INTRODUCTION

The term “Madani” was introduced on 26 September 1995 by Anwar Ibrahim when he spoke of “Masyarakat Madani” (Madani Society) during the Istiqlal Festival, an Islamic cultural event held in Jakarta, Indonesia. In his speech entitled “Islam and the Establishment of Civil Society”, Anwar emphasized that Islam introduced humankind “to the ideals of social justice and the establishment of civil society that is a democratic civil society” (Anisma 2019, pp. 147–48). This was the core principle around which Anwar conceptualized Masyarakat Madani.

One of the key elements of Masyarakat Madani was the importance of freedom of thought. Anwar believed that “freedom of thought should definitely be a prerequisite to successfully deal with the challenges of globalization” (Anwar Ibrahim 1997, p. 8). However, despite the emphasis on freedom of thought, and in the mould of his mentor Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, he emphasized that “we do not need to be secular in order to succeed” (ibid., pp. 8–9). From his perspective, secularism—which focused on more worldly matters such as freedom of thought—should not overpower the spiritual aspect of life, which Madani would provide.

Another key element was Islam’s emphasis on social justice. Anwar emphasized that “Islam was the first to introduce the ideal of social justice and the development of Masyarakat Madani or a democratic civil society” (ibid., p. 9). However, he reminded the audience that despite the arrival of Islam, the Malay rulers and religious authorities continued to neglect and violate the rights of individuals. This was well documented by Abdullah Munshi in his writings and by Sejarah Melayu (ibid., p. 10). The purpose of Madani as a moral principle was, therefore, to ensure citizen rights and transparency, and prevent corruption, extremism, terrorism, poverty, injustice, intellectual depletion, social depravity, wealth inequality and authoritarianism. To achieve this, the ummah had to examine their own internal conscience before achieving outward justice (ibid., pp. 10–11).

Finally, Anwar stressed that moderation and pragmatism were important criteria for achieving Madani. Aided by modern democracy and Fiqh Awlawiyyat, these two criteria would inculcate in the ummah the values of tolerance, multiculturalism, and reciprocity (ibid., p. 12). In summary, Anwar stated that the core values of Masyarakat Madani were morality, justice, equality and dialogue (ibid., p. 13).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • In 1995, then Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim introduced “Masyarakat Madani” as his proposed economic framework for Malaysia. The term was heavily debated among scholars and politicians across all parties and ideologies. It was often argued that Madani was an effort to limit the rise of political Islam.

• • Following Anwar Ibrahim's dismissal from government in 1998, Madani came to be more narrowly redefined as “civil society”. However, Anwar’s supporters, known as the “Anwarinas”, strove to keep the spirit of Madani alive and continued to promote its ideals of social justice, democratic values and inclusivity. They were encouraged further by the fall of Barisan Nasional from federal power in the 14th General Election in 2018.

• • After Anwar Ibrahim became Malaysia’s tenth Prime Minister in 2022, he reintroduced Madani as a framework for the country, to be implemented in various sectors. Anwar Ibrahim likely received help from scholars such as Ziauddin Sardar, as reflected in his election manifesto, Script for a Better Malaysia. This time around, the core component of Madani is Maqasid Al-Shariah, or the higher objectives of sharia.

• • In that sense, Madani is now arguably more an expression of what may be called post-Islamism. For it to succeed, however, it will have to counteract the growing power of the conservatives and Islamists. This may be an uphill battle, given that a key component party of the unity government—UMNO—is facing several allegations of corruption.

INTRODUCTION

This paper looks at the ideologies of political Islam and post-Islamism in the Malaysian context. In conducting a historical survey of Malaysian politics, I postulate that while Abdul Hadi Awang and his party Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) are Islamists, Anwar Ibrahim is a post-Islamist. The battle between the two was both intense and sharp, and the results show that there will certainly be sequels to come. Although Anwar finally managed to become prime minister, the aftermath of the 15th general election (GE15) and the results of state elections in Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Penang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan on 12 August 2023 illustrate that political Islam is growing in strength. This is most evident in the fact that PAS currently has a whopping forty-three seats in the Malaysian parliament, controls four states, and has significant numbers of seats in the state assemblies of Perak, Selangor and Pahang.

Over the years, there has been much debate about what is commonly referred to as political Islam, or Islamism. According to Andrew March, political Islam should be understood “in the broadest sense possible as the range of modern political movements, ideological trends, and state-directed policies concerned with giving Islam an authoritative status in political life”. The goal of political Islam is to “create an ‘Islamic state’ or to fuse ‘religion and state’ (din wa dawla)” (March 2015, p. 17.10).

The core business of political Islam is undoubtedly centred on aspects of morality. It focuses on how to use political tools and means to regulate people according to the teachings of Islam as understood by these players. Furthermore, it is not monolithic. As March put it, “political Islam by and large belongs to the right of the political spectrum, but it would be a mistake to see it as a single movement or ideology. Islamist trends range from left-leaning populist protest movements to ultraconservative movements devoted more to social control over morality than to economic redistribution” (ibid., p. 17.2).

The agents of political Islam themselves maintain that Islam is a way of life, and thus should be the only governing factor and core principle in every aspect of life, including governance (Meijer 2009). This idea has led to a power struggle between the Islamists and those they dub as secularists.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • During the 15th general election (GE15) in 2022 and the state elections in 2023, the clash between Anwar Ibrahim and PAS reached new heights. This can be viewed as a battle between political Islam and post-Islamism.

• • Political Islam as embodied by PAS pursues the establishment of an Islamic state, while post-Islamism as represented by Anwar Ibrahim is a way of balancing the ambitions of Islam with secular approaches.

• • While PAS has been consistent in espousing political Islam since its establishment, Anwar Ibrahim’s approach to the role of Islam in politics has changed since his early days in UMNO. Evolving from an Islamist involved in state-led Islamization to a post-Islamist, he now espouses democratic values and multiculturalism.

• • GE15 and the 2023 state elections witnessed fierce competition between PAS and Anwar Ibrahim. Both sides either escalated or downplayed crucial topics such as the implementation of hudud law and RUU355, the myth of Islam and Malays being under threat, the claim that states under PAS are discriminated against, and the takfiri denouncements of non-Muslims as election candidates or potential leaders of the country.

• • The results of GE15 and the 2023 state elections between PAS and Anwar Ibrahim, who is now prime minister, show that there will certainly be sequels to come. The elections illustrate that political Islam is growing in strength. This is most evident in the fact that PAS currently has a whopping forty-three seats in the Malaysian parliament, and controls four states. The only way Anwar Ibrahim can remain in power is through assistance from PAS’ old nemesis, UMNO, a party heavily tainted by corruption.

Due to its strategic location, maritime Southeast Asia serves as an economic hub that connects the East and the West, with the Straits of Malacca serving as an important route for business access. Maritime Southeast Asia remains essential today, if not more significant, as the economies within the region continue to grow faster than many other regions in the world. Its strategic location and the advancement of its combined economy make the region a premiere meeting point, offline and online, for many people worldwide as more people look for investment opportunities and leisure activities in more prosperous Southeast Asia.

Apart from its economic and strategic positioning, maritime Southeast Asia is a significant area for analysis as the region also serves as a hub for the cross-pollination of ideas. During the Cold war period (1945–91), Southeast Asia became the battleground for the forces of neo-liberal capitalism and communism. But an equally interesting scope of scholarly interest is the development and exchange of religious ideas, particularly concerning Islam. Azra’s (2004) study The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia, among others, remain one of the most important contributions capturing the network of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern ideas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Maritime Southeast Asia is home to the largest Muslim society in the world, namely Indonesia. Eighty-nine per cent of its 281 million people are Muslims. However, the community is not homogenous, depending on where they live, and the extent to which they immerse cultural and ethnic influences into their religious life. Some would reckon that the country is also changing, from one that was referred to as the smiling face of Islam to one that is currently experiencing a conservative turn (Van Bruinessen 2013; Feillard and Madinier 2011); or a hotbed of political Islam and radicalism (Ayoob 2008).

Maritime Southeast Asia is also home to the relatively homogenous and traditional Islamic polity of Brunei Darussalam, which ties the concept of the monarchy to Islam and Malay culture. Based on its 2021 census, Brunei has a population of 333,600 citizens, 89 per cent of which are Malays (Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, Brunei 2023).

Introduction

In discussions on trending Islamic ideas, focus has been given to the role of charismatic personalities or popular mediums, namely the Internet and social media, but not on the role played by administrators. In Malaysia, the role of public administrators is equally important, especially on matters related to Islam, as religion has become intertwined with public policy. Malaysia’s civil service is estimated to employ a million staff members, and for a country with a population of 32.7 million, the number of civil servants signifies “strength and influence” (Ahmad Faiz Yaakob et al. 2012, p. 133). Majority of the civil servants are Malay by ethnicity and this does not accurately reflect Malaysia’s multiethnic composition. According to Malaysia’s 2020 census, the three major ethnic groups in the country are Malay or Bumiputera (69.4 per cent), Chinese (7.3 per cent), and Indian (0.7 per cent) (Launching of Report on the Key Findings Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 2020).

Prijono Tjiptoherijanto (2012) states that the “indigenous Bumiputeras which are largely ethnic Malays” have “87 per cent of government jobs”. Prijono further adds that “the biggest loser in the current system is Indians, who, according to government statistics make up 9 per cent of the labor force but hold 16 per cent of menial jobs and control just 1.2 per cent of equity in registered company in the country”. In 2022, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) admitted that 89.23 per cent of the top posts in Malaysia’s public service are Malay, and that those from Sabah and Sarawak are also least represented (Malaysiakini 2022).

As most civil servants are Malay-Muslim, scrutinizing their role and impact in society is important, especially since those serving in religious institutions are also considered civil servants. Moreover, religious authorities have been allocated a large amount of funds from Malaysia’s national budget. The previous administration provided a RM1.5 billion budget allocation for the management and development of Islam, and this was heavily criticized especially since the religious authorities are regarded as largely incompetent (Imran Ariff 2021).

This chapter aims to analyse the significance of a Malay-Muslim dominant civil service. Arguably, as Muslims, the Malays are very much influenced by current Islamic trends. The civil servants’ way of thinking about certain issues can be carefully predicted according to contemporary trends.