To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
A discrete-time, scalar, pursuit-evasion game is considered in which an evader, moving according to a stationary stochastic process, is continually being tracked by a pursuer. The pursuer's observations of the evader's positions are subject to observation error and time lag. It is shown that when the pursuer's strategy is linear in his information, the evader is able to infer the values of the observation errors (subject to the same time lag) and it is assumed that he utilises this information linearly in his evasion strategy. The payoff is taken to be the mean-square distance between pursuer and evader, the latter being subject to a quadratic constraint on his movement. The upper value and the corresponding strategies are found for all values of the variance θ of the observation error. The lower value problem is solved completely only for variances θ below a certain critical value and partially for variances above this critical value.
A discrete time, scalar, pursuit-evasion game is presented in which an evader, moving according to a stationary stochastic process, is continually being followed by a pursuer. Both players have perfect observations of the evader's positions, but the observations of the pursuer are subject to a time lag. It is assumed that the strategy of the evader can be represented as an infinite moving average, and that he is restricted by a velocity constraint. The pursuer is limited to strategies linear in his information, and the payoff is taken to be the mean-square distance between pursuer and evader. Under these conditions it is shown that the game does not have a value, and subsequently the lower and upper values and corresponding strategies are found.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.