INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the Philippines’ government policy towards the South China Sea (SCS) dispute since 1995 in the context of bilateral relations with China as well as membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Specifically, it looks at how the country has managed its maritime dispute with China since the Mischief Reef incident in 1995 and the implications of the international court's ruling in July 2016 for its bilateral ties with China and ASEAN regional diplomacy, as well as its external defence posture. Using a neoclassical realist perspective, I argue that—despite the favourable ruling of the international court—the Philippines under the new administration of President Duterte still faces a number of challenges in managing its maritime conflict with China. These challenges include: difficulties in renormalization of relations with Beijing; the push for a regional Code of Conduct (COC) between China and the ASEAN in the SCS; and the dismal state of the Philippines’ external defence capability. This author also contends that, under new leadership, the Philippines should seriously consider embarking on developing selfreliance or self-help capability as part of its internal balancing strategy, which should have been the country's core defence strategy since 1992, to effectively protect its interests in the West Philippine Sea.

Self-help is fundamentally a principle of action in an anarchical system of states where each state actor is responsible for their own survival or security. Realists do not consider it prudent for states to rely on other states or institutions to ensure their security. While powerful states can pursue military or defence build-up when they feel threatened by other states, this may not be adequate for smaller states especially if they face a more powerful hegemonic state. To compensate, small states may resort to balance of power strategies by aligning with a more powerful state or forming alliances with other states to counter a perceived hegemony. From a neorealist perspective, states can pursue balance of power internally, by mobilizing internal resources to build economic and defence capability, and externally, by forming alliances or bandwagoning with other states. According to Waltz, power is a means to ensure a state's security and the concern of states is ultimately to maximize security.

Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the challenges and constraints in promoting the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) norms in Southeast Asia, focusing mainly on the potential role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in preventing mass atrocities covered by RtoP. Specifically, it examines the characteristics of states and political systems of members of ASEAN, the political dynamics of the organisation, and to what extent its traditional norms and institutional set-up serve as the main challenges to promoting RtoP in this part of the world. The chapter also identifies some entry points or opportunities for RtoP promotion to gain some ground, notwithstanding the limitations within ASEAN. It also discusses the role of the Asia Pacific Centre for Responsibility to Protect (APRtoP) in promoting RtoP in Southeast Asia through its country programmes and regional engagement, and the extent to which RtoP is appreciated by civil society groups in the region, especially those engaged in peace, conflict prevention and post-conflict rebuilding efforts.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: An Overview

ASEAN came into being in August 1967, following several failed attempts at regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The precursors to ASEAN were the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and the MAPHILINDO (Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia), which both failed to develop because of territorial conflicts among the founding members. The Bangkok Declaration of 1967, which created ASEAN, essentially underscored the core principles of non-interference and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of states as the basis of ASEAN cooperation. These traditional norms served as the main anchor on which the original five members (and later the rest who joined) managed their relations and pursued the organisation's goals and objectives through consultation (mushawarah) and consensus (mufakat). In the context of the Cold War environment in Southeast Asia at the time, the traditional norms of ASEAN helped prevent inter-state conflicts among its members, even as it also served as a strong glue that ensured ASEAN's solidarity vis-avis external threats (such as Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in the late 1970s). That the founding members of the organisation were still in the process of nationbuilding following the post-colonial period in Southeast Asia also made the traditional norms quite important.

Introduction

The rejuvenation of Philippine–American security alliance in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States has created opportunities and expectations for both countries in their fight against international terrorism. For the Philippines, supporting Washington's war essentially opened channels for increased U.S. military assistance that enabled the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to gain the upper hand in its fight against local Islamist terrorist and secessionist groups led by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). On the other hand, the United States gained much more from the revived alliance because it was able to secure a mutual logistics accord that would enable it to use Philippine territory in its campaign against international terrorism. The security interests of the Philippines and the United States on the issue, however, are by no means absolutely mutual. This chapter examines the nature and dynamics of Philippine–American security relations since 11 September, and looks at the influence of political and economic factors in the domestic, regional, and international levels that continue to shape the Philippines’ policy of supporting the United States’ war against international terrorism.

Bilateral Alliance: An Overview

Philippine–American security relations, dormant since the removal of the U.S. military bases in Clark and Subic Bay in 1992, were reinvigorated following the tragic event of 11 September. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and U.S. President George W. Bush have both considered international terrorism as a serious threat to international security, and both leaders have pushed for closer military co-operation between their two countries in the fight against terrorism. However, the mutuality of Philippine and American security interests on this issue was complicated by domestic and external factors that to some extent have constrained their revitalized bilateral alliance, especially for the Philippines. For one, the deployment of a small contingent of U.S. forces in Mindanao, in February 2002, caused the re-awakening of anti-American sentiments among Filipino nationalist legislators and civil society groups — a kind of reverse déjà vu that preceded the closing days of American military presence in the country in the early 1990s.