This chapter provides a brief history of thinking about glory from Homer to Arendt. It begins with the “Achillean” conception of the term, which is focused on celebrating how rather than why one fights. We then contrast this idea with its “Periclean” counterpart, wherein glory is fundamentally moral and political. Next, we discuss Cicero’s classical account of glory. The Roman orator argues that civic pursuits are more worthy of glory than military ones, both because the former often make the latter possible and because they frequently are more closely aligned with the state’s true interests. Machiavelli is far more circumspect about the connection between personal virtue and glory. For him, an interest in glory is constitutive of competent leadership and the objects of glory are necessarily exalted: success in war, high diplomacy, or institution building on a grand scale. Hobbes’ emphasis is more psychological – our need for glory, he claims, makes us dangerous enough to each other to require the social mediation offered by the government. Finally, we consider the connection Arendt draws between a “Greek” understanding of politics, where the private realm is subordinated to public “action,” and the emphasis on immortality and permanence fundamental to the idea of glory.

In this chapter, we take up the conceptual relationship between humiliation and glory. We argue that reversing humiliation has often been the cause for which glory is assigned. Leaning on James, Orwell, and Machiavelli, we explore the attraction of political causes in general and suggest that undoing a history of humiliation has a particular grip on the political imagination. We further note that while glory is the reward for ending political humiliation, the sentiment itself is often understood in terms of lost glory. We proceed to argue that the symmetry between the two terms was incomplete: While reversing political humiliation will always win glory, it is possible to become glorious for other causes, completely unrelated to that reversal. In Section 7.4 of the chapter, we note that the humiliation/glory dyad has very different consequences for men and women: While war can be humiliating for both, glory is typically reserved for the men planning and fighting the wars. We conclude by suggesting that a preoccupation with the humiliation/glory dynamic necessarily comes at the expense of the private, intimate milieu of the person who pursues them.

This chapter offers three case studies to illustrate the main theoretical claim of this book. The rise of ISIS was animated by a narrative of historical humiliation of Sunnis by “apostates.” This narrative featured key elements of our account of humiliation in international affairs – from dismissal of past promises to contempt towards cultural and geographical realities. Russia’s foreign policy in the last two decades is also deeply tied with a sense of national humiliation, both reflected and manufactured by Vladimir Putin, according to which Russia has been displaced and discarded as a serious world power by the United States and its NATO allies. Finally, we look at the 1973 Middle East war as an example of a conflict fueled by a need to reverse an earlier humiliation. Egypt’s primary aim in this war was to erase or counteract the humiliation it suffered in the 1967 war with Israel. Interestingly, in this case, the officials who negotiated the war’s conclusion took the sentiment’s potency into account as they designed the terms of the ceasefire and armistice.

An overview of the theory offered in the book and its abiding relevance. The account of glory and humiliation suggested here is primarily descriptive rather than normative and hence this is a work of non- ideal theory. The conclusion also takes up the question of what it would take to break free from the dynamics of glory and humiliation.

This chapter develops a rudimentary theory of glory. Glory is a particularly elevated form of honor, a kind of “super recognition.” It is more exclusive and longer lasting than honor, and it is typically connected with promises of immortality and an “upgrade” of one’s reputation. We distinguish between political (or Periclean) and personal (or Achillean) glory. Personal glory is competitive by definition, political glory is not. We also discuss the scope of the term and suggested that determining the proper objects of glory (military, political, cultural, or even everyday pursuits) turns on the social role the concept is supposed to play. The status and role of glory change during different stages of a conflict. Early on (typically before a war starts) glory helps motivate people to fight for a cause. During the conflict, the preoccupation with glory usually fades among those who actually do the fighting, and after the conflict, the question of bestowing glory becomes subject to bureaucratic and social decisions. Furthermore, we argue that often those who actually do the fighting are not the ones who get glorified. We note the tension between positing that someone has a duty to fight and the practice of glorifying them for fulfilling that duty, and we also argue that glory is subject to both internal and external explanations. We conclude by tracing the relationship between glory and death, and examining the normativity of both Periclean and Achillean glory.

A summary of the book’s argument, a rationale for why that argument is needed, and how it addresses a lacuna in the existing literature. The introduction also offers a brief overview of the material covered in each of the chapters.

Thinking about humiliation and its consequences informs various areas of political theory – even if latently. Part of the point of classical jus in bello restrictions like the requirements of proportionality and discrimination is to limit the harm we do to our enemies, so as to keep alive the possibility of future reconciliation. Indiscriminate and disproportionate harms undermine the chances of peace, among other reasons, because they are humiliating. In the field of transitional justice, the prospect of ending the humiliations endemic to authoritarian governance can justify the compromise of liberal principles (such as retroactive criminalization and reliance on shaky evidence) that transitional policies often involve. Our discussion also takes up the role humiliation plays in political appeasement. We argued that one of the reasons that appeasement is wrong is that it involves a self-humiliation. By deferring to those who threaten force, the appeaser communicates that survival matters more to them than their self-respect.

The chapter surveys critiques of glory. We begin with the argument that cultures of honor are deadly. This argument gives rise to theories which explain the early rise of capitalism as an attempt to swap the pursuit of fame with the (safer) pursuit of money. We also review the argument that it is grotesque to speak of glorious fighting or glorious death in the age of industrial warfare. Other critiques of glory touch on the nature of asymmetrical warfare, the actual attitudes soldiers display towards each other in battle, and the rise of drone warfare. How is it that in spite of all of these powerful critiques, the idea of glory still permeates public discourse? We suggest that the key to thinking about this puzzle might be a tendency to run together the Achillean (personal) and Periclean (political) varieties of glory.

We begin this chapter by outlining what constitutes a humiliating foreign policy. We then linger on a key feature in the phenomenology of political humiliation, namely the sense of being replaced. This sense manifests in a perception of being removed from importance and consequence – usually by someone not viewed as a worthy competitor. After describing the phenomenology of replacement, we point out that it is particularly important to understand this sentiment because it straddles personal and political psychology, and because a focus on the sense of replacement helps us distinguish normative and descriptive aspects of political humiliation. After discussing the phenomenology of replacement, we highlight the difference between democratic and autocratic rulers in their susceptibility to humiliation. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the dual role of humiliation as both driver and method of war.

This chapter begins with a discussion of Avishai Margalit’s misrecognition-based theory of political humiliation. For Margalit, humiliation is primarily understood as the culpable denial of self-respect. Margalit notes that political humiliation usually takes one of three forms – removing people from the human community (as when we liken them to animals), the negation of control (as in torture), and ignoring or looking through others. After providing an account of this theory, we argue that Margalit does not sufficiently consider the contagious nature of political humiliation nor the possibility that the feeling might be present even when recognition is offered or, conversely, that we might be humiliated even by those whose recognition we don’t want. We also look at the conceptual differences between humiliation, shame, and embarrassment. We note that despite these clear differences the way these emotions are experienced sometimes feels similar. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the effect of technology and, in particular, social media on the character of contemporary political humiliations.