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This article describes the Global Legislators Database, a new cross-national dataset on the characteristics – party affiliation, gender, age, education, and occupational background – of nearly 20,000 national parliamentarians in the world’s democracies. The database includes 97 electoral democracies with comprehensive information on legislators who held office in each country’s lower or unicameral chamber during one legislative session in 2015, 2016, or 2017. The GLD is the largest individual-level biographical and demographic database on national legislators ever assembled, with a wide range of potential applications. In this article, we provide multiple types of validity checks of the GLD to document the integrity of the data. We also preview three potential applications of the dataset and note other possible uses for this one-of-a-kind resource for studying representation in the world’s democracies.
Since the 1990s, economic inequality has risen in just about every affluent democracy in North America and Western Europe. But the last three decades have also been characterized by falling or stagnating levels of state-led economic redistribution. These two contemporaneous trends pose a puzzle for students of political economy. Why have democratically accountable governments not done more to compensate the large majority of citizens with low and middle income for rising top-income shares? Our introductory chapter begins by describing this puzzle of rising inequality and noting some nuances that most accounts regularly miss. We then examine two groups of explanations for the puzzle of rising inequality: one set that focuses on voters and their demands for redistribution, and another that focuses on elites and unequal representation that is biased against less-affluent citizens. This volume seeks to contribute to explaining the puzzle of rising inequality by bringing these two groups of explanations into dialogue with each other. We describe the contributions of the individual chapters to these efforts and suggest directions for future research.
Why do working-class people so rarely go on to hold elected office in the world’s democracies? In this chapter, we review what scholars know and use new data on the social class backgrounds of national legislators in the OECD to evaluate several country-level explanations that have never been tested before in a large sample of comparative data. Our findings suggest that some hypotheses have promise and warrant future research: working-class people more often hold office in countries where labor unions are stronger and income is distributed more evenly. However, some common explanations do not pan out in our data – neither Left-party strength nor proportional representation is associated with working-class officeholding – and the various country-level explanations scholars have discussed in the past only account for at most 30 percent of the gap between the share of workers in the public and in national legislatures. Future research should focus comparative analyses on individual- and party-level explanations and consider the possibility that there are factors common to all democracies that limit working-class officeholding.
While economic inequality has risen in every affluent democracy in North America and Western Europe, the last three decades have also been characterized by falling or stagnating levels of state-led economic redistribution. Why have democratically accountable governments not done more to distribute top-income shares to citizens with low- and middle-income? Unequal Democracies offers answers to this question, bringing together contributions that focus on voters and their demands for redistribution with contributions on elites and unequal representation that is biased against less-affluent citizens. While large and growing bodies of research have developed around each of these perspectives, this volume brings them into rare dialogue. Chapters also incorporate analyses that center exclusively on the United States and those that examine a broader set of advanced democracies to explore the uniqueness of the American case and its contribution to comparative perspectives. This book is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Classic theories of public opinion suggest that negative shocks can undermine system support in weak democracies, but scant work has systematically assessed this thesis. We identify Peru’s explosive Vacuna-gate scandal as a most-likely case for finding a connection between corruption and political support. The scandal’s unexpected revelation in the middle of the 2021 AmericasBarometer Peru survey created conditions for a natural experiment. Applying an unexpected-event-during-survey design, we consider the consequences of the scandal for perceptions of corruption, system support, and support for democracy. We find robust evidence that the scandal increased even already high perceptions of corruption and lowered system support. Contrary to expectations derived from prior theories, we find no effect on explicit support for democracy. In the conclusion, we discuss the nuanced ways that scandal may shape democratic stability.
Online surveys of public opinion are less expensive and faster to administer than other surveys. However, nonprobability online samples diverge from the gold standard of probabilistic sampling. Although scholars have examined the quality of nonprobability samples in the United States and Europe, we know little about how these samples perform in developing contexts. We use nine online surveys fielded in six Latin American countries to examine the bias in these samples. We also ask whether two common tools that researchers use to mitigate sample bias—post-stratification and sample matching—improve these online samples. We find that online samples in the region exhibit high levels of bias, even in countries where Internet access is widespread. We also find that post-stratification does little to improve sample quality; sample matching outperforms the provider’s standard approach, but the gains are substantively small. This is partly because unequal Internet access and lack of investment in panel recruitment means that providers are unlikely to have enough panelists in lower socioeconomic categories to draw representative online samples, regardless of the sampling method. Researchers who want to draw conclusions about the attitudes or behaviors of the public as a whole in contexts like Latin America still need probability samples.
Edited by
Claudia Landwehr, Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz, Germany,Thomas Saalfeld, Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, Germany,Armin Schäfer, Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz, Germany
In most democracies, politicians tend to be vastly better off than the citizens they represent: They are wealthier, more educated, and less likely to come from working-class jobs (e.g., Best 2007; Best and Cotta 2000; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Matthews 1985). Scholars have recently taken a renewed interest in this longstanding phenomenon. Some have studied the symbolic or normative implications of the shortage of politicians from the working class (e.g., Arnesen and Peters 2018; Barnes and Saxton 2019; Mansbridge 2015). Others have focused on policy: Just as the shortage of female and racial minority politicians can affect policies related to gender and race (e.g., Bratton and Ray 2002; Franck and Rainer 2012; Pande 2003; Swers 2002), the shortage of working-class politicians – who tend to be more leftist on economic issues – seems to bias taxing and spending policies towards the more conservative positions affluent citizens tend to favor (Carnes and Lupu 2015; Kirkland 2018; Kraus and Callaghan 2014; Micozzi 2018; O’Grady 2019; Rosset 2016; Szakonyi 2016; 2019; but see Lloren, Rosset, and Wüest 2015).
To what extent has the Argentine party system been polarized along class lines? The political historiography gives mixed and contradictory answers to this question. We explore the social bases of Argentina's political parties using an original database, the most comprehensive database of Argentine elections yet assembled, and new methods of ecological inference that yield more reliable results than previous analyses. We identify two distinct party systems, one in place between 1912 and 1940, the other emerging after 1946. The first party system was not consistently class based, but the second was, with the Radical Party representing the middle classes and the Peronists, workers and the poor. Still, there were important exceptions. Lower-class support for the Peronists, as proxied by literacy rates, declined during Perón's exile, which implies that the party had trouble mobilizing lower-class illiterate voters. Since the return to democracy in 1983, class polarization has again found some expression in the party system.
The conventional wisdom about contemporary Venezuelan politics is that class voting has become commonplace, with the poor doggedly supporting Hugo Chávez while the rich oppose him. This class voting is considered both a new feature of Venezuelan politics and a puzzle given the multiclass bases of prior populist leaders in Latin America. I clarify the concept of class voting by distinguishing between monotonic and nonmonotonic associations between class and vote choice. Using survey data, I find that only in Chávez's first election in 1998 was class voting monotonic. Since then, class voting in Venezuela has been nonmonotonic, with the very wealthiest Venezuelans disproportionately voting against Chávez. At the same time, Chávez's support appears to have increased most among the middle sectors of the income distribution, not the poorest. Finally, I find that whatever effect Chávez may have had on overall turnout, his efforts have not disproportionately mobilized poor voters.