This chapter aims to locate the critical juncture when securitization is – from a moral point of view – not merely permitted (and thus optional) but obligatory (mandatory). This chapter argues that securitization is morally obligatory (pro tanto) when ‘must cause’ is satisfied. This is the case when would-be securitizing actors have tried relevant less harmful alternatives and when these have failed to satisfy just cause. This view is in line with supererogationism a philosophical position that sees value in keeping morality – where possible – free from prescriptive behaviour whereby every good and right generates a moral obligation. It is argued that the value of autonomy that allows relevant actors (limited) freedom to choose on how to respond to a just cause for securitization diminishes as certainty that securitization is the best response increases. Certainty increases subject to evidence that less harmful options than securitization do not work. This chapter goes on to discuss must cause in detail on six illustrative hypothetical examples of different threat types, including drought disaster, cyberattack, and climate disaster.

The book’s overall conclusion summarizes the argument advanced in this book. Despite advancing a theory that utilizes security practice to achieve security as a state of being, it ends on a cautionary note. To wit, although we have established the existence of mandatory securitization, the same should not be considered a ready-made solution to the world ills but rather a necessary evil in an insecure world. The conclusion argues that decision-makers concerned with improving the world should ultimately concern themselves with eradicating the sources of insecurity and not with fighting fires.

This chapter considers the impact of the discovery of mandatory securitization on global security institutions. While ties of community and friendship, specifically at the sub-systemic level, ensure that the burden of mandatory securitization on the international community is relatively small, the international community – in the form of the UNSC – is obligated to act when (1) states or sub-systemic actors fail (note, in other-securitization they may fail for legitimate reasons), or (2) where there is no other designated protector. This chapter suggests that the UN charter amounts to a social contractual situation between the people of the world and the UNSC, rendering its duty to securitize – when conditions are met and there is no other protector – overriding. It goes on to examine the nature of these duties as they already exist by examining RtoP provisions. It shows that even if RtoP was in perfect working order and always acted on, it does not cover the moral duties of the UNSC regarding securitization; notably, it does not cover intent-lacking threats. Much like in Chapter 4 where mandatory securitization is used to update NATO’s Article 5, this chapter shows how mandatory securitization can refocus and thus help RtoP.

This chapter examines sub-systemic actor’s duties. It treats NATO as indicative of a collective defence organization and the European Union (before the Lisbon treaty that contains two collective defence clauses) as indicative of a collective security organization. This chapter argues that NATO has, if requested to help by a member country, a contractual (Article 5) – and thus overriding – duty to protect a member state, and when must cause is satisfied, with securitization. It is argued that Article 5 is now somewhat outdated and that – going forward – just reason (i.e., the existence of an objective existential threat) + macro-proportionality, and not armed attack, should be the threshold for collective political action. The obligation to use securitizing measures, however, rests with the satisfaction of must cause. This chapter also argues that in collective security organizations, the obligation to securitize insiders, rests with remedial responsibility triggered by ties of community/friendship, this means that unlike in collective defence organizations, the obligation to securitize insiders can be overridden.

This chapter examines the duties of states to insiders (people living within a state’s physical territory) and outsiders (people in other states). It is argued that states have, provided the initiation of securitization is otherwise justified and that must cause is satisfied, an overriding duty to secure insiders from objective existential threat via securitization. Regarding morally mandatory other-securitization, the picture is more mixed, a range of costs to the self, including (1) the risk of death, disease, and disability; (2) the risk of instability and insecurity; and (3) financial costs can override an individual state’s obligation to secure and – where necessary – securitize outsiders from threat. This chapter goes on to examine what happens to pro tanto duties if states are liable for threat creation abroad. Moreover, it suggests a ranking of different triggers for remedial responsibility derived from common-sense morality, enabling the pinpointing of specific states as primary duty-bearers for morally mandatory other-securitization.

The introduction explains the purpose of this book and situates this book in the relevant literature. It discusses the meaning of securitization as used in this book, and it introduces Just Securitization Theory on which the theory of the moral duty to secure developed in this book builds. It also discusses the methods employed and methodology informing this work. Finally, it provides a chapter overview.

This chapter considers non-state actors. It argues that only organized, not simply aggregate, groups can have a moral duty to securitize. This chapter goes on to examine relevant sub-state actors’ duties to securitize insiders and outsiders. Sub-state actors are permitted to securitize only when the state they reside in fails in its duty to deliver security. In such cases, relevant actors have a pro tanto obligation to securitize insiders; however, in situations where a quasi-social contract is established this duty evolves into an overriding duty. Outsiders are not – unlike in all the other chapters of this book – people in other states, but rather people not represented by the sub-state actor. Here, a pro tanto obligation to securitize outsiders is largely based on capacity.