Being the last speaker of the day I suppose has advantages and disadvantages. One disadvantage is that, as I had anticipated, much of what I would have wished to say about the Franklin Dam case has been said — and well said — by earlier speakers. One advantage, however, is that I may now speak substantially without fear of contradiction — perhaps the “infallibility offinality”, as it has sometimes been called, is not the exclusive province of the High Court! In any event, I will confine myself to some very general remarks — not so general, I hope, as to be trite, but general enough, at least, to put some of the points we have heard earlier today into perspective.

Certainty generally is illusion, Holmes once said, and repose is not the destiny of man. Mr Coper vividly illustrates this in relation to the High Court’s exposition of the meaning of “duty of excise” under section 90 of the Constitution, and argues that the Court’s failure to achieve certainty in this area has not been due to a Barwick-led departure from a so-called settled formula, as alleged by some critics, but has rather been the consequence of the inherent limitations of any legalistic approach. Mr Coper then looks to the purposes of section 90 for guidance, but finds a surprising degree of ambiguity surrounding them. The High Court has also referred to the purposes of section 90, but in attempting to achieve certainty without entirely losing sight of those perceived purposes, it has, Mr Coper argues, compromised both objectives. The author concludes by considering how the Court might escape from the present impasse.

Geoffrey Sawer was the Foundation Professor of Law at The Australian National University, appointed in 1950 at the age of 39. He was a pioneer in the understanding of law in a broader context, especially at the intersection between law and politics, and his fluid and incisive writing has been a major influence on succeeding generations of academics, practitioners and judges. Drawing on Sawer's writings, oral history interviews and private papers, Michael Coper makes an affectionate biographical sketch of this outstanding scholar and warm and genial human being. In particular, he explores how Sawer's scholarship stands up today, when so much has changed in the legal and political landscape; what is enduring and what is transient in a life's work; and what lessons we can draw when we look at law and life through the lens of biography.