This chapter assesses the enduring relationship between the military role of the United States in Europe, through its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and European integration from the Cold War to the present. It argues that, during the Cold War, western European security cooperation was conceived as part of a wider endeavour, which also included the United States and Canada. Also after the end of the East--West division, diverging priorities among the European countries and their preference for intergovernmental rather than supranational cooperation, together with US determination to preserve the transatlantic alliance, bolstered NATO’s role as the bedrock of European defence, while confining the role of European institutions to the range of peacekeeping and crisis management tasks. After reviewing the current state of the art of research on European security and defence, the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section focuses on the relationship between transatlantic and European security in the late 1940s, showing how western Europe’s security initiatives, such as the Dunkirk Treaty and the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO), endeavoured to secure a US pledge against the Soviet threat rather than to foster defence integration in Europe. The second section debates the project of a European Defence Community (EDC) in the early 1950s, emphasising diverging west European perceptions of the EDC and of West German rearmament. More specifically, France viewed the EDC mostly as an intergovernmental toolbox to control the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), rather than a truly supranational organisation. This section also argues that the British declined to participate, dreading the prospect of undermining NATO. After the EDC’s failure in 1954, the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) unequivocally left west European defence under the US umbrella.

INTRODUCTION

National legal systems are struggling to work out whether, and if so how, employment laws should apply to new forms of non-standard employment including work in the so-called gig economy, performed through online platforms often located in countries different from where the person actually performs her tasks. Many, but by no means all, of those working in these jobs are migrant workers circulating within the EU or coming from third countries.

A number of issues emerge in the EU regulatory space, such as the rise of non-standard work; the breaking down of work; micro-labour; the short duration of work; the use of algorithms to assign work, fix prices and to evaluate workers; uncertainty, insecurity, isolation and precarity; health and safety issues; and discrimination and fundamental rights.

It seems that not all such issues have been addressed by the loose, stipulatory definition of ‘collaborative economy’ adopted by the EU Commission in the 2016 Communication ‘A European agenda for the collaborative economy’. Referred to individuals providing their services, the document defines them as ’service providers who share assets, resources, time and/or skills – these can be private individuals offering services on an occasional basis (“peers”) or service providers acting in their professional capacity (“professional services providers”)’.

In light of such a definition, the EU is now given the chance to better address a number of legal questions arising from the multi-level context typical of the union, taking into account the interests stemming from social partners and other civil society instances.

A much clearer avenue has been taken by the EU Commission with the launch of two rounds of consultation on a possible action addressing the challenges related to working conditions of platform workers. In February 2021, the commission opened a consultation with social partners at the EU level according to Article 154(2) TFEU, already articulating its strategy to develop sustainable growth for platforms and tackle the most pressing issues for platform workers. In June 2021, the commission published a second-phase consultation document, clarifying the possible direction of an EU intervention in the field of platform work.

Anglo-American views and West Germany's relationship with NATO

This chapter focuses on Anglo-American views of Germany's relationship with NATO. While the question of a peace settlement had caused tension, the issue of Germany's relationship with NATO was one of overall Anglo-American agreement. By April 1990 there was a strong consensus in Washington and London that a united Germany should remain a member of the Western alliance. Nonetheless, there were nuances in Anglo-American approaches. Britain's preference was to discuss unification in the CSCE in order to appease the Russians. Only after Washington's rejection of British proposals did London endorse US demands for a united Germany's membership of the alliance. The British also supported Washington's ambitious review of NATO's strategy, which made the organisation more political and less military and part of a security structure for the whole of Europe. Ultimately, Whitehall helped the White House overcome Soviet resistance and French uncertainties. The British also contributed to preventing Bonn from making excessive concessions to Moscow. However, although there was a closeness of positions, NATO's transformation was not the product of a joint Anglo-American initiative. In contrast, this process reflected the American vision for the alliance, rather than one that emerged through the usual channels of NATO bureaucracy or bilateral Anglo-American negotiations.

The Federal government's initial cautiousness on this issue had been a cause of apprehension for both the White House and Whitehall. As in the heyday of Brandt's Eastern policy – when Nixon and Heath had feared the Federal Republic's neutralisation – the perception that there might not be a firm consensus in Bonn over Germany's commitment to the alliance caused concern.

The US, the UK and the origins of Bonn's Ostpolitik

This second chapter focuses on Anglo-American approaches to the German question during East–West détente. It first debates the evolution in Anglo-American policies in the context of East– West relations, their encouragement for an evolution in West Germany's attitude to détente, and their reactions to the FRG's Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik in the late 1960s and early 1970s until the signing in August 1975 of the CSCE Final Act. The chapter argues that, while Washington and London formally maintained a commitment to German unity, during détente an Anglo-American consensus consolidated around the understanding that the country's division would be a long-term feature of East–West relations. It then debates how US and British views of the German question evolved in the second half of the 1970s, following the rapid deterioration in relations with Moscow which was brought about by the Euro-missiles crisis, conflicting approaches to the CSCE third basket and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The chapter concludes that, after a period of tension in US–German relations, which coincided with the presidency of Jimmy Carter in the US and the chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt in the FRG, in the early 1980s Helmut Kohl's commitment to NATO proved a major factor in reassuring Washington.

In the early 1960s the cautious Anglo-American reactions to the Berlin Wall had made it evident that Washington and London saw no immediate urgency in ameliorating the situation in Germany and Berlin. Bonn interpreted allied conduct during the Berlin crisis as proof of a receding Western commitment to German unity. This perception was one of the key factors in prompting an evolution in the Federal government's policy towards the Soviet bloc and the GDR. With Anglo-American policy encouraging more flexibility, in the early 1960s the Federal Republic began a fundamental re-examination of its Eastern policy.

This book is organised into two main sections. The first discusses Anglo-American views of the German question from the Potsdam Conference until Gorbachev's election to general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1985 and the embrace of glasnost and perestroika. The second section focuses on the dynamics of 1989–90, debating Anglo-American approaches to the German question at the Cold War's end.

The first section includes three chapters. The first focuses on the German question from the Cold War's early stages until West German rearmament. The second discusses Anglo-American policy towards Germany during European détente. The third evaluates Anglo-American perceptions of dynamics in Germany following Gorbachev's reforms in the second half of the 1980s.

More specifically, the first chapter debates Anglo-American views of Germany in the context of a deteriorating relationship with Moscow. It focuses on the Potsdam Conference, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin blockade, the 1953 East Berlin riots, West German rearmament and membership of the Atlantic Alliance in 1955. During the early stages of the Cold War the US and Britain endeavoured to integrate Germany into the Atlantic and European structures, but British policy was influenced by London's attempt to preserve a great power status and by fresh memories of the two world wars.

The second chapter focuses on Anglo-American views about Germany during détente. It debates the evolution in Anglo- American policies, their approaches to the Berlin crisis of 1958–61 and the evolution of the FRG's grand strategy from Western integration to Ostpolitik. It also discusses Anglo-American perceptions of the FRG's policy towards the GDR or Deutschlandpolitik until the signing in August 1975 of the CSCE Final Act at the end of the Helsinki conference. While the US and Britain formally maintained a commitment to German unity, during détente a certain Anglo-American consensus consolidated that the country's division would be a long-term feature of European politics. Thirty years after the conclusion of the War, a number of Anglo- American officials interpreted the signing of the CSCE Final Act as a durable, if not permanent, arrangement of the European status quo rather than a potential first step towards unification, as it was seen in Bonn.

The second part of this book debates how the US and West Germany managed to build on the events of 1989 to harness the momentum of the East European revolutions, overcome widespread resistance to unification and enforce a major transformation in Europe and NATO. Nonetheless, as this process unfolded, division in the Anglo-American camp deepened and the special relationship was superseded by a growing convergence of US and West German strategies. As a result of diverging Anglo-American priorities, Britain's role became secondary, if not marginal, in hammering out the details of unification. London continued to affirm in public that stability in Europe would be difficult to achieve as long as Germany remained divided. However, Britain's prime minister maintained an openly critical attitude towards Bonn. Thatcher's difficult relationship with Kohl further augmented her determination to block or at least to slow down unification. At the beginning of 1990 Whitehall even contemplated the prospect of a continental bloc against German unity. Nonetheless, the British were unable to rally enough support from other European nations. London was also unwilling to support French efforts to deepen European integration. Ultimately, Thatcher attempted to work out a compromise with the Kremlin, supporting the preservation of a Russian presence in East Germany and backing Gorbachev's preferences for an expanded CSCE structure. Only when faced by US firmness and having failed to convince the French and the Russians to block unification did London reluctantly align with Washington, endorsing German unity within NATO and US plans for the alliance's reform.

Anglo-American views of Germany at Potsdam

This first chapter examines Anglo-American views of Germany from the Potsdam Conference, which opened on 17 July 1945 and ended in August with an agreement between the Three Powers, establishing quadripartite rights and responsibilities through France's association, to the FRG's inclusion into NATO in May 1955. Although US and British views were powerfully influenced by the dynamics of their relationship with the Soviet Union, in the early stages of the Cold War there was not a consolidated Anglo- American consensus about Germany. The East–West structure powerfully shaped almost every aspect of Anglo-American policy in Europe, making Germany's unification for a number of years a remote possibility. Furthermore, both US and British decisionmakers ostensibly pursued national strategies, which were not always inspired by a shared vision about Germany's place in the post-War order. From the early stages of the Potsdam Conference US decision-makers endeavoured to constrain Soviet influence and after 1948 they favoured West Germany's rehabilitation and rapid integration into the Western security system. In contrast, Britain was driven by the concern to preserve its world standing and by a persistent distrust of the Germans. As a result, London initially attempted to preserve a degree of cooperation with Moscow and only gradually supported American initiatives to restore West German sovereignty.

The Potsdam Conference – convened ten weeks after Admiral Karl Dönitz signed the Third Reich's act of surrender on 8 May 1945 – was the first chapter in a long story of failed Anglo- American and Soviet endeavours to reach an arrangement on Germany. However, East–West disagreements there quickly turned the German question into one of the most pressing and intricate issues of the emerging post-War settlement in Europe.

As one of the Cold War triggers and in light of its persistent endurance during the East–West division, the German question undoubtedly represents a primary indicator of the vitality and strength of the special relationship in the second half of the twentieth century. While Anglo-American relations were influenced by a number of complex and diverse dynamics, the problem of Germany remained, although with varying intensity, a constant preoccupation for US and British decision-makers from Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945 until its unification in October 1990. Nonetheless, while Washington and London regarded Germany as the centrepiece of their European policy, Anglo-American strategies did not always coincide. In the first half of the 1950s US and British decision-makers worked closely to secure the FRG's rearmament and integration into the West. However, before and after the formation of the two blocs in Europe Britain entertained hopes for an arrangement with the USSR. This desire also influenced British attitudes towards Germany during the period of East–West détente. During the late 1950s and early 1960s London struggled to adapt to the realities of its international decline. Nonetheless, British decision-makers continued to hope that their country could assert itself as a middleman between the two superpowers. As part of this strategy, London encouraged Bonn to a gradual opening up to the East in order to defuse tension between the two blocs. However, the British did not fully realise the implications that this policy would have for East–West relations.

In the same time period, the US, facing expanding budget deficits and the consequences of a protracted conflict in Vietnam, also supported the FRG's diplomatic initiatives towards the Soviet bloc. Nonetheless, both London and Washington remained suspicious of Bonn's long-term ambitions and of the repercussions of West German policy on the cohesion of the West. In the early 1970s both the Americans and the British reacted with concern when the Federal government's initiatives exceeded their expectations. Both Washington and London now resented, to a certain extent, the FRG's increasing status and growing influence on East–West relations. In the aftermath of Ostpolitik the special relationship was reaffirmed during the Helsinki conference by a common Anglo- American determination to emphasise the ongoing responsibilities of the Four Powers on the German question and Berlin.

Gorbachev's election, the European security debate and the German question

Both the US and Britain greeted with enthusiasm Moscow's embrace of glasnost and perestroika following Gorbachev's election as the CPSU's first secretary in March 1985. Even before Gorbachev had come to power there had been signs of easing East–West tensions. Thatcher had already made clear her support for a thaw in relations with Moscow. The Reagan administration, now in its second term, also began to soften its stance. However, the new Soviet course rapidly rekindled latent Anglo-American differences over Germany. In the late 1980s as popular manifestations of dissent in the East forcefully brought the German question back on the international agenda, US and British strategies drifted apart. Washington cheered transformation, backing Bonn's quest for unification, on the condition that a united Germany remained firmly anchored into Western institutions. In contrast, the British reacted with caution mixed with concern at the prospect of change in Germany. Their first response was to reiterate a commitment to the principle of self-determination. However, London viewed with diffidence Bonn's initiatives, feared the implications of dynamics in Germany and attempted to strike an uncomfortable balance between change in the GDR, but not necessarily German unity, and its long-standing commitment to unification. In the following years Britain's preference for preserving the status quo caused irritation in Washington, weakening Anglo-American solidarity. How the special relationship between the US and the United Kingdom was affected by these dynamics is the detailed subject of this chapter.

Thatcher, Mitterrand and the EEC Strasbourg Council

This chapter explores Anglo-American views on the German question from late December 1989 until the spring of 1990. It shows how the Federal government's determination to press ahead with its version of German unity rapidly turned into a motive of Anglo- American controversy. While Whitehall denounced the risks of a hastened path towards unification, by mid-January 1990 the Bush administration backed Kohl's fast-track approach. Washington also endeavoured to reassure the Russians and its West European allies. Unable to influence American views, Thatcher initially turned to France, then she tried to delay unification with the Kremlin's help. Nonetheless, the British failed to work out an arrangement with either Paris or Moscow and London's initiatives to slow down unification were countered by the Bush administration. The US government pressed for a solution that would allow the two German states to play a role alongside the Four Powers in the unification process. In contrast, Whitehall tried to hold on to the remnants of Four Power sovereignty and only in the final stages of the negotiations supported US views.

In December 1989 Bonn's public calls for German unification had become a cause of serious concern in a number of European countries. These concerns had emerged first in early December at the NATO Brussels summit. On this occasion, the Italians and the British had expressed significant reservations about Kohl's ten points and Baker's four points.

Germany's unification in October 1990 was one of the most momentous events in European history in the second half of the twentieth century. Its unique historical value stems from the highly symbolic and emotional significance of the events that made the unification of the two German states possible. German unity ended the Cold War in Europe, which for forty years had divided Germany and the continent. It knocked down the remaining vestiges of the bipolar order that had emerged at the end of World War II and drew back the Iron Curtain, accelerating the process leading to the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe and to the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in December 1991. At the same time, it marked the demise of the logic of limited sovereignty and the rise of self-determination and liberal democracy in the former Soviet bloc, ushering in a dramatic acceleration in the process of Europe's political and economic integration and triggering the beginning of NATO's post-Cold War transformation and enlargement.

This revolutionary process occurred first and foremost as a consequence of widespread political and social discontent across the Soviet bloc. The East German people's action against their own rulers also played a dramatic role. It began in May 1989 when, inspired by the new Soviet leadership's reforms and by the growth of democratic movements in neighbouring Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, a truly peaceful popular revolt undermined and overwhelmed the dictatorial regime, which had ruled Eastern Germany since the late 1940s with ironclad support from Moscow.