IOM wields power over individuals and is capable of violating their rights, for instance when it contributes to migrant detention operations or when it engages in migrant returns that are ‘voluntary under compulsion’. This chapter assesses IOM’s legal human rights accountability in three steps. First, IOM’s human rights obligations are identified. While there has been much debate about their proper source, there is today little doubt that organizations such as IOM as have at least a core bundle of human rights obligations. The second step is to identify and analyze the mechanisms that may potentially hold IOM to account for violations of its human rights obligations. I identify the Office of the Inspector General and domestic courts as the only two IOM human rights accountability mechanisms, and analyze their rules on access, participation, neutrality, and outcomes using doctrinal legal methodology. Third, I assess the sufficiency of these two accountability mechanisms, in light of the right to an effective remedy and procedural justice research. The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of IOM’s human rights accountability, and some thoughts on potential avenues for reform.

This chapter establishes a framework for the analyis and assessment of the accountability mechanisms of international organizations. I establish a definition of IO accountability mechanisms, as well as a detailed taxonomy of them. I also propose a normative framework for assessing the sufficiency of IO accountability mechanisms, based on the right to remedy and procedural justice research. From these two strands of theory, I establish concrete normative yardsticks for assessing four aspects of IO accountability mechanisms: Access, Voice, Neutrality, and Outcome.

In this chapter the framework developed in Chapter 3 is applied to the UNHCR practice of administering refugee camps. I discuss how the UNHCR thus exercises power over individuals, both directly through its personel and through its so-called implementing partners. The sources of the UNHCR’s human rights obligations are also identified. Thereafter, I turn to assessing the applicable accountability mechanisms: the UNHCR Inspector General’s Office, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, and domestic courts. Neither of these mechanisms provide sufficient accountability.

In this chapter I apply the framework developed in Chapter 3 to the first case study, namely the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy missions. This case study focuses on two such mission in particular: NAVFOR Atalanta and EULEX Kosovo. The structure of both missions and their potential for human rights violations is discussed, before turning to the applicable accountability mechanisms. These include the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Ombudsman, domestic courts, and EULEX Kosovo’s Human Rights Review Panel. The overall assessment is that the accountability mechanisms applicable to CSDP missions are insufficient.

In this chapter I apply the framework developed in Chapter 3 to the ICC Detention Centre. The chapter opens with an overview of who the ICC detains, and how the Detention Centre is managed. Then I identify the human rights obligations of the ICC and discuss the potential for human rights violations in connection with ICC detention. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to the myriad of accountability mechanisms available to ICC detainees: the administrative appeals procedure, pre-trial and appeals chambers, the Independent Oversight Mechanism, and domestic courts. Despite some promising aspects, these accountability mechanisms are also insufficient.

This chapter introduces the topic in four steps. First, by explaining the research design. Second, by explaining the methodology applied. Third, by discussing a few key aspects related to the sources of law applied. Fourt, the chapter concludes with a section on the concept accountability, and how it can be applied to the relationship between international organizations and individuals.

In this concluding chapter I first summarize the key findings across the three case studies, and offer an overall conclusion to the research question posed in the introduction. I also discuss some hypotheses, generated from the case study findings, which may explain the variations between cases and the variations between different types of accountability mechanisms. Finally, I sketch out some aspects of a reform agenda.