On October 6, 2021, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down Opinion 1/19 on the conclusion of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). Based on a request by the European Parliament, the Opinion was rendered under Article 218(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which enables the Court to rule on the compatibility with EU law of international agreements envisaged, but not yet concluded, by the Union. The Opinion is about, on the one hand, the legal basis under the EU Treaties and, on the other hand, the procedure pursuant to which the EU and its member states may conclude the Convention.

A stream of recent judgments by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice has shed light on the procedures that govern treaty-making by the European Union. This article explores how this case law approaches the principle of institutional balance and the duty of cooperation between the institutions. It argues that the former is construed in a balanced manner on the basis of a literal interpretation of primary law that promotes strict compliance with procedural rules and does not favour a particular institution. As for the duty of cooperation, whilst its procedural dimension is strengthened, its scope remains somewhat elusive. The analysis identifies a pragmatic streak in the Court's balanced approach, and argues that there is an inherent limit to the impact of constitutional law on inter-institutional disputes. Ultimately, the less time and energy the institutions waste on turf wars about their procedural powers, the greater their contribution to inceasing the efficiency of the Union's treaty-making practice.

Within the context of Community law, the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of international agreements is often fraught with legal problems about competence. There are various reasons for this: the EC Treaty set out a sui generis legal order based on the principle of limited powers pursuant to Article 5 EC. On the other hand, international trade relations deal with a wide range of distinct, albeit interdependent, areas not necessarily falling within the Community’s competence. This substantive discrepancy entails the simultaneous involvement of both Member States and Community institutions, whose often differing agenda may give rise to disputes of a procedural and practical nature. This process has been seen as a threat to the uniformity of the Community’s external relations. The Commission, for instance, has often argued that, in order for the Community to maintain a unified position on the international trade scene, to preserve the coherence of its policies and protect the credibility of its negotiating stance, the exclusive nature of its competence should be interpreted broadly.

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was conceived of as an area ill-suited for full judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty confers on the Court limited jurisdiction which the recent case law has interpreted in broad terms. This article will place this case law in the broader constitutional setting of the EU legal order and will provide a critical analysis of its implications for both the EU's and domestic courts. The analysis is structured on the basis of three main themes. The first is about the position of CFSP in the EU's constitutional architecture: the article will analyse the constitutional ambivalence that characterizes this position and how it is conveyed by the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union governing the Court's jurisdiction. The second theme is about the recent case law, and the integrationist approach that the Court of Justice has adopted to the scope of its jurisdiction. The third theme is about national courts: the article will argue that recent case law has been too quick to dismiss them, and that primary law renders them an essential part of the judicial review system governing CFSP.

This article discusses how the EU legal order deals with cases where Member States deem that the principle of necessity justifies a deviation from EU law. It analyses the various exceptional clauses laid down in primary and secondary EU law, and discusses the tensions which their application may raise in the context of the Union's idiosyncratic constitutional order. It assesses the broad powers with which national courts are endowed, and highlights the dynamic nature of the Union's approach to accommodating potential deviations. Finally, it focuses on an area at the core of national sovereignty, namely defence, and outlines the gradually shifting approach to its economic aspects which the Union institutions have developed over the years.

Whilst the political aspects of Cyprus's membership to the European Union have become the main focus of academic analysis over the years, its trade relations with the Member States have raised issues just as interesting from a legal point of view. This has been illustrated quite recently by the Anastasiou II judgment delivered by the European Court of Justice in 2000. The article aims at highlighting some of these issues. It is structured in three parts: the first part outlines the provisions of the EC–Cyprus Association Agreement governing trade between the parties; the second part analyses the Court's first ruling on imports of certain produce from the northern part of Cyprus;1 the third part examines the recent judgment of the Court on imports of produce which, whilst originating in the northern part of Cyprus, are being accompanied by phytosanitary certificates issued by the Turkish authorities.