This chapter highlights that the Japan Fair Trade Commission was not able to introduce a leniency programme because of Sadanori Yamanaka, the leading politician within the Liberal Democratic Party for competition law reform; that a leniency programme is essentially different from plea bargaining; and that a leniency programme does not necessarily detract from the rigid characteristic of the surcharge, the financial remedy applicable to infringements of the Antimonopoly Act. The chapter further indicates that, when Yamanaka passed away, the opposition to a leniency programme disappeared, partly because the JFTC was able to show the legislator the substantial difference between a leniency programme and plea bargaining and the possibility of introducing a leniency programme without it claiming any discretion. The leniency programme without discretion has led to useless leniency applications, not enabling the JFTC to pursue an investigation or obliging the JFTC to grant lenient treatment without getting full information. As the JFTC considered the latter problem, the leniency programme was amended in 2019.

The authors of this chapter argue that the Chinese legislator has infused a dose of trust and predictability into its leniency programme. The trust was necessary because not all enforcement agencies in China, of which the National Development and Reform Commission is most often singled out, applied due process during their investigation. Furthermore, predictability was required because the existing leniency programmes, one for price-related cartels and one for non-price-related cartels, gave too much discretion to the enforcement agencies. As a result of the lack of due process or predictability, the outcomes of investigations were uncertain. This chapter will show that, by reconfiguring the enforcement structure, both elements are addressed. There is one condition for the new leniency programme to be more effective. The new enforcement agency, the State Administration for Market Regulation, which has elaborated the new leniency programme, should ensure transparency in its decision making.

This chapter sheds light on the international organisations that have been active in proliferating leniency programmes. This contribution includes the efforts of the OECD, ICN, UNCTAD and ASEAN. For each of these organisations, the chapter argues that they have a tendency to look for the common elements among existing leniency programmes and present them as an international guideline or best practice. When the existing leniency programmes diverge, the international guideline or best practice is to offer options. By not further clarifying these options, the chapter holds, the international organisations do no more than summarise local practices and pull them outside of their context. Due to this practice, convergence is unlikely to happen because, when the international guidelines or best practices are consulted, there will be an automatic reflex to also consult existing local practices and the existing literature regarding those practices.

This chapter investigates the 2019 amendment of the Japanese leniency programme. The authors’ approach starts by observing that the old leniency programme may have substantially contributed neither to detecting nor to deterring cartels. The question, therefore, is whether the new leniency programme, whereby the amount of reduction of the leniency programme is drastically lowered for subsequent applicants but which can be compensated by entering a consultation process with the JFTC regarding the information to be submitted, is able to address the limitations of the old leniency programme. The chapter concludes that this may not be the case, since the changes to the leniency programme only address the potential of subsequent leniency applications. Nothing is done to attract better leniency applications from the start. To increase deterrence, the authors therefore investigate whether there is still some possibility of tweaking the sanctions in order to compensate for what the leniency programme cannot yet achieve.

This chapter is an introduction to the book. The chapter therefore starts with introducing the practical necessity for a leniency programme and the first use of a leniency programme in the United States. After this, the focus shifts to Asia. The chapter indicates that competition law in Asia is a relatively recent phenomenon, which, in turn, has had an impact on the implementation of the leniency programme in Asia. Since the Asian countries, more specifically China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines, saw the success of the leniency programme in other jurisdictions, their embrace of the leniency programme was not only fast but also recent. This means that these leniency programmes have not yet been researched against the existing theoretical literature.

The concluding chapter argues that the Asian leniency programmes only converge on the core elements of a leniency programme. The core elements are the building blocks of a leniency programme. However, the composition of these blocks is often different. Some of the differences are subtle. Other differences make the respective leniency programme distinct from the others. Some of the distinctive elements are not necessarily part of the building blocks any more and thus give a unique character to the respective leniency programme. This chapter further claims that these differences can be explained by either the political economy of a country, experimentation due to prior negative enforcement results and a desire to achieve better enforcement results, or foreign influence. Since the result of experimentation cannot always be predicted, the authors estimate that further amendments will be made to the Asian leniency programmes.

This chapter introduces one of the more recent leniency programmes in Asia. Due to the dual enforcement structure, the Philippines has developed two different leniency programmes, one administered by the Philippine Competition Commission and one by the Office for Competition of the Department of Justice (DOJ-OFC). Whereas the latter is only applicable in criminal proceedings, the former applies to administrative, criminal and civil proceedings. The chapter argues that both leniency programmes are generous. However, discretionary powers of the enforcement agencies and the possibility of carving employees out of the leniency application diminish the attractiveness of leniency programmes. Uncertainty about the outcome of a leniency application has, in general, not been well accepted by cartel participants. It can therefore be predicted that, no matter how generous the leniency programmes are, there will be no race to the enforcement agencies’ doors.