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33 results

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  • 8 - The Method of Insulation

  • from Part II - Developments between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism
  • Edited by Paul Weithman, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
  • Book:
    Rawls’s <i>A Theory of Justice</i> at 50
    Published online:
    20 July 2023
    Print publication:
    10 August 2023, pp 140-150

  • Summary

    Suggesting the term of a “method of insulation,” this paper analyzes a development that characterizes Rawls’s thought after the publication of Theory. He sought to strengthen his theory of justice by seemingly weakening it, that is, by reducing its philosophical – and especially metaphysical – core commitments to what is absolutely essential for the theoretical enterprise to be successful, aiming at “doctrinal autonomy” and a “free-standing” conception of justice. In reconstructing the main “declarations of philosophical independence” until Political Liberalism, the major achievements but also the problems of this view are discussed. For there came a point at which the method of insulation endangered rather than strengthened the autonomous normative standing of Rawls’s “political” conception of justice.

  • Noumenal Alienation: Rousseau, Kant and Marx on the Dialectics of Self-Determination

  • Rainer Forst
  • Journal:
    Kantian Review / Volume 22 / Issue 4 / December 2017
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    29 November 2017, pp. 523-551
    Print publication:
    December 2017

  • This article argues that alienation (as Entfremdung) should be understood as a particular form of individual and social heteronomy that can only be overcome by a dialectical combination of individual and collective autonomy, recovering a deontological sense of normative authority. If we think about alienation in Kantian terms, the main source of alienation is a denial of standing or, in the extreme, losing a sense of oneself as a rational normative authority equal to all others. I call the former kind of alienation, where persons deny others equal standing as a normative authority in moral or political terms, first order noumenal alienation, as there is no proper mutual cognition and recognition of each other in such a social context. I call the latter kind of alienation, where a subject does not consider themselves an equal normative authority – or an ‘end in oneself’ – second order noumenal alienation (again, in a moral and a political form). In this sense, alienation violates the dignity of humans as moral and political lawgivers – a dignity seen by Rousseau, Kant and Marx as inalienable: It can be denied or violated, but it cannot be lost.

  • 6 - A Kantian Republican Conception of Justice as Nondomination

  • Edited by Andreas Niederberger, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Frankfurt, Philipp Schink, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Frankfurt
  • Book:
    Republican Democracy
    Published by:
    Edinburgh University Press
    Published online:
    05 October 2013
    Print publication:
    23 May 2013, pp 154-168

  • Summary

    No one has done more to situate republicanism firmly within the contemporary landscape of political theory than Philip Pettit. His version of freedom as nondomination proves powerful and fruitful in a number of ways and contexts, including that of global political structures. But my (long and not very elegant) title points to two questions about Pettit's approach and to two answers that I will suggest. To begin with the first: If republicanism is presented not just as a partial, but as a general theory of legitimate government, why does it not imply a notion of justice with respect to a basic social and political structure or to transnational relations and structures? I propose a certain hypothesis as to why this might be the case, and I also argue that a republican conception of justice is congenial to Pettit's approach and is called for in any case. This is because justice is, as Rawls (1999, 3) rightly argued, the first virtue of social institutions, and it is only on the basis of considerations of justice that one can justify the kinds of freedom, equality or other values participants in a context of justice owe one another.

    My second question delves further into the very basis of a republican conception of justice as nondomination and locates it within the principle of justification, which says that no one should be subject to norms or normative arrangements that cannot be properly justified to him or her as a free and equal agent of justification.

Toleration in Conflict
  • Past and Present
  • Rainer Forst
  • Published online:
    05 February 2013
    Print publication:
    17 January 2013
  • The concept of toleration plays a central role in pluralistic societies. It designates a stance which permits conflicts over beliefs and practices to persist while at the same time defusing them, because it is based on reasons for coexistence in conflict - that is, in continuing dissension. A critical examination of the concept makes clear, however, that its content and evaluation are profoundly contested matters and thus that the concept itself stands in conflict. For some, toleration was and is an expression of mutual respect in spite of far-reaching differences, for others, a condescending, potentially repressive attitude and practice. Rainer Forst analyses these conflicts by reconstructing the philosophical and political discourse of toleration since antiquity. He demonstrates the diversity of the justifications and practices of toleration from the Stoics and early Christians to the present day and develops a systematic theory which he tests in discussions of contemporary conflicts over toleration.

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