so through an examination of power based on cooperative game theory.
Many debates over the ‘true’ nature of power relationships concern the importance given to agents or to structures in describing those relationships. Those who discuss the power structure or system tend to concentrate upon structures; those who write about the power of agents or power relationships tend to concentrate upon actors. The agency–structure relationship goes deep into many seemingly different issues in very different approaches to power. I argue that whilst the agency–structure divide is false, our interpretation of the world – the way in which we describe it – means we cannot fully transcend the structure–agency divide using natural language. Whether we choose to use the language of structures or of agents depends upon the questions we are seeking to answer and the commitments we wish to make in assigning responsibility. Ultimately, structural and agential accounts can describe the world in non-contradictory ways, though the choice of description demonstrates the sorts of commitments the describer has towards changing the world.
Being pluralist about the concept of power does not mean that all definitions are equally valid. Many definitions are non-rival and gain their utility from the specific contexts in which they are applied. Others are rival and their relative utility derives from how good an explanation is provided by the theory of which they are part. Such explanation is constrained by the world, because good explanation is constrained by the expectations it engenders. Some conceptions of power and related terms do similar explanatory work, but hold different normative values. The contestability of ‘power’ derives from the normative work it does in different contexts and explanations. By making our concepts as non-normative as possible, we can ensure that moral or political disagreement is brought into the open. How we define social and political power does matter in some contexts for both explanatory and normative reasons.
Much has been made in recent years of increasing the choice of the citizen-consumer. This article argues that the concept of ‘increasing choice’ is far more problematic than at first appears and has little intrinsic value in itself. Choice is only to be valued in itself in the sense that the process of choice or decision-making plays a part in our discovery of our own preferences. To justify the introduction of the market process on the grounds of increasing choice is doubly wrong; first, increasing choice is not in itself valuable and, secondly, what is valuable about the market has little to do with choice.
This chapter discusses the links between the concepts of power, luck and freedom that are elucidated in the subsequent chapters of the book. It argues that comparative static definitions of power are correct for understanding the power structure of society and for comparing power across societies, but will always be inherently disappointing as power in action is dynamic. It discusses the nature of dynamic power and relates that to individual freedom, control and responsibility, demonstrating how luck underpins our understanding of freedom and responsibility.