There are many books on climate change and cities, so why another one? In this literature cities feature variously as victims (threatened by the rise of sea levels), solutions (compact living) and models (various new ‘green’ settlements), but always as adjuncts, effectively just add-ons, to the subject of climate change. The basic argument is that given climate change is happening, how are cities affected and what can be done about it?

Acknowledging Hassett's (2017: 14) wide-ranging evidence that cities have made us humans – as she states, ‘we haven't just built cities. Cities have built us’ – this book offers a completely different take: cities are the key human component in anthropogenic climate change. Our basic argument is that without cities, there would never have been anthropogenic climate change. So there – if you want to engage with this unique argument, read on. We think you should because to deal effectively with any emergency – and climate change is now an emergency – it is vital to understand the fundamental mechanism behind the crisis. And we might just be right.

Our book has been a long time in the making. The path to this text begins in 2010 when we three found ourselves together in the same academic home, the Department of Geography at Northumbria University in Newcastle upon Tyne. By coincidence we were in the process of researching and writing two books that were soon to be published: Taylor's Extraordinary Cities: Millennia of Moral Syndromes, World-Systems and City/State Relations (Edward Elgar, 2013) and O’Brien and O’Keefe's Managing Adaptation to Climate Risk: Beyond Fragmented Responses (Routledge, 2014). This book has its origins in our trying to bring together some of the core ideas of these two texts, the human potentials of urban agglomerations and connectivities, and the building of resilient communities to reduce risks from disruptive events. Although the original texts are very different, they shared common concern for holistic thinking, bottom-up practice and anthropogenic climate change. These starting points were consistent with others’ research agendas in the Department of Geography so that when The Leverhulme Trust invited bids to initiate a major research programme on climate change in 2013, we threw our hat into the ring.

Introduction: unthinking a thoroughly modern discourse

Without a sustained input from a critical social science, climate change science and policy-making have been condemned to being thoroughly modern. Whereas future scenarios – posited, projected or predicted – take humanity into uncharted waters (literally for many!), mainstream thinking about how we got into this predicament and how we might get out of it have been severely constrained by an embedded modern mindscape. Hence the need for a dose of Wallerstein's (1991) ‘unthinking’:

Our attempt at loosening these constraints involves confronting conventional modern theses on the framing of human activities in time (chronology) and space (chorography) with plausible antitheses, thereby pointing towards a different understanding of the ‘anthropo’ in anthropogenic climate change. For chronology this means developing a ‘trans-modern’ approach that brings the ‘pre-modern’ into play in order to understand the possibilities of a ‘post-modern’. The result is a break from the modern progress myth of humanity moving ever forward and upwards with its concomitant faith in technology to deliver a safe future. For chorography this means thinking outside the mosaic world created by nation-states that frame modern actions, economic and cultural, as well as political. Thus we break with modern state pre-eminence and its concomitant faith in good governments delivering a safe future. We view both dimensions of conventional thinking – progress/technology and state/policy – to be severely problematic: modern sinks dragging us into an abyss.

Our critical concerns are overtly manifest in the mainstream of climate science and policy-making, as represented by the IPCC and UN Climate Change Conferences (known as COP from ‘Conference of the Parties’ to the 1992 UNFCCC; the meeting in Paris in 2015 was COP 21) respectively. Quite overtly, these two remarkable global institutions epitomise state framing in both the science and policy-making.

Introduction: Jane Jacobs beyond urban celebrity

Zipp and Storring (2016b: xvii–xviii) have made a powerful case for revisiting Jane Jacobs’ rich intellectual legacy:

The description of her as ‘greatest theorist of the city’ is probably derived from a Planetizen survey (Planetizen is a US urban planning news website) in 2009, where Jacobs was ranked first among the ‘Top 100 Urban Thinkers’ by a readers’ poll (Goldsmith and Lynne, 2010: xxiv). A similar survey from the same source in 2017 again ranked her first, this time as ‘The Most Influential Urbanist’ of all time (see www. planetizen.com/features/95189-100-most-influential-urbanists). The accompanying citation refers to two aspects of her work: the book The Death and Life of Great American Cities (Jacobs, 1961) and her battle with Robert Moses over New York planning issues in the 1950s and 1960s. This surely represents her prime legacy (Hirt, 2012a). Still in print today and always mentioned on the front cover of all her subsequent books, Death and Life catapulted Jacobs into literary stardom as an authority of things urban: the book is credited with igniting paradigmatic change in the theory and practice of city planning.

But Jacobs’ reputation rests on much more than her writing. She was a protestor and activist, defender of communities and advocate of civil disobedience. Her successful struggles to stop Moses physically destroying communities complemented her book and have become the stuff of legends, a modern David and Goliath story (Flint, 2009; Lang and Wunsch, 2009), even making its way onto the silver screen – see Altimeter Films’ Citizen Jane: Battle for the City.

Introduction: trans-modern scholarship

The last chapter made the case for unthinking in a trans-modern manner; here we implement this approach. But developing transmodern scholarship is fraught with knowledge difficulties. In effect, our take on anthropogenic climate change is a provocation to modernity's innate superiority complex. We are downgrading our modern world from ultimate historical climax to just another historical interlude. This changing macro-positionality means we are basically searching for a sort of ‘self-reflexivity’ at a societal level, moving towards a global ecological holism that Jacobs understood many years ago:

We tackle this transcending of modern sensibilities, as indicated by our title, by transferring the ‘anthropo’ in contemporary climate change from industrialisation, as specifically modern, to urbanisation, as generic focus: modern people are not the only humans to influence planetary climate change. The chapter consists of two arguments, the first developing and presenting a narrative for anthropogenic climate change, and the second making trans-modern interventions through consequent new chorological and chronological framings.

As described in the last chapter, at the heart of the modern mindset there is grand narrative combining a progress (development) chronology with a mosaic (states) chorography. This can be challenged in two ways, by eschewing grand narrative as legitimate reasoning or by constructing a contrary narrative. In practical terms we think the former is the risky option for radical social change at the macro level because it leaves a pedagogic vacuum. Thus we confront the modern narrative with an alternative narrative customised for humans’ role in planetary climate change. This combines a generic process – urban demand – with historical specifics in a story that importantly includes, but does not extoll, modernity.

The second part is equally contentious. In the chorological intervention we identify research themes for a relevant urban studies. There is a long tradition of critical urban scholarship that we do not engage with in this book.

Many believe that climate change is the greatest threat we face. But there are others who do not. Although the international community has put in place a system for tackling climate change, it is not making sufficient progress to avoid a global temperature rise that could lead to dangerous climate events. In addition, although there is increasing evidence of adverse events being driven by climate change, some nations such as the USA do not support actions, and the energy producers are clearly using their immense political influence to limit efforts being made to reduce conventional energy use. This Primer discusses climate change and posits that cities are best placed to lead on reducing greenhouse gas emissions as well as the adaptations needed to deal with changes driven by climate change.

Climate change is a natural phenomenon that depends on relationships between the Earth, Moon, Sun and other planets in our solar system and the composition of the Earth's atmosphere. The amount of what are termed ‘greenhouse gases’, such as carbon dioxide (CO2), determine how much energy from the sun is trapped in the atmosphere. The more greenhouses gases present, the more heat is trapped, and the warmer the atmosphere becomes. This is called the ‘greenhouse effect’, a natural phenomenon that fluctuates cyclically. Over time the Earth has experienced both ice ages and warm periods, with the last ice age ending some 12,000 years ago.

With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, increasing use of fossil fuels massively increased the amount of greenhouse gases, particularly CO2, emitted into the atmosphere. This has grown from a concentration of some 280 parts per million (ppm) prior to the Industrial Revolution to some 400ppm today. And it is still growing. Since the Industrial Revolution the global average temperature has risen by 1 degree Celsius. Climate scientists believe that a rise of more than 1.5 degrees Celsius will lead to dangerous climate change.

What has been the response? The international community has recognised the dangers of climate change. In 1994 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) came into force. Its role is to find the means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It initially set a target to reduce emission rates to 1990 levels by 2000. This proved to be completely unrealistic, and in 1997 UNFCCC established the Kyoto Protocol.

Introduction: I wouldn't start from here…

Growing urban demand, millennia old with modern rapid acceleration, this is what we have identified as the integral social component, the critical ‘anthropo’, in anthropogenic climate change. Thus the Urbanocene goes back thousands of years to the beginnings of cities, their demand for food and consequent land clearances. This much longer time frame underscores global urban demand as also integral to what our species has long been, what we are now, and what we are still becoming. Urban demand is not the economist's simple demand variable; it is a way of life, a multifaceted social complex.

We have entered Naomi Klein's (2014) world of policy dilemmas pitting embedded worldviews against the need to change how we think. Put bluntly, we seem to be locked into a position where we are collectively pursuing a path with terminal consumption as the outcome. Thus the Urbanocene reveals our ‘shared DNA’ as the Earth's creative, destructive species: our consuming involves both inventively using Nature (including other humans) to satisfy our demand for stuff while simultaneously destroying Nature to produce said stuff. To continue the DNA analogy, it follows that some sort of critical ‘gene editing’ will be required to make manifest changes. As an ‘urban species’ we have to reimagine ourselves, that is to say, we must reinvent the city.

To say ‘action is needed’ is an understatement of immense proportions. And there are myriad practices and policies aimed at mitigating and adapting to climate change, with many more in the pipeline, working in countless places across the world. They should all be supported – every little helps – but they can never be enough unless uber urban demand is confronted head on. We can equate our situation with the common urban myth about a lost cosmopolitan traveller asking a local yokel how to reach a destination. The answer given is totally useless: ‘I wouldn't start from here’.

Introduction: unwelcome statements of the evident

Things are not going well in the world of climate change policy and action. There are myriad initiatives and innovations, not least in alternative energy, but somehow it never seems enough. The threat of global warming and its numerous dire consequences are unrelenting. Why? It is not that we do not know what is happening; the science is conclusive, extensively reported and widely accepted, albeit not universally. Obviously humanity's overall responses to these authoritative warnings are wholly inadequate. But this answer only elicits another question, why inadequate? It is this second ‘why’ that we attempt to answer in this book. Put simply, we think that the basic framing of the global climate change debate – scientists providing compelling evidence so that governments can collectively produce the urgently required policies – is deeply flawed.

We begin this book with a set of Declarations. These are eight statements of our starting position, blunt pronouncements that are the foundations of our thinking. Hence we do not discuss and debate current climate change policy and action; we treat its failing as a given. We do not offer ways of improving what is being done through building on successes and avoiding known pitfalls. This is not a ‘how-to-do-better’ manual. We do not belittle the very important work being done in the field, but these efforts are known to be wanting overall. They don't add up to anything that looks like an adequate solution. Despite multiple exhortations to sort it out there is a feeling of exasperation every time a new set of climate science warnings is published. It seems to be not so much a matter of ‘what can be done?’ as admitting ‘what can't be done?’ We present what we think are intractable obstacles that appear to be blocking a credible path ahead and suggest an alternative way forward.

Relevant legislation and statutory standards

New Zealand’s competition (antitrust) laws are contained in the Commerce Act 1986 (‘the Commerce Act’). The Commerce Act deals with restrictive trade practices, mergers and potential regulatory control. The purpose of the Commerce Act is ‘[t]o promote competition in markets for the long-term benefit of consumers within New Zealand’. It is based largely on the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974, which in turn is based on principles derived from United States antitrust jurisprudence.

Prior to its enactment, the New Zealand economy was characterised by price controls, government involvement in private enterprises, licensing and regulation of monopolies, and widespread import licensing and tariffs designed to protect domestic producers. The rapid deregulation of the New Zealand economy from 1984, which began with the election of the fourth Labour government, created a need to establish strong and credible competition laws to replace the scaled-back (and, in many cases, eliminated) level of central government involvement.

Introduction

New Labour's standard defence of its record in the sphere of industrial relations is to refer trade union critics to its legislative achievements. Government apologists point to the 1999 Employment Relations Act, the 1998 National Minimum Wage Act and to endorsement of the European Union (EU) Social Chapter soon after the 1997 electoral victory. While these Acts marked a distinct break from the Conservatives’ repudiation of any form of statutory union recognition, and the limited protection afforded the lowest-paid workers by the Wages Councils, many regard the legislation as limited – indeed, minimalist – measures (McKay, 2001; Smith and Morton, 2001, 2006). These strictures also applied to the government's attitude to the EU directives on working time, part-time workers and information and consultation. Similarly, the introduction of the National Minimum Wage was designed to bring the UK into line with other EU countries, and the composition of the Low Pay Commission appointed by New Labour ‘guaranteed that the level would be set well below what trade unions were asking for’ (Howell, 2004, p 7).

Notwithstanding the Labour Party's long-standing organisational links to the trade unions, the Blair government's legislative approach has been characterised by a determination to do nothing that might be perceived to favour them or detract from the overall pro-business agenda. The government has paid the weakest form of lip service to the EU concept of permitting (if not promoting) formal, orderly dialogue between union and employer ‘social partners’ in order to discourage adversarial relations. In practice, UK legislation has been framed so as neither to disadvantage the employer nor to undermine the far-reaching effects of the battery of coercive anti-union laws imposed by Conservative governments between 1980 and 1993. The role of labour law, in Blair's words, is ‘to put a very minimum infrastructure of decency and fairness around people in the workplace’ (Howell, 2004, p 14).

Insofar as it can be argued that workers’ rights have been advanced, then these have been concerned mainly with the position of the individual employee. Thus, legislation has been designed to eschew the use of collectivist terminology that might conceivably enhance the influence of trade unions (Undy, 1999). Indeed, obstacles placed in the way of unions seeking to utilise the limited employee grievance and disciplinary clauses introduced under the Employment Relations Act severely constrain their ability to defend even individual rights (McKay, 2001; Smith and Morton, 2001).