The received view is that Kant denies all moral luck. But I show how Kant affirms constitutive moral luck in passages concerning radical evil from Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. First, I explicate Kant’s claims about radical evil. It is a morally evil disposition that all human beings have necessarily, at least for the first part of their lives, and for which they are blameworthy. Second, since these properties about radical evil appear to contradict Kant’s even more famous claims about imputation, ‘ought implies can’, and free will, I unpack Henry Allison’s proof of radical evil and show how it is consistent with interpretations of Kant’s broader views about morality. Third, I define and illustrate the category of constitutive moral luck and argue that Kant embraces the existence of constitutive moral luck given Allison-style interpretations of radical evil. This provides a reason for philosophers to reject the received view, and it creates an occasion for Kantians and Kant scholars to check their reasons if they deny moral luck.

There is an ethics of blaming the person who deserves blame. The Christian scriptures imply the following no-vengeance condition: a person should not vengefully overtly blame a wrongdoer even if she gives the wrongdoer the exact negative treatment that he deserves. I explicate and defend this novel condition and argue that it demands a revolution in our blaming practices. First, I explain the no-vengeance condition. Second, I argue that the no-vengeance condition is often violated. The most common species of blame involves anger; anger conceptually includes a desire for vengeance; and there are many pleasures in payback. Third, I clarify that it is possible to blame non-vengefully in anger and highlight three good uses for anger in non-vengeful blame. Fourth, I offer two reasons that justify the divine command prohibiting vengeance, and I note that the Christian God is merely sufficient to make non-vengeance morally obligatory. Fifth, I defend the no-vengeance condition against four biblical objections.

According to the Free Will Explanation of a traditional view of hell, human freedom explains why some human persons are in hell. Human freedom also explains its punishment and finality: persons in hell have freely developed moral vices that are their own punishment and that make repentance psychologically impossible. So, even though God continues to desire reconciliation with persons in hell, damned persons do not want reconciliation with God. But this moral vice explanation of hell's finality is implausible. I argue that God can and would make direct or indirect alterations in their character to give them new motivational reasons that re-enable their freedom to repent. Subsequently, I argue that it is probable that each damned person will be saved eventually, because there is a potential infinity of opportunities for free repentance. Thus, if the Free Will Explanation's descriptions of hell and divine love are correct, it is highly probable that each person in hell escapes to heaven.

Galen Strawson's Basic Argument is that because self-creation is required to be truly morally responsible and self-creation is impossible, it is impossible to be truly morally responsible for anything. I contend that the Basic Argument is unpersuasive and unsound. First, I argue that the moral luck debate shows that the self-creation requirement appears to be contradicted and supported by various parts of our commonsense ideas about true moral responsibility, and that this ambivalence undermines the only reason that Strawson gives for the self-creation requirement. Second, I argue that the self-creation requirement is so demanding that either it is an implausible requirement for a species of true moral responsibility that we take ourselves to have or it is a plausible requirement of a species of true moral responsibility that we have never taken ourselves to have. Third, I explain that Strawson overgeneralizes from instances of constitutive luck that obviously undermine true moral responsibility to all kinds of constitutive luck.

This study examined the extent to which effortful control moderated the risk of internalizing or externalizing problems associated with high negative emotionality in a Dutch population sample of pre- and early adolescents (N = 1,922). Internalizing and externalizing problems were assessed with the Child Behavior Checklist, Youth Self-Report, and Teacher Checklist of Psychopathology. Temperament (effortful control, fearfulness, frustration) was assessed with the parent version of the Revised Early Adolescent Temperament Questionnaire. The effects of fearfulness and frustration appeared to be attenuated by high levels of effortful control. The associations differed between the two domains of mental health investigated: effortful control reduced the effect of fearfulness on internalizing problems and the effect of frustration on externalizing problems. The effects were stronger for externalizing problems and similar for preadolescent (age 11) and adolescent (age 13/14) outcomes.This research is part of the Tracking Adolescents' Individual Lives Survey (TRAILS). Participating centers of TRAILS include various Departments of the University of Groningen, Erasmus Medical Center of Rotterdam, University of Nijmegen, Trimbos Institute, and University of Utrecht, The Netherlands. TRAILS is financially supported by grants from The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (GB-MW 940-38-011, GB-MAG 480-01-006, ZonMw 100.001.001, and NWO 175.010.2003.005) and the Department of Justice (WODC), and by the participating centers.

Nutrigenomics is the study of how constituents of the diet interact with genes, and their products, to alter phenotype and, conversely, how genes and their products metabolise these constituents into nutrients, antinutrients, and bioactive compounds. Results from molecular and genetic epidemiological studies indicate that dietary unbalance can alter gene–nutrient interactions in ways that increase the risk of developing chronic disease. The interplay of human genetic variation and environmental factors will make identifying causative genes and nutrients a formidable, but not intractable, challenge. We provide specific recommendations for how to best meet this challenge and discuss the need for new methodologies and the use of comprehensive analyses of nutrient–genotype interactions involving large and diverse populations. The objective of the present paper is to stimulate discourse and collaboration among nutrigenomic researchers and stakeholders, a process that will lead to an increase in global health and wellness by reducing health disparities in developed and developing countries.

AlN layers were grown on 6H-SiC(0001) by molecular beam epitaxy using ammonia as the nitrogen source. Clean (√3×√3)R30° SiC surfaces was prepared by in-situ annealing alone and also by in situ annealing consisted of followed by Si deposition and subsequent annealing. The surface morphology of the AlN films observed by AFM was significantly changed by the nucleation procedure. When the AlN growth was initiated with Al flux exposure on a SiC surface prepared by thermal annealing, the surface roughness of the AlN was significantly reduced. Two-dimensional growth of AlN was observed with reflection high-energy electron diffraction from the very beginning. Atomically flat AlN surfaces with a RMS-roughness of ∼0.3 nm were obtained. On the other hand, when film growth was initiated with an ammonia flux exposure on a Si rich SiC surface, a high density of bumps was observed. The bumps seemed to originate from SiNx formation at the heteroepitaxial interface. It was found that control of the Si composition and the V/III ratio at the growth interface is crucial for the AlN film quality.