In his Nobel Prize address, Herbert Simon urged choice theorists to stop pretending that actual choices can be predicted from theoretical models of optimal choice. He argued that any descriptively adequate account of human decision making must make contact with the actual psychological processes that are involved and that “the neoclassical ambition of avoiding [this] necessity is unrealizable” (1978, p. 507).
Many choice theorists have taken up Simon's challenge. They have sought to identify the various “heuristics” people use to simplify choice – the procedures they use to limit the amount of information that is processed or the complexity of the ways it is combined. In a prototypical study, a respondent might be asked to make several hypothetical choices among apartments, whose attributes (e.g. monthly rent, miles from work, square footage) are listed as rows of numeric values (e.g. $560, 12, 900, respectively). The respondent's choice processes are then either inferred from the choices she makes or are more directly observed through “process tracing” methods that use computerized displays to track the attributes and options that the respondent considers, the order in which they are considered, and, sometimes, the time spent pondering each piece of information.
On the basis of process tracing methods, verbal protocols, introspection, and theory, many different choice heuristics have been postulated (for reviews, see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Group, 1999; Gigerenzer, Czerlinski, & Martignon, Chapter 31, this volume; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).