Enns and Koch question the validity of the Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson measure of state policy mood and defend the validity of the Enns and Koch measure on two grounds. First, they claim policy mood has become more conservative in the South over time; we present empirical evidence to the contrary: policy mood became more liberal in the South between 1980 and 2010. Second, Enns and Koch argue that an indicator’s lack of face validity in cross-sectional comparisons is irrelevant when judging the measure’s suitability in the most common form of pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis. We show their argument is logically flawed, except under highly improbable circumstances. We also demonstrate, by replicating several published studies, that statistical results about the effect of state policy mood can vary dramatically depending on which of the two mood measures is used, making clear that a researcher’s measurement choice can be highly consequential.

Enns and Koch (hereafter E&K) use multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) along with survey aggregation to measure state policy mood. As E&K rely on direct information about public opinion, it would be preferable to Berry et al.‘s widely used indirect measure relying on data about the issue positions and vote shares of members of Congress, if E&K's measure were valid. Assessing the validity of E&K's measure takes on special importance because the measure proves to be nearly uncorrelated with Berry et al.‘s measure, implying that at least one is invalid. Because the “true” policy mood of states is unknown, it is impossible to definitively assess the validity of E&K's measure. Instead, we raise some concerns about E&K's measurement methodology and present evidence pertaining to the indicator's face validity, convergent validity, and construct validity. Our analyses leave us doubtful that the E&K measure is valid because its characterization of state moods departs significantly from conventional wisdom and current scholarship.

We modify Berry et al.‘s congressional-delegation-based measure of state government ideology to construct a new measure—which we call the state-legislative-based state government ideology measure—by relying on Shor and McCarty's National Political Awareness Test common space estimates of the ideal points of U.S. state legislators. We conduct tests of convergent and construct validity for the two measures. We find that they correlate highly in each year for which the state-legislative-based indicator is available (1995–2008), and when observations are pooled across all years. We also replicate numerous published studies assessing the impact of state government ideology using each indicator of ideology and find that the two measures nearly always yield similar conclusions about the effect of government ideology. Because the state-legislative-based measure is based on more direct estimates of the ideal points of state legislators than is the congressional-delegation-based measure—which uses estimates of ideal points for members of Congress from the same state as a proxy—we believe the state-legislative-based measure is superior, and we recommend that scholars use it when it is available for the state-years being studied. Because our empirical evidence indicates that Berry et al.‘s congressional-delegation-based measure is also valid—and it is available for a much longer period (annually beginning in 1960)—we advise that it be used when the state-legislative-based measure is not available.

Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race. By Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011. 368p. $75.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

It is more than 15 years since the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act was passed in 1996, famously described by then-President Bill Clinton as “the end of welfare as we know it.” In Disciplining the Poor, Joe Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford Schram analyze recent changes in US welfare policy as reflections of broader transformations of the “governance” of poverty, arguing that these transformations represent a new form of “neoliberal paternalism” in which race continues to be an important element. In this symposium, a diverse group of political scientists working on welfare issues have been asked to critically assess the book's account and to comment more broadly on the importance of the “governance of poverty” to the future of American politics.—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

Berry et al.'s (1998) measures of U.S. state citizen and government ideology rely on unadjusted interest-group ratings for a state's members of Congress to infer information about (1) the ideological orientation of the electorates that selected them or (2) state legislators and the governor from the same state. Potential weaknesses in unadjusted interest-group ratings prompt the question: Are the Berry et al. measures flawed, and if so, can they be fixed by substituting alternative measures of a member's ideology? We conclude that a version of the Berry et al. state government ideology indicator relying on NOMINATE common space scores is marginally superior to the extant version. In contrast, we reaffirm the validity of the original state citizen ideology indicator and find that versions based on NOMINATE common space scores and adjusted ADA and COPE scores introduced by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) are weaker.

The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy. By Bruce Ackerman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. 266p. $29.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

As the title of this book indicates, Bruce Ackerman does not believe that the Founding Fathers produced a finished, or flawless, frame of government in 1787. In particular, their method for selecting the president of the United States was ill-conceived and left critical questions of procedure unanswered and open to contestation. These failures aggravated the controversy surrounding the presidential election of 1800, when neither John Adams nor Thomas Jefferson won a majority in the Electoral College and Federalists in the outgoing House of Representatives nearly threw the election to Aaron Burr. As the House deliberated, the governors of Massachusetts and Virginia readied their militias to prevent each other's favorite son from stealing the election. Ackerman suggests that a civil war was avoided only by the statesmanship of Adams and Jefferson and the unraveling of a plot to install John Marshall as acting president.

Does state political ideology change over time? Brace et al. (2004, 537) say no, based on their analysis of three longitudinal measures of state citizen ideology: Berry et al.‘s (1998) indicator that relies on election results and congressional roll call votes, and two indicators that Brace et al. construct from ideological self-placement items, one using GSS and ANES survey results, and the other employing surveys conducted by CBS/New York Times. The authors imply that the ideological stability they detect precludes the possibility that state citizen ideology influences state policy. However, this implication stems from Brace et al.‘s definition of meaningful ideological change as differences in the relative ideology of states over time rather than absolute changes in ideology within states. We contend that this argument is both logically and methodologically flawed. Brace et al. maintain that their CBS/New York Times and GSS/ANES indicators are valid measures of state citizen ideology, but that the Berry et al. indicator is not. To assess this claim, it is crucial to distinguish between ideological self-identification (or symbolic ideology) and policy mood (or operational ideology). We find that the Berry et al. measure is a valid indicator of policy mood, but that it is invalid as a measure of self-identification. In contrast, the CBS/New York Times and GSS/ANES measures are invalid as indicators of policy mood, and while they are valid indicators of self-identified ideology, they are highly unreliable. Although a measure of self-identified ideology can be useful for answering some research questions, we contend that an indicator of policy mood is more appropriate when studying the impact of public opinion on public policy, and we reiterate our confidence in using the Berry et al. (1998) measure for that purpose.

our initial article challenged three of Brace et al.'s (2004) claims: (1) state citizen ideology is stable over time; (2) the Berry et al. (1998) measure of state citizen ideology is invalid; and (3) assessing the effect of state citizen ideology on state policy requires analysts to first parse out national or across-the-board changes in ideology. By stating that “the authors of the preceding article reinforce most of our substantive points,” Brace et al. (2007, 000) leave the impression that we agree with these claims. We do not. In fact, we see no evidence in this exchange to support any of these claims or to rebut our criticisms of them. To substantiate their first claim Brace et al. (2004) report that residuals from fixed-effects regression models of two measures of state ideological self-identification display few significant time trends. In this issue, we show that the results of the residual analysis are almost certainly artifacts of low statistical power and high measurement error and, hence, cannot support their claim. Brace et al. defend their second claim by showing that Berry et al.'s measure of citizen ideology both produces far more statistically significant time trends than do the two measures of ideological self-identification and is weakly correlated with these two measures. In response, we once again point to the artifactual nature of their regression residual results and note that Brace et al. (2001) report incorrect correlations. These empirical criticisms are independent of the distinction we draw between policy mood and self-identification; were we to abandon this distinction completely, which we recommend against on theoretical grounds, these criticisms of Brace et al. (2004) would still apply. We reject Brace et al.'s third claim that changes in state citizen ideology associated with national trends cannot meaningfully influence state public policyon logical grounds, noting that across-the-board changes in state ideology may very well produce changes in state public policy.

On the assumption that poor people migrate to obtain better welfare benefits, the magnet hypothesis predicts that a state's poverty rate increases when its welfare benefit rises faster than benefits in surrounding states. The benefit competition hypothesis proposes that states lower welfare benefits to avoid attracting the poor from neighboring states. Previous investigations, which yield support for these propositions, suffer from weaknesses in model specification and methodology. We correct these deficiencies in a simultaneous equation model including a state's poverty rate and its benefit level for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) as endogenous variables. We estimate the model using pooled annual data for the American states from 1960 to 1990 and find that a state's poverty rate does not jump significantly when its welfare payments outpace benefits in neighboring states. Furthermore, there is no evidence of vigorous benefit competition among states: states respond to decreases in neighboring states' welfare benefits with only small adjustments in their own.

How have our conceptions of politics changed, and how have these changes altered politics and its possibilities? These are the burning questions at one of the biggest campfires in political theory, and the answers are disputed as these three volumes show.

Modern welfare states offer cash payments, public housing, medical assistance, food subsidies, and a wide range of social services to needy individuals. The assistance is rendered by professional social workers and administrators who have the authority (and responsibility) to determine who is needy, what their needs are, and how those needs can be met equitably and efficiently. This top-down approach is both ineffective and paternalistic, according to Julie Anne White, who advocates a system of care based on democratic delib- eration rather than bureaucratic rationality.

An enormous amount of research on state politics and policy relies on monetary variables. Such variables are affected by differences in the purchasing power of a dollar over time and across states, but a lack of information about geographic variation in the costs of goods and services has kept social scientists from taking these differences into account. We remove this obstacle by constructing an annual cost of living index for each continental American state from 1960 to 1995. The index constitutes a deflator suitable for cross-sectional, time-series, and pooled research. After establishing the reliability and validity of our index using a battery of diagnostic tests, we illustrate the importance of deflating monetary variables by examining two variables that are often used in state politics research.