According to Myles Brand, ‘[t]he key to advocating a particularist account of events -or any account of events - is to provide adequate identity conditions’ . He thinks that the function of an identity condition is ‘to specify the nature of’ events.

To state an identity condition for events is to provide a way to complete the formula:

The mere fact that a proposed completion of (IC) is true does not imply that it is an informative identity condition for events or that it plays any role in specifying the nature of events.

One commonly stated reason for thinking that there are abstract entities such as propositions is that they are needed to account for undeniable facts about propositional attitudes and the sentences reporting such attitudes. According to the propositional theory, belief, doubt, assertion and other attitudes are relations between individuals and propositions. In sentences reporting these relations the words in the content-sentence (e.g., ‘p’ in sentences of the form ‘S said that p’) refer to concepts or other abstract things and the entire ‘that-clause’ refers to a proposition. According to a common rival account, propositional attitudes are complex relations between individuals and sentences and each that-clause refers to the content-sentence it contains. The words in the content-sentence either fail to refer or refer to themselves. A striking implication of both the propositional theory and the sentential theory is that the words and phrases in the content-sentence of a sentence expressing a propositional attitude fail to refer to the familiar things to which they ordinarily refer.

Many different analyses of the concept of de re belief have been proposed in recent years. Most of these analyses may be called ‘reductionist’ since they attempt to “reduce” de re belief to de dicta belief or to analyze de re belief in terms of de dicta belief. Some reductionist analyses are extremely liberal in their attribution of de re beliefs — they imply that people have de re beliefs in a variety of situations in which more restrictive analyses have no such implication. In this paper I will show that the most liberal of the reductionist theories, those Roderick Chisholm calls “latitudinarian theories”, are unacceptable.

Latitudinarian analyses have been proposed by many philosophers, including Ernest Sosa, Mark Pastin, and also, perhaps, W. V. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars.

A stochastic model is developed for the expected number of prey taken by a single predator when prey depletion is apparent. The so-called “random predator equation” with prey exploitation of Royama and Rogers is compared with the stochastic model. The numerical comparisons illustrate situations where the deterministic model provides adequate and inadequate approximations.

Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism and that there are no true general principles about justified responses to disagreement other than the general evidentialist principle. I then argue that the puzzles about disagreement are primarily puzzles about the evidential impact of higher-order evidence–evidence about the significance or existence of ordinary, or first-order, evidence. I conclude by arguing that such higher-order evidence can often have a profound effect on the justification of first-order beliefs.

Relative Identity contains a sustained attack on the classical or absolute theory of identity and a defense of a non-classical or relative theory of identity. According to the absolute theory of identity each thing is identical with itself and with nothing other than itself. The fundamental principle of this theory is Leibniz' Law:

From (LL) a variety of characteristic principles about identity can be derived, including The Indiscernibility of Identicals, The Identity of Indiscernibles, and the symmetry, reflexivity, and transitivity of identity.

Heterogeneity is observed in the patterns of cognition in Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Such heterogeneity might suggest the involvement of different etiological pathways or different host responses to pathology. A total of 627 subjects with mild/moderate AD underwent cognitive assessment with the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) and the Dementia Rating Scale-2 (DRS-2). Latent class analysis (LCA) was performed on cognition subscale data to identify and characterize cognitive subgroups. Clinical, demographic, and genetic factors were explored for association with class membership. LCA suggested the existence of four subgroups; one group with mild and another with severe global impairment across the cognitive domains, one group with primary impairments in attention and construction, and another group with primary deficits in memory and orientation. Education, disease duration, age, Apolipoprotein E-ε4 (APOE ε4) status, gender, presence of grasp reflex, white matter changes, and early or prominent visuospatial impairment were all associated with class membership. Our results support the existence of heterogeneity in patterns of cognitive impairment in AD. Our observation of classes characterized by predominant deficits in attention/construction and memory respectively deserves further exploration as does the association between membership in the attention/construction class and APOE ε4 negative status. (JINS, 2010, 16, 233–243.)

The 1955–56 Annual Report of the Department of Research Psychology at the New York State Psychiatric Institute begins by noting that –Dr. Joseph Zubin, who had been Associate Research Scientist in this department since September, 1938, resigned January 15th, 1956 to become Principal Research Biometrician, heading a new Department [now Unit] of Biometrics Research…” While this move soon proved to be a stimulus for the development of significant new avenues of research, it by no means marked a sharp break with previous work. As Zubin has often noted, the late Carney Landis, when he was head of the Department of Research Psychology, actively fostered a variety of biometric studies, and indeed the annual reports of that department had eventually come to contain a separate section devoted to biometrics, in which the work of Zubin and his colleagues figured prominently. Much of this work would serve as the foundation of the new unit's research programme. In particular, an extensive study of prognosis in early and chronic schizophrenia had already been in progress for several years. In addition to interviews, a battery of tests was employed to sample a range of levels in the patients' functioning: psychophysical, psychophysiological, psychomotor, perceptual, behavioural, and conceptual.

Most models of generational succession in sexually reproducing populations necessarily move back and forth between genic and genotypic spaces. We show that transitions between and within these spaces are usually hidden by unstated assumptions about processes in these spaces. We also examine a widely endorsed claim regarding the mathematical equivalence of kin-, group-, individual-, and allelic-selection models made by Lee Dugatkin and Kern Reeve. We show that the claimed mathematical equivalence of the models does not hold.