The right of self-defence is usually presented as an exception to the principle of non-use of force. Conventional wisdom therefore holds that the right of self-defence can only be relied on to justify those measures constituting a threat or use of force. This article rejects that claim. It argues that self-defence is a general right under international law and, as such, can be invoked to justify all measures necessary to repel an armed attack regardless of whether they are forcible or non-forcible in nature. To support this argument, this article examines the genesis of the right of self-defence under customary international law, the text of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the structure of the United Nations Charter and State practice on Article 51.

This article examines the extent to which international law protects international organizations (IOs) from hacking operations committed by States. First, it analyzes whether hacking operations undertaken by member States and host States breach the privileges and immunities granted to IOs by their constitutive treaties, headquarters agreements, and conventions on privileges and immunities concerning the inviolability of their premises, property, assets, archives, documents and correspondence. The article also explores the question of whether hacking operations carried out by non-member States breach these provisions on the basis that they have passed into customary international law or because they attach to the international legal personality of IOs. Second, the article considers the question of whether hacking operations breach the principle of good faith. In this regard, it discusses the applicability of the principle of good faith to the relations between IOs, member States, host States and non-member States, and then considers how hacking operations impinge on a number of postulates emanating from good faith such as the pacta sunt servanda rule, the duty to respect the legal personality of IOs, the duties of loyalty, due regard and cooperation, and the duty not to abuse rights. Finally, the article examines the question of whether the principle of State sovereignty offers IOs indirect protection insofar as hacking can breach the sovereignty of the host State or the sovereignty of the State on whose cyber infrastructure the targeted data is resident.

Under international humanitarian law it is prohibited to make the object of attack a person who has surrendered. This article explores the circumstances in which the act of surrender is effective under international humanitarian law and examines, in particular, how surrender can be achieved in practical terms during land warfare in the context of international and non-international armed conflict. First, the article situates surrender within its broader historical and theoretical setting, tracing its legal development as a rule of conventional and customary international humanitarian law and arguing that its crystallisation as a law of war derives from the lack of military necessity to directly target persons who have placed themselves outside the theatre of armed conflict, and that such conduct is unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective. Second, after a careful examination of state practice, the article proposes a three-stage test for determining whether persons have surrendered under international humanitarian law: (1) Have persons attempting to surrender engaged in a positive act which clearly reveals that they no longer intend to participate in hostilities? (2) Is it reasonable in the circumstances prevailing at the time for the opposing force to discern the offer of surrender? and (3) Have surrendered persons unconditionally submitted to the authority of their captor?

UN peacekeeping missions operate under the authority of the UN. However, the military personnel that constitute a UN peacekeeping mission remain organs of the states from which they are contributed. Thus, whether unlawful acts committed by peacekeepers can be attributed to the UN is dependent upon whether the peacekeeping force can be regarded as being under the direction and control of the UN. This is a question of fact. According to the ICJ and the International Law Commission, unlawful acts committed by peacekeeping forces will be attributed to the UN only where the UN exercised ‘effective control’ over the commission of the unlawful act. In contrast, the ECtHR has consistently propounded a very different test, asserting that unlawful acts will be attributed to the UN only where the UN retained ‘ultimate authority and control’ over the peacekeeping mission. I argue, however, that neither of these tests provides a suitable legal framework for determining attribution of unlawful conduct in the context of UN peacekeeping missions. After outlining the deficiencies of these tests, I submit that a more suitable approach to determining attribution would be based upon the overall control test as outlined by the ICTY in Tadić.