From a relatively small number of troops at the time of the country's independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar Armed Forces, has grown into one of Southeast Asia's formidable militaries, even while details on the total number of troops and units are difficult to ascertain. Indeed, they remain a matter of secrecy. Undoubtedly, the Tatmadaw is today far better equipped than it was when it took over the state three decades ago, in September 1988, in the name of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)—to become the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. The cash-strapped socialist regime of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which ran the country from 1974 to 1988, had, despite its best effort to look after the military, done little to modernize the Tatmadaw. The latter thus remained a poorly equipped force, relative to its peers in the region. It was essentially a counter-insurgency force with almost no capability to engage in conventional warfare.

Since the early 1990s, the Tatmadaw has pursued a force modernization programme, procured military hardware from various foreign sources, and expanded Myanmar's defence-industrial bases. In the last five years, Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly confirmed his commitment to build the Tatmadaw into a “Standard Army”, although the concept has never been properly defined. In recent years, the Tatmadaw has received some of the advanced weapon systems, fighter aircraft and warships available on the international arms market. In addition, it has improved troops’ combat gear and equipment. All of this has required an injection of large amount of money into defence spending.

Throughout 1990s and 2000s, the Tatmadaw leadership repeatedly reminded its commanders that the force had to be built by four means: administration, training, welfare, and morale. Troops’ welfare is thus an essential part of building a “modern, strong and highly capable” Tatmadaw. In his address at the fifty-fourth Armed Forces Day Parade on 27 March 1999, Commander-in-Chief Senior General Than Shwe explained what he meant by building the Tatmadaw by means of welfare.

The year 2016 was a milestone in the political history of Myanmar as it gave birth to a popularly elected civilian government for the first time since the military takeover of the state in March 1962. In the elections held on 8 November 2015, it was clear within a few hours that the National League for Democracy (NLD) had won a landslide victory. When the result was finalized, the NLD won 57.20 per cent of valid votes (12.79 million) for the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) and 78.95 per cent of contested seats (323 seats). Similarly, for the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities), the party won 57.68 per cent (13.10 million) of the valid votes and 80.36 per cent of contested seats (168 seats). The 2008 Constitution is essentially designed by the military to require partnership with civilian politicians, allocating twenty-five per cent of the seats in both houses to military members and allowing the military to nominate a vicepresidential candidate along with ministers for Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs. In a mix of parliamentary and presidential systems, the NLD's nominee Htin Kyaw became the president and the Tatmadaw's nominees, ex-general Myint Swe, and the other NLD nominee, Henry Van Thio, became vice-presidents. In this constitutional setting and with the results of the 2015 election, the NLD has become a ruling partner for the Tatmadaw.

In his inaugural address, President Htin Kyaw pledged that his government would “implement four policies: national reconciliation; internal peace; the emergence of a constitution that will produce a democratic, federal union; and the improvement of the quality of life of the majority of the people”. At the same time, he cautiously stated: “I am responsible for the emergence of a constitution that will be in accord with the democratic norms suited to our country. I am also aware that I need to be patient in realizing this political objective, for which the people have long aspired” (GNLM 2016, p. 1).

In order to streamline the cabinet size, the NLD government initially reduced the numbers in the ministry from twenty-eight to twenty-one, yet it created the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs, and the number of ministers was reduced from thirty-two to eighteen with no deputy ministers. At that point in time, Aung San Suu Kyi herself held four ministerial portfolios.

With the promulgation of a new constitution in 2008 and subsequent elections in 2010 and 2015, Myanmar has undergone a process of political transition which could lead eventually to full-scale democratization. One important aspect of the political transition is the changing pattern of civil–military relations, which started with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) coming to power in 2011, ending more than two decades of direct military rule by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces). This process of structural adjustment in civil–military relations, from domination to influence, was expected to enter into a new phase when the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, came to power in March 2016, as there were high expectations for further steps towards democratization and democratic consolidation.

What should be an ideal model of civil–military relations in a democratic setting? In conventional literature, the most desirable form of civil–military relations in a democracy is what Samuel Huntington called “objective civilian control” over the military. Huntington's model emphasizes the separation of civilian and military institutions, non-involvement of the military in domestic politics, and the subordination of the military to the civilian authorities. According to Huntington, “objective civilian control” can be achieved by maximizing military professionalism, which involves the recognition of an independent military sphere within government and a clear distribution of power and responsibilities between the military and civilians. The other form of civil–military relations, according to Huntington, is “subjective civilian control”, which is maintained through “maximizing the power of the civilian groups in relation to the military”. Historically, subjective civilian control has been identified with maximizing the power of particular governmental institutions, social classes, or constitutional forms. Subjective civilian control is possible in the absence of a professional officer corps and a lack of democratic principles in governance. In a recent study on civil–military relations, Zoltan Barany claimed that, “democracy cannot be consolidated without military elites who are committed to democratic rule and obedient to a democratically elected political elite”.

On the other side of the equation is the military's supremacy over civilians, where the military holds the monopoly of power to make political decisions. This pattern of civil–military relations is not democratic in nature. Rebecca Schiff has put forward an alternative model of civil–military relations, known as “concordance theory”.

Myanmar, geographically located at the junction of South, Southeast, and East Asia, shares common maritime boundaries with Bangladesh in the northeast of the Bay of Bengal, with Thailand and India in the Andaman Sea. From the mouth of the Naf River to Kawthaung (Bayint Naung Point), Myanmar has a 2,228-kilometre (1,385-mile) coastline. The coastline consists of three sections: the Rakhine coastline of 713 kilometres (443 miles), the Ayeyarwady Delta coastline of 437 kilometres (272 miles), and the Tanintharyi coastline of 1,078 kilometres (670 miles). On land, the coastline is shared by six administrative states or regions in Myanmar, namely, Rakhine State, Ayeyarwady Region, Yangon Region, Bago Region, Mon State and Tanintharyi Region. After the declaration of the Territorial Sea and Straight Baseline in 1968, Myanmar promulgated its Territorial Sea and Maritime Zones Law in 1977, prior to the conclusion of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Myanmar then signed the UNCLOS and ratified it on 21 May 1996, after which it came into effect on 20 June 1996. In accordance with Article 76 (paragraph 8) of the UNCLOS, on 16 December 2008, Myanmar submitted information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Myanmar has 29,043 square nautical miles of internal waters and 9,895 square nautical miles of territorial waters (please see Table 3.1 for more details). There are 852 big and small islands in Myanmar waters.

This chapter describes the challenges posed by domestic contenders and foreign entities on the Myanmar state's authority, management and control of the maritime frontier, highlighting the many actors involved in making and unmaking the frontier in Myanmar waters. In addition, it looks at the emerging politics of resource control between the central and local/regional governments, for the first time in Myanmar at least since 1962. Using two types of natural resources located in Myanmar waters as examples — fish stocks and hydrocarbon reserves — this chapter describes and analyses the way in which the exploitation of natural resources affects local and central politics, people's livelihoods and the forms of collusion between business and government.

History has often been used and misused by statesmen and political leaders to serve their national, regime or personal interests. Historical lessons are, rightly or wrongly, employed to guide the nation's domestic and foreign policy. In countries with nation-building projects, history is presented, in different formats, with a particular nationalist discourse to inform the general public of their roles and duties and to imagine their nations through lenses of a specific socio-political context. In many cases, a particular historical juncture serves as the basis for creating collective memories, shaping perceptions of self and others, framing issues and prescribing particular courses of action. In the introductory chapter to this book, N. Ganesan conceptually defines historical overhang as “a negative perception that derives from historical interactions and subsequently becomes embedded in the psyche of a state, both at the levels of the elites and the citizen body”. In the context of bilateral relations in Asian countries, he argues that the historical overhangs or legacies have been kept alive and consciously cultivated and embellished in order to make them more durable and invoke emotional responses.

In Myanmar, in terms of framing a nationalist discourse, the most important historical juncture is the period of British colonial rule from 1885 to 1948. For several hundreds of years, under different dynasties, yet on more or less the same area of land, Myanmar had remained an independent polity. At one stage, Myanmar under King Bayint Naung (1551–81) extended its influence over most of present-day mainland Southeast Asia. King Sinphyu Shin (1763–76) of the Konebaung dynasty was famous for his victories over Qing troops in four military encounters (1765–69) and his subjugation of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya in 1767. Beginning with the defeat and the loss of coastal provinces in the first Anglo–Burmese War (1824), followed by yet another defeat and the loss of lower Myanmar in the second Anglo–Burmese War (1852), Myanmar eventually lost its independence in 1885. This was the most humiliating moment for the very proud people of Myanmar. Therefore, the anti-colonial struggle or national liberation movement has been the epitome of Myanmar's historiography.

Although the national budget and government expenditure have never been a secret in Myanmar, any attempt to calculate Myanmar defence expenditure is fraught with peril. This is particularly true since 1988. The published figures are unreliable. Besides, there are several other factors that should be considered in calculating Myanmar defence expenditure. First, the defence expenditure itself is underestimated. There is heavy state subsidization coming from other ministries and agencies, rather than the Ministry of Defence. For example, the armed forces get subsidized fuel from Ministry of Energy. Second, some of the expenditure in foreign currencies is calculated on the basis of the official exchange rate, which is more than 200 times lower than the market rate in early 2000s. Third, some expenditure comes from other agencies, such as home affairs and forestry. And fourth, some expenditures are paid by military businesses. Finally, some expenditures, such as payment for overseas suppliers, are made in kind under a barter system. (Some claim that some of the military hardware bought from the PRC are paid for in teak and other natural resources.)

Defence Expenditure

Financing the force modernization programme in Myanmar has always been a major issue. The defence budget takes the lion's share in the Total Government Expenditure (TGE) or Central Government Expenditure (CGE). In the first two years immediately after the nation's independence in 1948, the defence expenditure in momentary terms amounted to 40 per cent of the TGE. And it remained relatively high throughout 1950s — about 32 per cent of the TGE. Between 1948 and 1961, the Myanmar government spent Kyat 4,067.7 million (in current price terms) or Kyat 880.8 million (in 1960 constant price) on the defence. This budget was used mostly for equipment, salaries, rations, and medical facilities for the troops. The calculation of the percentage of defence expenditure to the TGE or CGE was simply for the period between 1948 and 1962 when there was little state-owned economic enterprises (SEE). In the early 1950s, the Tatmadaw found a way to provide welfare services for its members and their families; it established a number of business firms, including stores to sell subsidized commodities for Tatmadaw members. The issue of military business will be discussed later in the chapter.

Military training in Myanmar is the second task of the Tatmadaw, the first being combat duty and the third being public works. Training is the most important business of the Tatmadaw in peacetime and can take many forms. Military training is the key to achieving combat readiness. The Tatmadaw has been developing a training regime to provide officer education and leadership training for its officers. In this context, a wide range of skills needs to be developed and a variety of people need to be trained. This chapter discusses the development of military training in Myanmar from 1948 to the present. In the mid-1990s, in accordance with its modified military doctrine, the Tatmadaw introduced a new training regime to train its officers and men to be capable of fighting conventional warfare.

Military Training Programme

At the time of Myanmar's independence in 1948, in accordance with the War Establishment, a major was appointed as G-II (general staff officer — grade II) for military training and operations at the insufficiently staffed war office. He was assisted by two G-IIIs captains, one of whom was responsible for military training. The G-II was under the G-I (staff duty), a lieutenant colonel, of the General Staff Office. Then in September 1950, the War Office introduced a new set-up in which a new G-I (training) was appointed under the Vice-Chief of General Staff while the G-I (staff duty) was placed under the Deputy Chief of General Staff. The G-I (training) oversaw the Burma Regimental Centre, Burma Army Training Depot, Burma Army Central School, Burma Army Officers' Training School, Burma Army School of Education, and Burma Army Staff College.

Until 1953 there was neither a directorate of military training nor a proper training policy. Most of the officers were sent overseas for training. Although the Tatmadaw could send several officers to foreign training schools to take junior officer courses, mostly in the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan, it was incapable of securing places in such training facilities as the staff college and the artillery school. At the 1953 Tatmadaw conference, held on 24 August, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Ne Win, pointed out the weaknesses of the military training programme in Myanmar.

Before 1988, the Tatmadaw had been poorly equipped and modestly maintained and its weapons were of World War II vantage. Most of the Tatmadaw's major arms procurements, including aircraft and surface ships, were made in the 1950s and early 1960s. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Tatmadaw's order of battle had been a very modest one compared with most of its neighbours. In this regard, the force modernization in Myanmar has been one long overdue. With the coming of the SLORC in September 1988, the Tatmadaw began to pursue a force modernization programme. The Tatmadaw had injected a massive amount of resources to boost its order of battle. Moreover, the Tatmadaw embarked on ambitious arm production and procurement programmes. The force modernization programme of the Tatmadaw since the early 1990s indicates that external security threats had significantly influenced the Tatmadaw's threat perception. In accordance with its modified military doctrine, the Tatmadaw has been building up conventional war fighting capabilities. While it procured most of its artillery, aircraft, and surface ships from oversea sources, the Tatmadaw relied more or less on its domestic defence industries for small arms production as it has long been pursuing a policy of self-sufficiency in small arms and ammunition production. Force modernization took place for all aspects of the Tatmadaw. Here I will discuss the modernization of three services of the Tatmadaw, mostly in terms of military capability and order of battle.

THE TATMADAW-KYI (THE ARMY)

In his analysis of the Myanmar Armed Forces, Andrew Selth remarked that:

In one way, the force modernization of the Tatmadaw-Kyi was closely related to the building of local defence industries.

Building the Tatmadaw since 1948 has been a challenge. It has gone through various phases of development. In July 1947, Bogyoke Aung San, father of the present day Tatmadaw, expressed his view on the future of Myanmar's national defence and the armed forces in the following terms:

Over a period of nearly six decades, the small and lightly equipped Tatmadaw has grown in size, force structure, and technological sophistication. Largely as a result of recent force modernization and expansion, the Tatmadaw has transformed itself from essentially a counter-insurgency force into a force supported by tanks and artillery, capable of fighting a regular conventional war. It has now become Southeast Asia's second largest military force, next to Vietnam's. One of the declared missions of the Tatmadaw is to build a “strong, highly capable and modern armed forces”, which, according to the rhetoric, “keeps up the twelve noble traditions of the Tatmadaw”. According to official statements, in building a strong, highly capable, and modern Tatmadaw, three capabilities — military, organization, and administrative, have to be achieved through four means — training, administration, welfare, and morale. While training is a key to enhance all capabilities, there are other factors that play an important role in building the Tatmadaw, especially in the field of military capability: military doctrine and strategy, force structure, armament and force modernization, and military training and officer education.

This chapter primarily discusses the historical development of the military doctrine and strategy of the Tatmadaw since Myanmar's independence in 1948. It sets out both security perceptions and policies, charting developments in each against the situation at the time, and also notes the contributions of the leading actors in each period. The Tatmadaw has gone through three phases of doctrinal developments. In the initial period, doctrine focused on the method of coping with foreign invasion; the second period saw the development of counter-insurgency doctrine and the formulation of the concept of total people's war; in the third period the Tatmadaw modified its people's war doctrine to meet modern conditions.

First Phase of the Development of Military Doctrine

Since independence day in January 1948, the armed forces of the Union of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, have been combating a number of insurgencies throughout the country. The insurgencies of both right- and left-wing groups, such as the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) and the Burma Communist Party (BCP), were so strong in the late 1940s that the Myanmar Government was described in the international media as the Rangoon (Yangon) government. Various communist and separatist insurgencies in Myanmar were so widespread that the government of the time admitted that “large section[s] of the countryside was under complete domination of the insurgents”. Only from the early 1950s was the Tatmadaw able to recapture and reassert its control over some important cities. However, the rural areas were still very much under the control and influence of various insurgents. This internal armed security threat to the state has long overshadowed the security perception of the Tatmadaw, in terms of doctrine, force structure, armament, and training. In the meantime, as the communists came to power in China in 1949, remnants of the Kuomintang (KMT) troops under General Li Mi moved into Myanmar and used the frontier as a springboard for attack against the People's Republic of China, which, in turn, became an external threat to national security in Myanmar.

The first military doctrine for the Tatmadaw was formulated in the early 1950s, when the security situation of the Union had improved markedly, but it focused on methods of coping with foreign invasion, rather than suppressing insurgency. Despite the fact that internal security operations continued to preoccupy the Tatmadaw's operational priority, the first military doctrine was surprisingly for external defence.