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In 1089, when David IV ‘the Builder’ (1089–1125) ascended the throne, the problem of the Turkmen nomads was probably the most difficult he faced. Confrontation with Turkmens was characterized by small-scale but high-intensity clashes distinguished by dynamism and mobility. Due to this, the struggle with the nomads and the suppression of their raids required specific methods of warfare. The theoretical foundations for dealing with raids had already been developed by the Byzantine military, which in the tenth century produced a detailed and practical manual, De velitatione bellica, whose author was a comrade-in-arms of Nikephoros II Phokas (963–69). Though it is hard to show with certainty that the Georgian king knew and followed De velitatione, it is very possible that he derived some ideas about warfare from this Byzantine treatise. In the military career of David the Builder can be seen both the observance of the recommendations of De velitatione (for instance the formation of a strategic barrier and stopping the enemy in a mountainous region with small forces in Trialeti; destroying the enemy camp by a surprise attack in Upper Tao and Botora; luring and then destruction at Avchala), and creative understanding and rethinking of the treatise. There is evidence that he extended the tactical recommendations of the treatise to the strategic level, including when the king addressed the method of luring his adversary at both the tactical (Avchala episode) and strategic level (marching beyond Likhi): David the Builder took the treatise's recommendation to detain the enemy in a border area to a new height when he attacked the nomads outside the country, meaning that he successfully used the military experience of the Byzantium treatise and enriched it with his own ideas.
At the end of the eleventh century, Georgia was in an extremely difficult military-political situation: the kingdom had been defeated in a war with the Great Seljuk Sultanate and paid tribute to the Seljuks. The territory of the country was reduced, and the king's authority did not go far beyond the Likhi Range, the natural border between the western and eastern parts of Georgia. Turkic nomads raided Kartli (central Georgia) every year and settled on Georgian lands, which they turned into pastures.
The latest collection of the most up-to-date research on matters of medieval military history contains a remarkable geographical range, extending from Spain and Britain to the southern steppe lands, by way of Scandinavia, Byzantium, and the Crusader States. At one end of the timescale is a study of population in the later Roman Empire and at the other the Hundred Years War, touching on every century in between. Topics include the hardware of war, the social origins of soldiers, considerations of individual battles, and words for weapons in Old Norse literature. Contributors: Bernard S. Bachrach, Gary Baker, Michael Ehrlich, Nicholas A. Gribit, Nicolaos S. Kanellopoulos,Mollie M. Madden, Kenneth J. McMullen, Craig M. Nakashian, Mamuka Tsurtsumia, Andrew L.J. Villalon.
Over the centuries the horseman has used his lance in several ways: hurled it like a javelin, stabbed the enemy either from above or forward, or held it in both hands. When thrusting the lance, the horseman used his horse only as a combat platform, its power and speed never fully incorporated into the attack. Full use of the potential of the horse became possible after introducing a new combat style, when the medieval warrior held his lance fixed under his arm. As a result, the combined mass of the lance, the horseman and the horse rushing towards the enemy factored into the impact force, which was much greater than possible when thrusting the weapon with the muscles of the arm. In such an impact, the energy of the man and the horse is concentrated at the tip of the lance. Only the end of the lance was placed under the arm, therefore its point was more thrust forward (“lengthened”), than when using other methods of combat. It was the position of the lance behind the center of gravity that caused its being “lengthened,” which imparted a certain advantage to this style of fighting. The name of the new method of combat (couched lance) is due to this specifically: couched means lengthened, stretched out. In Georgian its equivalent is tsagrdzelebuli shubi: i.e., a lengthened lance.
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