This chapter puts Donald Trump’s populism in comparative perspective by applying the theory developed in chapter 2 and substantiated in chapters 3 to 5 to the US case. My analysis highlights the great institutional strength of US democracy and the unlikelihood of acute and severe crises and of huge windfalls, given the complexity and prosperity of US economy and society. As a result, populism is exceedingly unlikely to suffocate US democracy -- contrary to recent observers’ fears. The chapter substantiates these arguments through an in-depth examination of the Trump experience, which establishes intense partisan and affective polarization as another obstacle to the American populist’s ability to boost his mass support. Trump’s haphazard agency and very mixed governing performance created further limiations. Therefore, despite Trump’s relentless challenges to liberal norms and long-established institutions, US democracy held firm, even during the unprecedented post-electoral crisis of 2020/21. Indeed, the US’s vibrant civil society spearheaded a pro-democratic backlash that brought the electoral defeat of a populist leader who never managed to garner majority support in a highly polarized polity.

This chapter summarizes my theory about the restrictive “necessary conditions” for the populist destruction of democracy; conversely, democracy proves resilient when these conditions are absent. More broadly, this book reaffirms the crucial importance of democracies’ institutional frameworks and corroborates the analytical value of my political-strategic definition of populism. While my theory emphasizes the main domestic factors that condition populism’s regime impact, I also discuss the role of cross-country diffusion, which can exacerbate populist pressures on liberal democracy. Moreover, inside countries with weak party systems, there can be a succession of populist leaders over time; but their limited political clout prevents them from doing grave damage to democracy. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of prominent Asian cases of populism demonstrates the broader applicability of my theory, but also uncovers some specific country and regional characteristics that affect populism’s effect on democracy in some cases. The book concludes with a restatement of the main argument, namely that populism’s threat to democracy -- while substantial -- is not as grave as many recent observers have feared.

This chapter highlights the global wave of populism and the intense fears about democracy’s fate to which it has given rise. I explain why indeed, populism inherently threatens liberal democracy. Then I summarize my main argument, namely that this danger is often averted; consequently, populism’s effective threat is much less severe than often feared. Instead, the analysis of a comprehensive set of populist experiences in Latin America and Europe shows that under many circumstances, democracy proves resilient to populism’s threat; populist leaders manage to suffocate democracy only under special, restrictive conditions. The chapter then defines the central terms, namely democracy, democracy’s destruction, and populism; for the latter, heavily contested concept, I employ my political-strategic definition, whose conceptual validity and analytical value I thoroughly explain. Finally, I justify the study’s focus on Latin America, Europe, and the USA and preview the subsequent chapters with brief summaries of the main arguments and findings.

This chapter documents the restrictive conditions under which rightwing, traditionalist populism managed to destroy democracy in Europe. Only Victor Orban of Hungary (2010-present) and Recep Erdogan of Turkey (2003-present) have accomplished this feat because they benefited from the institutional openness of parliamentary systems and faced an acute, severe crisis in the economy. This massive problem discredited the established parties, so the two populist leaders won clear parliamentary majorities, succeeded in dismantling the remaining checks and balances, and established authoritarianism. In the absence of a crisis and a reliable parliamentary majority, by contrast, Polish populists have tried to push aside institutional constraints through para-legal maneuvers, but have provoked substantial domestic and international pushback, which has defended democracy. Moreover, several populists in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, who did not encounter conjunctural, resolvable economic crises, did not manage to still their power hunger and asphyxiate democracy. Facing similar conditions, Silvio Berlusconi in Italy (1994, 2001–2006, 2008–2011) left democracy intact as well.

This chapter documents the restrictive conditions under which rightwing, neoliberal populism managed to destroy democracy in Latin America. Only Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990–2000) and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador (2019-present) have accomplished this feat because they benefited from institutional weaknesses of their countries’ presidential systems and, at the same time, managed to resolve two acute, severe crises, in the economy as well as in public security; this “miraculous” success earned them overwhelming political support, which they leveraged for dismantling the remaining checks and balances. Whereas Fujimori ended hyperinflation and defeated a countrywide guerrilla insurgency, presidents who resolved only one such crisis; who failed to overcome such a challenge; or who did not face a crisis at all, did not manage to still their power hunger and asphyxiate democracy. And whereas Bukele successfully contained the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic and greatly lowered rampant gang violence, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022), who did not face such challenges, was unable to boost his mass support and therefore lost his reelection bid.

My theory argues that populist chief executives manage to concentrate power and asphyxiate democracy only under special, restrictive conditions, namely when a distinctive institutional weakness and a special conjunctural opportunity for achieving overwhelming mass support coincide. I distinguish 3 types of institutional weakness: a) susceptibility to para-legal change in Latin American presidentialism; b) exceptionally high instability in that region; and c) the attenuated checks and balances of European parliamentarism. Conjunctural opportunities arise from huge revenue windfalls, with which populist leaders can “buy” massive support via ample benefit distribution; or from acute, severe, yet resolvable crises: If populist leaders can bring “miraculous” relief, they receive an outpouring of support. As my scoring of 40 cases shows, these institutional weaknesses and conjunctural opportunities combine in ways that correspond to 3 wellknown types of populism. Accordingly, the theory elucidates the unusual conditions under which a few neoliberal populists in Latin America, leftwing, “Bolivarian” populists in Latin America, and rightwing, traditional populists in Europe have destroyed democracy.

This chapter documents the restrictive conditions under which leftwing, “Bolivarian” populism managed to destroy democracy in Latin America. Only Hugo Chavez of Venezuela (1999–2013), Evo Morales of Bolivia (2006–2019), and Rafael Correa of Ecuador (2007–2017) accomplished this feat because they benefited from the high instability plaguing their countries’ presidential systems and, at the same time, from the enormous hydrocarbon revenues provided by the global commodities boom. By distributing massive benefits to ample population sectors, they won overwhelming political support, which they leveraged for dismantling the remaining, already battered checks and balances. By contrast, presidents who did not benefit from such a huge windfall or who governed in countries not suffering from high institutional instability did not manage to still their power hunger and asphyxiate democracy. Instead, some of these leftwing populists suffered irregular evictions from office, whereas others managed to serve out their terms, but failed to perpetuate themselves in power and strangle democracy.