Increasing participation of Chinese companies in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) standardization has been a frequent topic of the recent academic and policy discussions. Many Western governments and companies believe that the growing representation of Chinese companies, especially Huawei, in the leadership of Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) allows these companies to unduly influence standardization processes. Building on previous empirical studies on China’s representation in SDOs, this chapter theorizes whether, and to what extent, different institutional models of SDOs are capable of safeguarding the integrity and independence of their standardization processes and their resilience to political and commercial pressures, by studying the rules on the leadership appointments of four global SDOs. In a broader sense, our analysis sheds light on the neutrality, independence and trustworthiness of these critical institutions of global economic governance and their evolving and continuous relevance for global standardization.

This chapter provides an overview of the US Regulatory framework applicable to standardization. It discusses the US law and policy instruments codified in the NTTAA and the OMB Circular, as well as the procedural requirements for American national consensus standards introduced by the ANSI. Similar to the previous chapter on the EU, this chapter covers the value of private voluntary standards in US policies and legislation based on the judgments of the US courts. Likewise, it also discusses whether and when standards development organizations may breach the US antitrust provisions, in particular Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and the SDOAA.

This chapter, while acknowledging that there are certain differences and similarities in how the law treats standards development organizations (SDOs) that develop voluntary standards, offers a holistic analysis of the procedural principles introduced in the WTO, EU, and US regulatory frameworks, namely, transparency, openness/participation, consensus, impartiality, balance, effectiveness, relevance, coherence, coordination, concerns of developing countries, appeal, and access to standards, which this study collectively refers to as “due process” principles. This chapter further explores the relevance and suitability of these principles to the different types of standards bodies and identifies the shortcomings of each of the legal mechanisms with regard to ICT standardization. It concludes that these principles are formulated rather flexible and, to be effective, need further concretization by SDOs.

This chapter conceptualizes technical standards and ICT standards, discussing their types and functions. It then introduces different types of standards development organization (SDOs), focusing in particular on competitive dynamics among standards developers. While discussing ICT standardization as a regime of private transnational governance, this chapter offers a theoretical background on non-State regulatory arrangements and explains how voluntary standards created in different types of SDOs may acquire a binding force. To that end, this chapter reviews the relevant scholarship in the field of global governance, transnational private regulation, and global administrative law, outlining the normative framework of this study.

This chapter conceptualizes technical standards and ICT standards, discussing their types and functions. It then introduces different types of standards development organization (SDOs), focusing in particular on competitive dynamics among standards developers. While discussing ICT standardization as a regime of private transnational governance, this chapter offers a theoretical background on non-State regulatory arrangements and explains how voluntary standards created in different types of SDOs may acquire a binding force. To that end, this chapter reviews the relevant scholarship in the field of global governance, transnational private regulation, and global administrative law, outlining the normative framework of this study.

This chapter provides a detailed systematic overview of the operational rules of seven prominent standards development organizations, each having a different institutional background and developing different types of ICT standards, namely: ITU; ETSI; 3GPP; IEEE; IETF; W3C; and Bluetooth SIG. Building on the previous chapter, it examines these organizations’ standards development procedures, which it divides into three stages: proposal of standardization projects, rules on contributing and voting at the meetings of technical committees, and approval of standards. It then offers comparative observations to the extent that the different institutional settings of these organizations allow.

This chapter reveals experiences of individuals who have been involved in ICT standardization, mostly experts from leading private companies, with the processes of different standards development organizations (SDOs), discussing such aspects as practical relevance of IPR policies, dispute resolution by the organizations’ governance bodies, and the differences between drafting organizational policies and drafting standards. In particular, this chapter seeks to understand from a practical viewpoint, how compliance with due process requirements by SDOs relates to the effectiveness of their standards and, building on these findings, reveal the limits of epistemic legitimacy in ICT standardization as a regulatory tool. The main conclusion from this qualitative empirical research is that, according to the experts, the ICT standardization ecosystem functions well and does not need any interference from the public sector. As such, while the findings of this chapter take a form of anecdotal evidence, they increase our understanding of current practices in ICT standardization, and offer food for thought for both public and private regulators with respect to the design and scrutiny of standardization processes.

This chapter offers three case studies on recent disagreements in the bodies and committees of three SDOs, where procedural guarantees were at stake. These disagreements arose at three different “levels”: standards development, policy-making, and appeal procedures. The discussed disagreements were either resolved through the internal dispute resolution bodies of these SDOs, or escalated to litigation. In particular, this chapter attempts to reveal what can be learned from the experiences of stakeholders involved in these disagreements and concludes that, despite the different nature of these disputes, they arose from the (potential) exclusion of the relevant stakeholders from particular institutional processes.

This chapter attempts to understand whether and how the increased compliance with due process principles within standards development organizations (SDOs) affects legitimacy and effectiveness of ICT standards. In this regard, it also aims to reveal whether private standards bodies weaken the role of international standards bodies in the ICT sector, and whether the low degree of balance in private standards bodies undermines the legitimacy of modern global economic activity. It further suggests what should be the role of different stakeholders (e.g., SDOs, governments, and courts) in strengthening the different types of legitimacy in ICT standardization, underscoring the importance of feedback mechanisms for SDOs’ decision-making that is currently insufficient or absent from the SDOs’ operational frameworks.

This chapter outlines the main findings of this book, placing them in the broader perspective of global ICT standardization. It discusses the arising challenges and sketches a broader legal, economic, and political outlook on due process in ICT standardization. In particular, this chapter provides a concise summary of the book’s main argument: if standards development organizations’ (SDOs) frameworks are to fall short on procedural guarantees, which is increasingly becoming the case due to the complexity and public function of their standards, there is little chance that their governance bodies will address the issue, which may result in lack of legitimacy in the ICT standardization ecosystem; this can be remedied, at least in part, by an “external” review of SDOs’ processes and decisions, (to be) conducted by industry experts, courts, or public law bodies. This chapter further provides recommendations and suggestions for improving both the existing regulatory framework and internal rules of SDOs, emphasizing, however, that any modifications of operational frameworks should take into account the specific sector in which these organizations operate.

This chapter focuses on legitimacy of ICT standardization as a form of regulation. After reviewing the relevant scholarship on legitimacy and effectiveness of private transnational regulation, it takes up Schmidt’s framework on input, throughput, and output legitimacy as the most relevant for ICT standards. It then introduces a nonexhaustive list of procedural meta-principles through which the private regulatory regime created by ICT standardization can be legitimized. These processes are addressed in this chapter as “good governance principles” and include participation, transparency, reason-giving, and review; they also serve as procedural mechanisms to hold private regulators accountable and to ensure legitimacy of their rule-making.