The wise person

The centre of Antisthenes’ ethics is the wise person. Those who act with wisdom act in accordance with complete virtue, as seen when Antisthenes exploits the warning of Athena in Homer. The interpretation of Homer makes its contribution to ethics, since virtue and wisdom are two interconnected concepts. The wise want to live in conformity with virtue, and it is the wise who possess virtue. Moreover, virtue is teachable. Not only does his whole didactic practice depend on the teachability of virtue, but so too does the central concept of the wise person. If there was no teachability, there would be no wise man. Wisdom and virtue form a symbiotic unity. Furthermore, as previously noted, virtue once acquired cannot be lost: ‘Virtue is a weapon that cannot be taken away’.

This highly debated point is, in Antisthenes’ eyes, very important and he is explicitly reported to have adhered to this theory, as we have seen. I believe there is some absurdity in the idea that a wise person could lose his or her virtue, because then the person would stop being wise. In order to acquire the right insight the wise person does not need to use many different forms of reasoning, Antisthenes said, nor does it require a great deal of learning. It is all a question of practice – actions or deeds rather than words. On the other hand, the vicious require a lot of reasons. There is a slight contradiction here because Antisthenes elsewhere stresses the importance of reasoning. We are not told what kind of reasoning leads to virtue, although such thinking will have the force of walls. Walls [sc. of the centre] must be constructed in our own impregnable methods of reasoning. The centre where such methods of reasoning function is ‘wisdom’ (phronēsis), but we are not told according to what standards they are to be formed in this centre of the self, nor precisely how they are constructed.

The wise are self-sufficient and everything belongs to the wise, that is, they possess all the things they need. While they do not need others, they do recognize their fellows.

Introduction

Antisthenes’ sources

We have two coherent speeches from an ancient Greek handbook of speeches that are attributed to Antisthenes, one spoken by Ajax and one by Odysseus. Myth relates that after the death of Achilles these two men both claimed the armour of the greatest Greek hero. The Atreides, the kings Agamemnon and Menelaus, not without manipulation, left the judgement about the armour to a jury consisting of Greek warriors who had fought at Troy. The mythological scene was well known before Antisthenes’ day because of its treatment by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar. Every reader of Antisthenes’ speeches knew from the start that Ajax was not awarded the armour, which was given to Odysseus instead, and moreover that Ajax could not handle his defeat and killed himself.

In his tragedy, Sophocles gives his Ajax a long speech deploring the method of jury selection and lamenting his loss. Pindar also dedicates a passage to this subject; he states that Ajax was ‘without gift of speech, but bold at heart’ (because in Homer Ajax was presented as a fighting machine). The secret votes of the Greeks favoured Odysseus, unfairly according to Pindar; the result, he says, ‘Ajax's sword once used in favour of the Greeks and above the corpse of the newly slain Achilles made also a suicidal end to Ajax's life’. Regarding Ajax's loss as unfair, Pindar takes sides against Odysseus, whose reputation was rather controversial as was previously discussed, accusing him of ‘cunning falsehood’.

There must have been something attractive in the matter of the contest between Ajax and Odysseus. Antisthenes also apparently felt that possibilities for exhibiting his eloquence were ready at hand, perhaps especially because Ajax was known to be ‘without the gift of speech’, as Pindar said. Hence it might be an incentive to write a striking speech in favour of a person who was known to be but a moderate speaker, or no speaker at all: in the underworld scene in Homer where Odysseus meets Ajax, he refuses to say anything to Odysseus. As already discussed, Antisthenes had written much to save the reputation of Odysseus, and it must have been attractive to do this again, or to use the material for the first time in a speech, but instead Antisthenes tries to be rather neutral here (at first glance in any case), because of the demands of the forensic context.

Did Antisthenes claim that there is no such thing as contradiction?

Antisthenes is credited with a remarkable theory: contradiction is impossible. Diogenes Laertius ascribes the tenet of the excluded contradiction expressly to Antisthenes, and it is a theory well suited to Antisthenes’ provocative attitude. It amounts to saying ‘you cannot be contradicted, you are always right’ – what a charming theory for the future politicians who were Antisthenes’ pupils! A witness for this thesis is a quotation from Proclus: ‘That it is not necessary to contradict, because every logos speaks the truth, he [sc. Antisthenes] says, for he who speaks says something, and he who says something, speaks being, and he who speaks being, speaks the truth’. ‘Being’ (τὸ ὄν) is what really is, what is true, what is valid. Thus, it turns out that Antisthenes’ ontology and gnoseology coincided: if one says ‘being’, one speaks the truth; being apparently has an actual existence experienced without metaphysics. If Antisthenes truly considered logos a kind of definition, then, for example, referring to an animal by the name of ‘horse’ labels an actual existing horse, a being; in that case something that is true is spoken, and such knowledge can spring only from reality.

Furthermore, contradiction is not necessary, he claims: it is possible that both debaters are saying something that is true and there is no need to assume that a contradiction is present. However, it is not easy to fathom precisely what Antisthenes had in mind when he launched this view. In the scholarly literature Proclus’ statement is explained as the amazing notion that one is not able to contradict or that contradiction does not exist. However, if this interpretation is right a problem arises, for it neglects the fact that Proclus said that according to Antisthenes it is ‘not necessary’ (μὴ δϵῖν) that one contradicts the other. The phrase ‘not necessary’ implies that there remain cases in which contradiction does actually exist. The number of cases, then, in which there is contradiction has only been reduced, but there positively remains the possibility that contradiction exists. Yet the current interpretation of the excluded contradiction according to Antisthenes has no provisos, an interpretation that could be supported if a slight change to the Greek is allowed and we read μηδ᾿ ϵἶναι instead of μὴ δϵῖν.

Antisthenes’ teaching regarding sex and marriage

We have already encountered some of Antisthenes’ opinions on sex, which in one instance he regarded as an unnatural form of badness, but nonetheless allowed for the necessity of procreation. He dedicated an entire work to his theory of marriage, On Procreation of Children or On Marriage, a Discourse on Love, of which we do not possess direct fragments. However, we know that Antisthenes had a purely practical eugenetic point of view: he will only marry a woman who has the best natural disposition (ταῖς ϵὐϕυϵστάταις συνιόντα γυναιζί), to get the best children. Hicks, in the LCL edition of Diogenes Laertius, translates ϵὐϕυϵστάταις as ‘handsomest’ (woman), but Antisthenes recommends that a man should not look for a beautiful woman, because he will have them ‘in common’ with other men. Moreover, one has to look for a woman who will be grateful because she will treat you better – a rather unromantic point of view. The wise man will only marry for the sake of procreation, and he himself knows whom he should marry, implying that the women who were match-makers did not know.

Antisthenes was a rather extraordinary character, as we may conclude from another of his odd actions. If he saw a woman anywhere decked out with ornaments he would hasten to her house and ask her husband to bring out his horse and his arms. If the man possessed them, he would leave the woman and her ornaments alone because the man could defend himself; but if not, he would ask him to strip off his wife's finery. This was obviously a lesson: first things first. Luxury is acceptable if the basics are provided for. Elsewhere we shall see that luxury is condemnable. This makes him like the Cynics, who disapproved of luxury entirely.

Adultery

While Antisthenes dedicated a book to marriage and procreation, he was also interested in extramarital sexual relations. So he had his own view of adultery, as transmitted by the following fragment. One day when seeing an adulterer running for his life he exclaimed: ‘Unfortunate fellow, what peril you might have escaped at the cost of an obol!’ Here he implies that the aim of the adulterer was sexual satisfaction, which could have been acquired cheaply by visiting a prostitute.

Antisthenes in Xenophon's Symposium

I offer here a discussion of some passages from Xenophon's Symposium in which a portrait of Antisthenes is presented in conversational action. This significant work can be seen as a counterpart to Plato's Symposium, which is far more well known because of its philosophical depth and style. However, it is hard to accept that Xenophon's text was written after Plato’s, although it does not have the grandeur of Plato's unforgettably rich work. Yet, most commentators believe that Plato's was prior. Guthrie, who does not admire Xenophon's Symposium very much, speaks about its ‘naivety’, and says that ‘structurally the composition creaks at every joint’. I am inclined to side with Patzer who says: ‘Es bleibt im Folgenden zu untersuchen, welche Rolle Antisthenes im Rahmen dieser wohldurchdachten und recht kunstvollen dreiteiligen Gesamtkonzeption spielt’. [‘It remains to be investigated in the following what part Antisthenes plays within this well-considered and quite ingenious tripartite composition’].

Antisthenes comes to the scene as a central figure in Xenophon's Symposium; one of the speeches is even given to him. He is the only future philosopher in the company of Socrates and he appears in this capacity as the most dedicated follower. There is reason to believe that Xenophon presented Antisthenes as he thought that he actually was: somewhat rough and very direct. In the Symposium, Socrates himself ascribes such a character to Antisthenes. Patzer assumes the pursuit of realism to be behind this portrait of Antisthenes; he presents a thorough and often convincing commentary on this passage in his chapter ‘Der Xenophontische Antisthenes’.

Xenophon could not have been present at the scene, although he claims that he was there. If he was not present, from where did he derive his material? It is likely that he took some material from memories of his contact with Socrates and from his own reading of works by Antisthenes, who did not write a Symposium himself, although he did write many works that were counterparts of books by Plato. If Antisthenes had written a Symposium (none is mentioned on Diogenes Laertius’ list), he would not have made an acceptable participant in Xenophon's work.

Polytropos

Antisthenes’ view on the Homeric epithet polytropos, a word that played an important part in our discussion of the study of names, requires special attention. Antisthenes made Homer the subject of profound study, as we may deduce from many titles of his works. Homer was a favourite of tragedians and rhetors, many of whom did not approve of Odysseus’ behaviour. Antisthenes belonged to the group of Odysseus’ defenders. The explication of Homer's poems, he believed, could not be entrusted to rhapsodists, who do not really understand what they recite in performance. Odysseus’ behaviour is often condemned and Antisthenes implies as much, while seeking to protect him explicitly with reference to his Homeric epithet polytropos, ‘turning many ways’, ‘versatile’, ‘wily’, or ‘sly’. As Antisthenes says, this word ‘does no more praise than criticize Odysseus’. This statement is frequently explained by stating that, according to Antisthenes, Homer does not pass moral judgement in deploying polytropos. For the sake of clarity I shall divide the original rendering of the text on polytropos into three sections.

Section 1

Following Antisthenes’ thesis on the balanced meaning of polytropos (‘polytropos does no more praise than criticize Odysseus’), he states that Homer does not grant this epithet polytropos to noble heroes such as Agamemnon and Ajax. This might suggest that polytropos ought to be interpreted negatively. Antisthenes calls these heroes ‘uncomplicated, noble persons’ (ἁπƛοῦς ϰαὶ γϵννάδας); then he presents a sketch of Nestor's character starting with this characteristic, the uncomplicated nature of his manners. Nestor, he says, was a wise person who mainly had to deal with Agamemnon (note the verb ‘to deal [with]’ (συνόντα) which will play an important role in Antisthenes’ argument). Nestor's character was averse to using a ruse or cheating, and he had uncomplicated relations with Agamemnon and the other heroes. When he had good advice for the army, he gave it and did not hide it. Achilles’ character also avoided the use of a ruse or cheating; in fact, he disliked dissembling to such a degree that he considered ‘a person who says other things than he has in mind’ to be an enemy equal to death. The problem arises because polytropos is not applied to noble persons such as Agamemnon, Achilles, or Nestor, but is said of Odysseus.

Introduction

The only fragment of an Antisthenean work entitled Politikos tells us ‘that his [sc. Antisthenes] dialogue Politikos contained an attack on all the demagogues at Athens’. Note that this is not a condemnation of democracy, only of the demagogues. It is plausible that Alcibiades was also attacked in this work, or in any case included in it, because the verdict on him must have been rather severe due to the moral disapproval of him (as stated already).

Antisthenes’ own attitude can be characterized as taking the middle course. In the personal domain he advised against coming too close to politics, but he did not advise abstaining from it either. Just as one must not come too close to fire with the risk of being burned, so too one must not be too far from the fire with the risk of getting cold. He seems to have had no preference for any particular form of constitution, be it oligarchic or democratic, only for the right kind of monarchy. He was a citizen of Athens, a democracy, and we do not know of any extended stay in another country. As a citizen he participated in the battle of Tanagra (426 B.C.) and distinguished himself, thus creating for Socrates the opportunity to make a humorous remark, something in the vein of ‘if both Antisthenes’ parents had been Athenians he would not have turned out to be so brave’.

In the theoretical field he had something positive to say about those who are individually outstanding to such a degree that they are entitled to lay claim to absolute power. We have a suggestion by Antisthenes referring to lions and hares at a human congress (!) requiring all of them to be equal. Obviously we are in the realm of fable. The congress of the lions and the hares appears in Aristotle's Politics, where Antisthenes is introduced in a discussion on the superior man, who is like a god, and for whom there can be no legislation. Aesop's fable 241 provides the only clue for interpretation, but there the lions say to the hares: ‘Where are your claws and teeth?’ In other words, ‘We did the job, so we have claim to a greater share’.

Antisthenes’ status

Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates and a rival of Plato, did not like democracy very much. On one occasion, he ridiculed the practice of voting, advising the Athenians to elevate donkeys to horses by voting. The Athenians considered this advice, to say the least, foolish. However, Antisthenes explained it by adding further insult: ‘But among you there are generals who have not learned anything but have been elevated to the rank of general only by voting’.

This anecdote shows that Antisthenes was a witty philosopher, an outspoken character, and a rude fellow who enjoyed surprising his interlocutors. When someone once remarked that many people praised him, he retorted: ‘Why, what did I do wrong?’ It is important to note his rudeness as well as his surprising reversals of established opinion because many fragments are marked as authentic precisely on account of these characteristics. These fragments often contain short, pithy statements that were very apt for quotation and in this way found their way into the tradition; but we shall see that he was also very capable of argument in a strictly philosophical manner. This study will also demonstrate that the pithy one-liners were often mitigated in his theoretical discussions or in further statements of his personal views. Such slogans, then, were meant to be provocative and to draw attention to his views, and this explains the imbalance in relation to Antisthenes’ other utterances.

With regard to his historical reception, Antisthenes has suffered quite a run of bad luck. According to Popper, Antisthenes was the only worthy successor to Socrates, the last of the ‘Great Generation’. Although his intellectual status in his own day was high, his social class was low: his father was a dealer in salt fish and his mother of non-Athenian descent, a Thracian by birth. The prominent rhetor Isocrates wrote twice against his rivals (Against the Sophists [13] and the Helena [10]), presumably at the opening of his school in 393 B.C. or just after that, and the first rival hinted at in the Helena is Antisthenes, ranked before Plato and others. It would seem that at that time Plato was less known or less important, perhaps still at the beginning of his philosophical career and not yet having developed his doctrine of the Ideas.

Analysis of the extant material shows that it is the veracity of the emerging picture of Antisthenes that matters. He is represented as a true and diligent follower of Socrates, despite all the negative points that Xenophon embeds in this portrait, such as his being a rather unpredictable and intruding person, a character that seems to be in line with his conduct in life. But Antisthenes must have grown into a master of his own character and spirit, becoming a philosopher capable of writing an impressive oeuvre itself much appreciated in antiquity given the witness of Cicero, and the recognition by Isocrates that this was his greatest rival for the duration of twenty years.

There is the risk of underestimating Antisthenes as a simpleton because of his at times extravagant or seemingly childish behaviour. Aristotle's description of the excluded contradiction as a silly thing, and his description of the viewpoint of the Antistheneans as ‘uneducated’, must not corrupt our perspective nor dominate our understanding. It must be underlined that Antisthenes was an interesting philosopher with interesting and logically coherent arguments, and perhaps an even better philologist in his time, although his interpretations of Homer are often more far-fetched than convincing. He was not averse to engaging in debate, for instance, with the rhetoricians Isocrates and Lysias, whom he attacked vehemently.

However, from a historical perspective his influence should not be overestimated either. This study has attempted to exhaustively retrieve what could be saved from the slippery ground of tradition, but a constant reminder is necessary that much of his influence in antiquity is no longer traceable since so many of his numerous works are lost. He does not seem to have been a constructive thinker in the sense of one who designs philosophical and cultural panoramas. Here, I have attempted to find the core of his philosophy, but what I have found is an amalgam of concepts that do not constitute a perspicuous whole, although they circle around wisdom and insight. The details of what this core actually entails remain obscure. For instance, at the centre of his educational activities, paideia, we find a form of ethics by example, not a thorough system.

A critical observation: Antisthenes in favour of Homer and the Cyclopes

One could criticize Antisthenes for connecting the favourable connotation of polytropos with a person and the negative with a form of address, whereas polytropos is often seen as negative precisely in connection with a person, namely Odysseus. Especially in tragedy, he was regarded as a dubious windbag and a sly cheater. But Antisthenes’ preference for a positive explanation of polytropos as an epithet for Odysseus is in line with other favourable interpretations of passages in the Homeric poems. Antisthenes’ idea seems to be that Homer is always right: even if at first inconsistencies emerge, they can ultimately be reconciled if one adheres to the correct line of interpretation – the one that Antisthenes offers, of course. The technical term for this is lysis (solution), as we learn from the polytropos passage in the case of the Cyclopes.

Antisthenes says that only Polyphemus is an unjust and bad creature, whereas the other Cyclopes are decent ‘people’. It is understandable that they have no agriculture because the fruits of the land grow spontaneously and without any labour, thanks to the favour of the immortal gods, especially the rain from Zeus. Antisthenes calls this particular fact righteous. Whereas Polyphemus despises the immortal gods, the others believe in them. In the story, the Cyclopes declare that Polyphemus’ illness is sent by Zeus and there is no remedy against this intervention. Polyphemus violated the laws of hospitality and despised Zeus. Although it is not in the Antisthenean fragment we have, the aim of Antisthenes’ considerations is obviously to exculpate Odysseus for his rude behaviour.

One of his main points is to stress that the other Cyclopes are ‘just’ (δίϰαιοι), because Antisthenes wishes to neutralize the Homeric predicate ἀθϵμίστων (‘without laws’), which rightly understood (and Antisthenes does so understand it) does not condemn the other Cyclopes. Although on a first reading one might think that ἀθϵμίστων is a negative epithet, upon further consideration (Antisthenes’ claim) the true meaning emerges. Homer himself confirms that the Cyclopes in their isolation do not need laws, explaining ἀθϵμίστων; but being not in the need of them is not to say that they are unjust.

For most of his professional life, the author of the present book, P.A. (Piet) Meijer, was university lecturer in Ancient Philosophy in the Classics department of Leiden University where he taught with contagious enthusiasm. His classes were characterized by an attractive sort of irreverence towards academic authority. Any scholar, no matter how great his or her reputation, could be wrong and Meijer would take great pleasure in demonstrating that, in his view, they often were, on the basis of thoughtful and often innovative readings of the primary texts. In much the same spirit he meanwhile produced a steady stream of studies on a variety of subjects, such as Plotinus’ metaphysics (Plotinus on the Good or the One (Enneads VI,9): An Analytical Commentary, Amsterdam 1992), Parmenidean ontology (Parmenides Beyond the Gates: The Divine Revelation on Being, Thinking and the Doxa, Amsterdam 1997) and Stoic theology (Stoic Theology: Proofs for the Existence of the Cosmic God and of the Traditional Gods, Delft 2007), to mention but the most important ones.

Upon his retirement, Meijer continued to do research with an almost youthful zeal. He had discovered Antisthenes, whose wit, intellectual acuity and subversive character had clearly struck a cord with him. As Meijer himself sets out in the introduction to this book, Antisthenes was one of the most important and colourful followers of Socrates. He made a major contribution to the history of ancient philosophy by offering the first definition of logos. Unfortunately, his reputation would soon be eclipsed by that other pupil of Socrates, Plato. As a result, Antisthenes’ many books dropped out of circulation and hence did not survive. For the reconstruction of Antisthenes’ views, then, we depend on reports of others, and those of Aristotle in particular. In the first part of this book, Meijer argues that Aristotle did not do justice to Antisthenes and sets out to offer a new, provocative interpretation of the famous logos doctrine of the latter. He argues that Antisthenes’ famous oikeios logos is not a definition, as Aristotle had claimed, but an argument that teaches or clarifies what something was or is. One attractive aspect of Meijer's new understanding of Antisthenes’ logos concept is that it allows him to connect this important aspect of Antisthenes’ thought to another, that of the study of Homer.

Introduction

There is more to say about Antisthenes’ attitude to extramarital relations when we read what he wrote about the well-known hetaira Aspasia, in whom he seemed to have been very much interested. A work with this title occurs in Diogenes Laertius’ list, but the question arises whether he was personally interested in her. Or was this work a dialogue in which one of the interlocutors was Aspasia? Or both? It is sometimes suggested that Pericles also participated in this dialogue. In any case, we have a testimonial which states that Pericles frequented her home and that he greeted her daily (as he was going to and coming from the market), which explains her name Aspasia, that is ‘Miss Embrace’. It is mentioned that her original name was Myrto (from Miletus). This explanation could be taken as an indication of Antisthenes’ authorship because, as we know, he was interested in etymology. Antisthenes himself, in the only fragment in which he figures with his name, tells us that she was very dear to Pericles’ heart, and that Pericles estimated her more than his own life and his property: ‘Antisthenes the Socratic says that he (Pericles) fell in love with Aspasia and that he twice, coming and going, embraced the woman , and when she once had to defend herself, being accused of impiety, he defended her and speaking for her he wept more, we are told, than when he risked his own life or fortune’.

Another story about Pericles is also attributed to Antisthenes. Cimon lived illegally with his sister Elpinice, but later she was given in matrimony to Callias. When Callias was driven into exile, Pericles got to have sex with Elpinice in exchange for Callias’ return. Interestingly, the only thing we can say is that the victim of Antisthenes’ negative remarks is Pericles, not Aspasia; Aspasia is only the cause of Pericles’ exaggerated love. It is highly debated by scholars whether Antisthenes’ judgement of her was favourable or not. It is well known that her reputation was ambivalent: the comic dramatists gave her unpleasant names. However, Antisthenes really says nothing unfavourable here about Aspasia.