This chapter discusses the sections of finite and absolute mechanics of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature which are predicated upon his theory of space and time. It starts with the emergent notions of matter and movement before giving the details of the mechanical analysis in a close reading. Giving a foundation for Kepler’s laws is not only a touchstone of Hegel’s theory but is an integral rung in a system of steps building natural science from space and time. The chapter exposes three main strands of argument: dimensional realization of time and space in movement of matter, striving towards inner and outer centers of extended bodies, and the realization of a system of bodies in motion which materializes a complexity paralleling not only of the tripartite system general-particular-individual of his logic but additionally includes two particulars – as necessary in Hegel’s account of nature. Lastly, the chapter comments briefly on the relationship to Kant, Newton, and classical mechanics, as well as on modern aspects. As it demonstrates, Hegel’s treatment of mechanics is not an idiosyncratic way of presenting celestial mechanics but contains radical, quite modern metaphysical concepts which are not only interesting in their own right but furnish a key to the understanding of his system.

Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature is interesting for three primary reasons: (1) its theory of space and time; (2) its theory of physical mechanics; and (3) reconstruction of biological categories. With respect to (1), the primary interest is its connection (a) to intuition and thus to Kant and prior theories of space and time; and (b) to the mathematical categories of the Science of Logic. With respect to (2), the primary interest is (a) the relation to important predecessors, particularly Leibniz and Newton, and (b) the relevance of Hegel’s comments on mechanical explanation for contemporary practice. With respect to (3), the primary interest is (a) the relation of Hegel’s account to past conceptions of organism in Leibniz and Aristotle and (b) the tenability of Hegel’s theory in the light of contemporary biology and Deleuze’s criticisms of the Aristotelian and Hegelian theories of organic life. A further question on the relation of mechanical and organicist explanation is whether the relation between the two supports Kreines’s influential reading of Hegel’s metaphysics as distinguishing between two orders of explanation and therefore of phenomena and dependence relations.