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65 results

Page 1 of 4

  • What is the Idea of the Soul? Comments on Katharina Kraus, Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation

  • Patrick R. Frierson
  • Journal:
    Kantian Review / Volume 27 / Issue 3 / September 2022
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    28 June 2022, pp. 475-481
    Print publication:
    September 2022
    • Article
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  • These remarks focus on Kraus’s claim that for Kant the category of substance cannot apply to the soul but that instead we can and should apply a merely regulative idea of the soul. While granting Kraus’s contention that we require an idea of the soul in order to investigate inner experience, I argue that the category of substance nonetheless applies to the soul, but that the notion of the soul as entirely non-corporeal is a regulative idea. To explore this contention, I closely examine two crucial passages Kraus uses to argue against parity between inner and outer sense.

  • Chapter 6 - Affects and passions

  • Edited by Alix Cohen, University of Edinburgh
  • Book:
    Kant's Lectures on Anthropology
    Published online:
    05 November 2014
    Print publication:
    30 October 2014, pp 94-113

  • Summary

    By providing a psychological account of affects and passions in terms of feeling and inclination, this chapter makes sense of Immanuel Kant's moral assessment of each. It offers some general overview of Kant's empirical psychology, and explains the psychology of affects and passions. Two key claims about affects and passions are present in Kant's earliest lectures on anthropology. Like affects, passions are illnesses of mind that shut out the sovereignty of reason, and just as affects prevent the comparison of one feeling with others, a passion is an inclination that prevents reason from comparing it with the sum of all inclinations in respect to a certain choice. With respect to Kant's seeming affirmation that one can be, to some degree, morally responsible for affects, one needs to distinguish between moral responsibility for actions motivated by affects, and responsibility for the affects themselves.

Kant's Empirical Psychology
  • Patrick R. Frierson
  • Published online:
    05 August 2014
    Print publication:
    17 July 2014
  • Throughout his life, Kant was concerned with questions about empirical psychology. He aimed to develop an empirical account of human beings, and his lectures and writings on the topic are recognizable today as properly 'psychological' treatments of human thought and behavior. In this book Patrick R. Frierson uses close analysis of relevant texts, including unpublished lectures and notes, to study Kant's account. He shows in detail how Kant explains human action, choice, and thought in empirical terms, and how a better understanding of Kant's psychology can shed light on major concepts in his philosophy, including the moral law, moral responsibility, weakness of will, and cognitive error. Frierson also applies Kant's accounts of mental illness to contemporary philosophical issues. His book will interest students and scholars of Kant, the history of psychology, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of action.

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