This chapter presents the conclusion that corruption is a tool of government. The cases of Brazil and of Russia provide examples of how corruption can function as a tool of government by providing powerful incentives, both positive and negative, that help maintain elite cohesion and implement policies. These cases demonstrate how corruption can become a trap, as it may be the only viable solution for maintaining control in government, despite its deficiency as a tool. The differences between Russia and Brazil, and other cases that I consider, emphasize the importance of context-dependent information and of case studies.

One aspect of the currently prevailing view on corruption is the emphasis on quantifications of corruption, which have been used to research its causes and effects, and to gauge progress of anti-corruption reforms around the world. This chapter is dedicated to these measures. Corruption country scores are an example of so-called Global Performance Indicators and assume that by taking the right initiatives, countries can improve their ranking in a given Global Performance Indicator. However, the available measures of corruption are not well suited to assess changes of corruption over time. A more general conclusion also emerges from this chapter. In studying social phenomena using quantitative techniques of analysis, it is considered to be important to draw a sharp line between the definition of a concept, which should come first, and attempts at measuring it, which should be conditional on the chosen definition. However, when measures of social phenomena are successful, they take on a life of their own and contribute to an ossification of the concept they refer to. Consideration of the extent to which the prevailing concept of corruption and its most popular measures have shaped each other also provides a good angle to discuss corruption more generally.

This chapter discusses corruption in Brazil. I provide a comprehensive overview of relevant facts, with a focus on the economy and the distribution of economic resources. This understanding will be crucial in examining the role of corruption in the political landscape of Brazilian society, which is marked by pronounced inequality. Brazil shares similarities and differences with Russia. In both countries, there is a close, often corrupt relationship between political power and state-controlled enterprises. In contrast to Brazil, the anti-corruption movement in Russia has not only failed to seriously challenge the government, but also has been confronted by brutal repression. Unlike in Russia, Brazil’s judiciary has been highly proactive. Moreover, the Brazilian government participated actively to the anti-corruption global regime, while Russia mostly pays lip service to it.

This chapter first summarizes the history of ideas of corruption, contrasting two perspectives that have coexisted. In one, it is seen as a degradation of the social body, often within an organic view of society, while in the other, it is defined in terms of public office, for example, as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” which is the definition prevailing today. All definitions of corruption (as phenomenon) have some common ingredients, and in particular, they depend on a normative view of the polity. This chapter also introduces a conceptual framework that is used to interpret the country case studies of Russia, Brazil, and the United States. It is formed by the interaction of a “lower sub-system” with a “higher sub-system.”

This chapter argues that anti-corruption is a tool of politics. This is true as soon as we recognize that it is also a tool of government, because assuring the viability of government is an essential political problem. I examine this issue from a wider perspective, viewing corruption as a “valence issue.” Parties, politicians, and civil society organizations may take advantage of the widespread popular opposition to corruption and campaign on an anti-corruption platform, especially if it is difficult for them to differentiate themselves in other ways. The decreased relevance of ideological differences in recent decades, particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has contributed to the increased interest in corruption that has accompanied the establishment of the current consensus view. Also because of this motive, adopting an anti-corruption political platform has occasionally been an inevitable choice for reform-minded political actors.

This chapter provides an introduction to the book. A focus on the social construction of corruption leads to the two main conclusions. First, corruption is a tool of government, because it offers reasons for elites to remain cohesive. These incentives may be in the form of both benefits and punishments. To the first type belong the enticements of corruption, and they are reinforced whenever the ruler has the possibility to assign at will the label “corrupt” and the ensuing punishments. This helps rulers solve a problem of control, which is a prerequisite for political order and a vital necessity of any political system. However, corruption as a tool of government has fundamental flaws. The second broad conclusion is that anti-corruption is a tool of politics, because it can be used to pursue a political agenda. Additionally, corruption is a tool of politics which is available more widely, because it is a powerful “valence issue,” that is, one of those issues on which most people agree, either negatively (as for corruption) or positively (as it would be, e.g., for “competence”). However, as a tool of politics anti-corruption has many shortcomings.

This chapter discusses corruption in Russia. It proposes a view that recognizes the ambiguity between the apparent anarchy of the observed conflicts in Russia’s society and the centrality of the State, the Kremlin, and President Putin. Background information on Russia’s economy since the collapse of the Soviet Union is presented first, with a focus on distributional issues. A series of existential struggles that the state has faced and examined what is known about corruption in Russia is then discussed. For the Russian state, corruption has been a crucial tool in addressing its existential struggles and a highly contested political arena. The theme of anti-corruption has been utilized by both reformers and the Kremlin for their own purposes.

This chapter discusses corruption in the United States. In recent decades, as a narrow view of corruption has taken hold, the United States has experienced a significant increase in economic inequality and a decrease in social mobility. Despite the growing public discourse on economic inequality, concerns about the viability of a democratic system in the face of extreme economic inequalities have a long history. In recent years, corruption has been frequently invoked to describe the state of American politics, with business corporations and their ultra-wealthy owners indicated as possible culprits. In the United States, the notion of corporations having a corrupting effect dates back to the early days of the Republic, when it was feared that corporate charters could be granted by state legislatures as rewards for favors or bribes. This chapter’s main conclusion is that while illegal forms of corruption may be uncommon in the United States, its legal variants are widespread, and is further discussed in Chapter 9.

This chapter recognizes that definitions of corruption depend on a normative view of the polity, and such dependence should be recognized when debating corruption. In the context of a discussion of corruption in the United States, this chapter argues for the relevance of new “geographies of corruption,” and in particular, of legal forms of corruption. My interpretation of legal corruption in the United States is framed within a dynamic relationship between economic and political inequality, which may be mutually reinforcing.

Anti-corruption efforts struggle against the perverse aptness of corruption in satisfying that prerequisite of government which is control. Anti-corruption efforts also fall victim to the function it serves as a tool of politics. From this perspective, this chapter derives a pessimistic view on the prospects of anti-corruption efforts that are narrowly defined, on which I present some concluding considerations. They vouch for a broader approach to the question of corruption, and they touch upon the idea of modernity and one of its key ingredients: the possibility of human agency.