Chapter 2 discusses “systemic effect,” which refers to the impact of the Rome Statute and the ICC on domestic legal systems. The systemic effect of the Rome Statute is presumed to be mainly through the application of the “complementarity” framework. The chapter argues that complementarity is not the main avenue to systemic effect, mainly because it is a court-centric notion that has often resulted in an adversarial relationship between the Court and national authorities. This has meant that at times the Court and national authorities compete for cases, as the national authorities seek to avoid the Court’s intervention. Instead of true complementarity, it may be more accurate to speak of “parallelism”: If national authorities are not able to arrest suspects (Uganda) or investigate (Afghanistan), neither is the ICC. Complementarity does not address wider rule of law challenges, and in some cases, it allows for unfair trials on the domestic level, as was the case in Libya. The flaws of complementarity may inhibit the Court’s impact.

The International Criminal Court seeks to end impunity for the world’s worst crimes, in order to contribute to their prevention. But what is its impact to date? This book takes an in-depth look at four countries under scrutiny of the ICC: Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya and Uganda. It puts forward an analytical framework to assess the impact of the ICC on four levels: on the domestic legal systems (systemic effect); on peace negotiations and agreements (transformative effect); on victims (reparative effect); and on the perceptions of affected populations (demonstration effect). It concludes that the ICC, through its expressive function, is having a normative impact on domestic legal systems and peace agreements, but it has brought little reparative justice for victims and it does not necessarily correspond with affected populations view justice priorities. The book concludes that justice for the world’s worst crimes has no “universal formula” that can easily be captured in law.

The ICC was meant to end impunity for the world’s worst crimes, thus contributing to their prevention. But twenty years after its establishment, its “theory of change” remains unclear, and few studies focus on its impact on the ground. To assess the Court’s impact, it is necessary to define the assumptions underlying its establishment. While deterrence is one such assumption, to date the evidence that the ICC effectively deters crimes is lacking. Other assumptions can be found in the Rome Statute itself, or in the expressed intentions of the Assembly of States Parties or senior officials of the Court. Lessons can also be drawn from impact studies of other international criminal tribunals. These sources indicate that the ICC should play an expressive function by engaging in norm projection. The chapter identifies four intended effects of the Rome Statute and ICC, including systemic effect on domestic legal systems; transformative effect on peace processes; reparative effect on victims; and demonstration effect, relating to its expressive function among affected communities. These four effects form an analytical framework to assess the impact of the ICC.

Chapter 7 discusses the societal impact of Court on the affected communities, known as demonstration effect. Different elements are important to “demonstration effect,” including (1) whether the Court is perceived as impartial in a specific context, (2) whether the ICC’s interventions are perceived as relevant and responsive to local communities and their justice struggles, (3) whether the Court is viewed as a legitimate justice institution, and (4) whether it is perceived as independent. Relying on qualitative data, the chapter seeks identify trends in perceptions in Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, and Uganda. The chapter concludes that the Court suffers from negative perceptions in all four countries. In Uganda and Libya, its failure to prosecute actors from different sides contributes to an impression that it is not impartial. In Afghanistan or Libya, it is perceived as Western-influenced and not independent. In different contexts including Afghanistan, Uganda, and Colombia, it was perceived as an external imposition, and not aligned with local justice priorities arising from many decades of conflict. The architecture of the Court, with limited capacity to conduct preliminary examinations to better contextualize its interventions, limited field offices and little outreach, hinders effectively addressing these negative perceptions.

Chapter 8 concludes that the ICC’s existence has not resulted in a short-term reduction in atrocities. It is not a shortcut to Utopia, but its long-term preventive impact is too early to assess. Through its expressive function, the Court is having normative impact. In terms of “systemic effect,” the Court may have the most impact where it is the least needed, or its impact may be hindered by “parallelism.” At the same time, there is potential in the internalization of the Rome Statute by domestic legal systems over time. In two peace negotiations, a measure of punishment for perpetrators was included, although this did not necessarily mean imprisonment. However, its normative impact is undermined by its lack of societal impact, including a lack of impact on victims. In this respect the ICC represents “law” rather than “justice.” Victims’ rights are recognized in the Rome Statute, but these have not yielded concrete remedies. The Court also suffers from negative perceptions among affected populations. To move from law to justice, the Court should seek to maximize its impact, through a better understanding of the local context and through a focus on fewer situations. However, justice has no “universal formula” and may require approaches beyond the ICC.

The International Criminal Court seeks to end impunity for the world’s worst crimes, in order to contribute to their prevention. But what is its impact to date? This book takes an in-depth look at four countries under scrutiny of the ICC: Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya and Uganda. It puts forward an analytical framework to assess the impact of the ICC on four levels: on the domestic legal systems (systemic effect); on peace negotiations and agreements (transformative effect); on victims (reparative effect); and on the perceptions of affected populations (demonstration effect). It concludes that the ICC, through its expressive function, is having a normative impact on domestic legal systems and peace agreements, but it has brought little reparative justice for victims and it does not necessarily correspond with affected populations view justice priorities. The book concludes that justice for the world’s worst crimes has no “universal formula” that can easily be captured in law.

Chapter 3 further expands on systemic effect and argues that impact of the Rome Statute on domestic legal systems is better described as “internalization.” Internalization is the process whereby states demonstrate compliance with international law. The chapter examines internalization in Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, and Uganda. Indicators of systemic effect, in the form of internalization, include implementation of domestic laws covering the Rome Statute crimes; the establishment of new or specialized investigative units or chambers to investigate or prosecute Rome Statute crime; or (genuine) national proceedings for Rome Statute crimes. The chapter concludes that “internalization” is taking place in all the countries under study. Laws have been amended, and new institutions established. National proceedings took place in all four countries. However, domestic proceedings in Colombia and Uganda demonstrate that it can be complex to assess for “genuineness.” In fact, most domestic proceedings are taking place in Colombia, a country with a robust legal system. This may mean that the Court has the most impact where it is needed the least.

Chapter 4 discusses transformative effect, that is, the impact of the Rome Statute and the Court on political processes such as peace negotiations, in order to contribute to ending impunity. The chapter discusses the mechanisms of the Rome Statute that seek to balance peace and justice, including Articles 16 and 53 (the “interests of justice” test). It also discusses who determines the interests of victims in peace and justice. The evidence on whether arrest warrants facilitate or hinder peace negotiations is not conclusive, although in Uganda, they may have hindered reaching a final peace agreement. Moreover, in Afghanistan or Libya, amnesties were passed, in spite of the involvement of the ICC. The coming into force of the Rome Statute does not constitute a “paradigm shift” from impunity to accountability as such, but transformative effect may be seen in certain negotiations or peace agreements.

Chapter 6 assesses the reparative effects of the Court on victims, with an emphasis on countries under investigation (Uganda and Kenya). Indicators of reparative effects include: whether victims are able to participate meaningfully in ICC proceedings; and whether victims receive reparations or assistance, either through Court proceedings or through the Trust Fund for Victims. The chapter concludes that the reparative effect of the Court on victims in situation countries is minimal. Victim participation is under strain and should be reexamined. By definition, the legal proceedings become more exclusionary as they progress. The Trust Fund for Victims lacks sufficient resources to provide for proportional individual reparations, and will inevitably disappoint victims, in spite of its innovative, humanitarian approach on the ground. In any case, victims need more concrete solutions to improve their daily lives instead of waiting years or decades for Court decisions (which have included many acquittals).

Chapter 5 analyses the impact of the ICC on peace negotiations in Colombia and Uganda, including impact of the ICC (and the role of the Prosecutor) on the process of negotiations, on the role of the parties, on victims, and on the content of peace agreements arising from these negotiations (including the Ugandan Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and the Legal Framework for Peace and Havana Peace Agreement in Colombia). The chapter concludes that there was a transformative effect in peace processes in Colombia and Uganda. These agreements adopted accountability provisions. However, they provided for alternative penalties for perpetrators rather than lengthy prison terms. They incorporated the views of victims into negotiations and allowed for various victim-oriented mechanisms in the agreements. In Uganda, however, unlike in Colombia, the final peace agreement was never fully implemented. The Colombian agreement may set new standards on how peace agreements may approach the balance between peace and justice in the future.

There may be a tendency in some circles not to see what has happened in Uganda through the lens of complementarity. To date, a national investigation into those Lord's Resistance Army (‘LRA’) leaders under arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) has yet to be opened, and any question of a challenge to the jurisdiction of the ICC is premature as remarked on by the Court itself. But at the same time, the case of Uganda highlights many important aspects of how complementarity may operate in practice. In Uganda, the ICC arrest warrants were a central issue in the peace talks between the government of Uganda and the LRA held at Juba from 2006 to 2008. This caused mediators and the parties to seek innovative solutions to accountability questions that sought to be compatible with the Rome Statute. It was significant that those involved did not seek to argue that traditional justice by itself would suffice to fulfil complementarity. The proposal put forward during the Juba talks represents a comprehensive vision for national accountability which, if it were fully implemented, would be highly significant for Uganda moving forward out of years of conflict. The fact that the final agreement negotiated at Juba was not signed of course complicates the pursuit of this vision.