Hunter–gatherer populations underwent a mass extinction in the Neolithic, and in present times face challenges such as explicit sedentarisation policies. An exception is in Nepal, where the nomadic Raute people receive monthly governmental individual payments. One consequence of the money transfers has been a significant increase in alcohol consumption, with nearly all individuals drinking industrially produced alcohol. Here we investigate the Raute demography based on a full census of 144 individuals. We show that the Raute exhibit the short life expectancies typical of other hunter–gatherer populations from Africa, Asia and America. Bayesian survival trajectory analysis demonstrated that heavy drinking by either parent substantially reduces offspring survival to age 15. Bayesian regressions revealed a significant effect of heavy drinking on maternal fertility by decreasing the number of living children and reducing the proportion of live children at the end of maternal reproductive life. Although the absence of data prior to monetary support precludes a direct assessment of long-term demographic trends, relatively stable population sizes over the last decades and a fertility rate close to the replacement rate rule out an imminent population crash. Further studies are required to elucidate the Rautes’ origins and relationship with other nomadic people in the region.

The number of studies examining gender differences in the social relationship rewards associated with costly religious practice has been surprisingly low. Here, we use data from 289 residents of an agricultural Tibetan village to assess whether individuals are more inclined to establish supportive relationships with religious individuals in general and to investigate the gender disparities in the relationship between religiosity and personal network characteristics. Our results reveal that participation in religious rituals contributes to the overall development of social support networks. The benefits to personal networks, however, seem to be contingent upon gender. For resource-intensive, infrequent religious rituals such as distant pilgrimages, males seem to benefit slightly more in terms of elevated in-degree values in their personal networks, despite similar levels of investment as females. In contrast, for daily, low-cost religious practices requiring ongoing participation, both genders obtain similar increases in in-degree values through regular engagement. It becomes more challenging for women to increase their status in communities when the effort invested in religious rituals yields smaller rewards compared with the same effort by men, contributing to ongoing gender inequality. These findings highlight the importance of examining the particular characteristics of religious rituals and the gender disparities in the associated rewards.

Teaching is an important process of cultural transmission. Some have argued that human teaching is a cognitive instinct – a form of ‘natural cognition’ centred on mindreading, shaped by genetic evolution for the education of juveniles, and with a normative developmental trajectory driven by the unfolding of a genetically inherited predisposition to teach. Here, we argue instead that human teaching is a culturally evolved trait that exhibits characteristics of a cognitive gadget. Children learn to teach by participating in teaching interactions with socialising agents, which shape their own teaching practices. This process hijacks psychological mechanisms involved in prosociality and a range of domain-general cognitive abilities, such as reinforcement learning and executive function, but not a suite of cognitive adaptations specifically for teaching. Four lines of evidence converge on this hypothesis. The first, based on psychological experiments in industrialised societies, indicates that domain-general cognitive processes are important for teaching. The second and third lines, based on naturalistic and experimental research in small-scale societies, indicate marked cross-cultural variation in mature teaching practice and in the ontogeny of teaching among children. The fourth line indicates that teaching has been subject to cumulative cultural evolution, i.e. the gradual accumulation of functional changes across generations.

According to Hamilton's rule, matrilineal-biased investment restrains men in matrilineal societies from maximising their inclusive fitness (the ‘matrilineal puzzle'). A recent hypothesis argues that when women breed communally and share household resources, a man should help his sisters' household, rather than his wife's household, as investment to the later but not the former would be diluted by other unrelated members (Wu et al., 2013). According to this hypothesis, a man is less likely to help on his wife's farm when there are more women reproducing in the wife's household, because on average he would be less related to his wife's household. We used a farm-work observational dataset, that we collected in the matrilineal Mosuo in southwest China, to test this hypothesis. As predicted, high levels of communal breeding by women in his wife's households do predict less effort spent by men on their wife's farm, and communal breeding in men's natal households do not affect whether men help on their natal farms. Thus, communal breeding by women dilutes the inclusive fitness benefits men receive from investment to their wife and children, and may drive the evolution of matrilineal-biased investment by men. These results can help solve the ‘matrilineal puzzle'.

Cultural diversity is disappearing quickly. Whilst a phylogenetic approach makes explicit the continuous extinction of cultures, and the generation of new ones, cultural evolutionary changes such as the rise of agriculture or more recently colonisation can cause periods of mass cultural extinction. At the current rate, 90% of languages will become extinct or moribund by the end of this century. Unlike biological extinction, cultural extinction does not necessarily involve genetic extinction or even deaths, but results from the disintegration of a social entity and discontinuation of culture-specific behaviours. Here we propose an analytical framework to examine the phenomenon of cultural extinction. When examined over millennia, extinctions of cultural traits or institutions can be studied in a phylogenetic comparative framework that incorporates archaeological data on ancestral states. Over decades or centuries, cultural extinction can be studied in a behavioural ecology framework to investigate how the fitness consequences of cultural behaviours and population dynamics shift individual behaviours away from the traditional norms. Frequency-dependent costs and benefits are key to understanding both the origin and the loss of cultural diversity. We review recent evolutionary studies that have informed cultural extinction processes and discuss avenues of future studies.

We believe cultural group selection is an elegant theoretical framework to study the evolution of complex human behaviours, including large-scale cooperation. However, the empirical evidence on key theoretical issues – such as levels of within- and between-group variation and effects of intergroup competition – is so far patchy, with no clear case where all the relevant assumptions and predictions of cultural group selection are met, to the exclusion of other explanations.

Re-analysis of the data provided in the target article reveals a lack of evidence for a strong, universal relationship between parasite stress and the variables relating to sociality. Furthermore, even if associations between these variables do exist, the analyses presented here do not provide evidence for Fincher & Thornhill's (F&T's) proposed causal mechanism.

Demographic transition theory states that fertility declines in response to development, thus wealth and fertility are negatively correlated. Evolutionary theory, however, suggests a positive relationship between wealth and fertility. Fertility transition as a result of industrialization and economic development started in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Western Europe; and it extended to some of the Asian and Latin American countries later on. However, economic crises since the 1980s have been co-incident with fertility decline in sub-Sahara Africa and other developing countries like Thailand, Nepal and Bangladesh in the last decade of the 20th century. A very low level of fertility is observed in Addis Ababa (TFR=1·9) where contraceptive prevalence rate is modest and recurrent famine as well as drought have been major causes of economic crisis in the country for more than three consecutive decades, which is surprising given the high rural fertility. Detailed socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of 2976 women of reproductive age (i.e. 15–49 years) residing in Addis Ababa were collected during the first quarter of 2003 using an event history calendar and individual women questionnaire. Controlling for the confounding effects of maternal birth cohort, education, marital status and accessible income level, the poor (those who have access to less than a dollar per day or 250 birr a month) were observed to elongate the timing of having first and second births, while relatively better-off women were found to have shorter birth intervals. Results were also the same among the ever-married women only model. More than 50% of women currently in their 20s are also predicted to fail to reproduce as most of the unmarried men and women are ‘retreating from marriage’ due to economic stress. Qualitative information collected through focus group discussions and in-depth interviews also supports the statistical findings that poverty is at the root of this collapse in fertility. Whilst across countries wealth and fertility have been negatively correlated, this study shows that within one uniform population the relationship is clearly positive.