In Hegel’s philosophical system, Nature is the Idea in its external manifestation, in the form of “otherness.” This is widely interpreted as implying that the realm of the Idea extends beyond the boundaries set by the Logic, permeating other parts of the system. On this reading, Nature functions solely as an extension of the Idea, with no intrinsic significance beyond this role. This chapter challenges this interpretation, showing that in Hegel’s system, Nature possesses an independent reality and cannot be reduced to a mere “function” or “mirror” of the Idea. As an autonomous and self-sufficient entity, Nature operates according to its own laws, distinct from the laws of Logic. Thus, what Hegel offers in his Philosophy of Nature is a metaphysical (philosophical) account of the conceptual structure of nature itself, of what it ultimately is. The account of nature that arises from Hegel’s philosophical inquiry into the natural world is not only realistic, it also offers a systematic image of nature in its dynamic development aligned with growing complexity. This underpins Hegel’s emergentist agenda, which differs substantially from the one proposed by traditional Naturphilosophie. Hegel’s version of emergentism aims to demonstrate why a particular set of concepts and principles is sufficient for comprehending natural phenomena at a specific level of complexity and how these concepts and principles logically necessitate the emergence of the succeeding level. This “system of stages” is not propelled by external factors such as divine command or preordination; instead, it operates internally and metalogically, driven by its own inherent logic and principles.

Serving as an introduction to the collection, this chapter underscores the significance of Hegel’s philosophy of nature within his comprehensive philosophical system and its relevance to contemporary philosophical engagement with empirical sciences. It explores the reception history of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, discussing several efforts to revitalize it over the last century and highlighting significant instances of its positive reception despite prevailing skepticism. Tracing the theoretical roots of Hegel’s philosophical interest in the natural world, from post-Kantian thought and the Romantic science movement, the chapter highlights Hegel’s engagement with figures such as Goethe and Schiller, which shaped his organicist views of nature. It examines Hegel’s evolving approach to nature, tracing the emergence of his own natural philosophy and its subsequent refinement in the Dissertatio, the Jena System Drafts, the Phenomenology, and the Encyclopaedia, all of which constitute the important stages of its development. Through successive revisions in the Encyclopaedia, Hegel incorporated advancements in scientific understanding, emphasizing the interplay between empirical observation and philosophical inquiry. In its final section, this chapter outlines the objectives and structure of the volume, emphasizing the revitalization of Hegel’s philosophy of nature beyond its historical context. It argues that Hegel’s approach provides insights into the intricate interplay between humanity and nature, recognizing its depth beyond mere physical needs. Therefore, reassessing his concepts from a modern perspective could generate new viewpoints on the relationship between nature and human culture.

Hegel’s account of the self, sketched in his Phenomenology of Spirit and systematically elaborated in the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit, is one of the most influential and insightful examinations of the concept in the history of modern philosophy. However, it seems to point in too many directions to allow consensus about its meaning. Much of what Hegel says about the self appears to conflict with many central assumptions of the mainstream interpretation that Hegel is a metaphysician who places the concept of “cosmic” spirit in the center of his system. This “cosmic” spirit is construed as some transcendent, supra-human entity or some kind of presence within the world of the absolute substance which submerges individual consciousness (Theunissen 1970, 59–62; Löwith 1991). Even those who insist on a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel, and who seek to appropriate his philosophy without exaggerating the universal dimensions of spirit, have trouble providing a satisfactory explanation of Hegel’s account of the self in all its complexity (Pippin 1989; Taylor 2000; Holgate 2005). Their interpretations attempt to accommodate Hegel’s narrative about the development of individual consciousness (Pippin 2011), and they usually discuss this development in purely epistemological terms (merely as a cognitive enterprise), without emphasizing social, historical, and cultural aspects of this process. What often escapes commentators’ attention is that the sociality of a human being bears much weight in Hegel’s discussion of the self, or the I, as Hegel prefers to call it. To be sure, some commentaries seek to highlight the social dimension of Hegel’s account of the individual subject, yet most of these attempts discuss the topic almost exclusively in terms of the principle of recognition, and most notably, in terms of the concept of mutual recognition that Hegel establishes in his Phenomenology (Williams 1997; Cobben 2009; Redding 2009; Kok 2013; Testa and Ruggiu 2016).1 These discussions rightly emphasize the distinctive feature of Hegel’s account of the self: that any individual self is a mutual, social, collective project, who arises only through interactions with other such individuals. Such social interactions are crucial not only because the encounter with another self-consciousness is a necessary condition of self-consciousness. As self-conscious beings, we advance claims about putatively objective states of affairs, and one’s authority to advance objective claims needs to be acknowledged (recognized) by another self-conscious being.